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God may or may not be dead, but Ronald McDonald
surely is immortal. There will be burgers forever!
Ronald Revisited:

<

Jon Carroll
The World of Ronald McDonald
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
His appearance on a Saturday afternoon drew 5,000
excitable visitors in a mere two hours.
fidgety and noisy.

The audience was

The manager called them a mob.

six police to keep the crowd under control.
rock concert?

It took

Teenagers at a

No, merely a visit by Ronald McDonald to one

of the more than 11,000 restaurants operated or franchised
out by the McDonald's Corporation. 1

Since 1948, when

brothers Richard and Maurice McDonald unveiled their fastfood prototype in San Bernardino, California, McDonald's has
been selling Americans on the cleanliness of its kitchens,
the speed and efficiency of its service, and the
wholesomeness of its image. 2
of these entreaties.

America's children heard none

A likable, carrot-haired clown invited

them to visit "his house" and have fun.

That they heard,

and they came by the millions.
Even McDonald's was surprised at Ronald's popularity.
McDonald's
Newsletter"
(May
1967),
McDonald's
Corporation Archives, Elk Grove Village, Illinois.
This
specific visit occurred on April 28, 1967, in Wilmington,
Delaware.
111

2 In

referring to the marketing, financial, or operational
functions of the corporation as a whole, the third person
singular 11 it 11 is used. The third person plural, "they, them,
their," is used in cases where the reference is to individual
units or licensees, rather than to the overall corporation.

2

originally created in 1963 as a regional, short-term
advertising gimmick, the literally colorful clown has even
overshadowed the equally colorful character of Ray Kroc.
Kroc became the guiding hand of McDonald's after he signed
on as the McDonald brothers' exclusive licensing agent in
1954.

That Ronald is so popular, however, is strong

testimony to a dramatic shift in child consumption patterns
in the years following World War II.

Children as young as

three and four, mere preschoolers, began to participate in
everyday purchasing decisions for the family.

They whined--

or begged, bargained, or cajoled--to go to McDonald's and
their parents, overworked and attracted by the new
convenience and ease of eating out, acquiesced.
Children constituted a significant consumer niche in
three ways.

First, they directly purchased items

themselves; a function that increased as the children
matured.

Second, they influenced parental purchases, either

through active requests or by their natural liking or
disliking of certain products.

Most importantly, however,

children eventually matured into full-fledged consumers
whose brand loyalties, advertisers hoped, continued into
adulthood. 3
McDonald's marketing message reached children at all
three levels.

3 charles

The message took such root that parents drove

Hull Wolfe, Modern Radio Advertising (New York:
Funk & Wagnalls and Printers' Ink, 1949), 175.

3

out of their way to avoid passing the local McDonald's. 4
By the late 1960s, children became McDonald's prime
marketing target as the corporation battled against
competitors Burger King, Burger Chef, and newcomer Wendy's.
To insure its success, McDonald's developed a threefold marketing program based on an image of McDonald's as
fun, an image of Ronald as friend, and an image of the
corporation as wholesome and benevolent.

While Ronald

attracted the children, the perception of McDonald's as
wholesome reassured parents.
In an era characterized by fears of teenage crime,
communists, and the atom bomb, drive-in restaurants bore the
stigma of delinquency.

In contrast, McDonald's prohibited

teenage rowdiness and aggressively positioned itself as a
safe and sanctioned outlet for young children.

Like Walt

Disney, whose animated fairy tales sanitized film
consumption for youngsters (nickelodeons were notoriously
uneven in their appropriateness for young audiences), Ray
Kroc made McDonald's culturally ''safe" for children.
Most importantly, McDonald's actively and consciously
pushed down the age at which children assumed a significant
consumer function.

Before Ronald McDonald, a three-year-old

was simply not considered a consumer.

4 Dictaphone

Children that young,

memo from Dick McDonald to Ray Kroc (October
1957), reprinted in The Legacy Series, dictaphone tape
transcript (Oak Brook, IL: McDonald's Corporation, 1988), 1617.

4

little more than babies, were thought incapable of the
discrimination necessary to developing brand loyalty, a prerequisite to the consumer socialization process. 5

Food

products, especially cereals and candies, and toy gadgets
sold via radio and comic book advertising, targeted
youngsters aged seven and older.

Comic books, by

definition, required a literate audience.

And children's

radio serials extended beyond the attention span of restless
and visually-oriented toddlers and preschoolers.

But

McDonald's succeeded in encouraging a friendship between
Ronald McDonald and youngsters using the medium most suited
for very young children, television.
Television perfectly met McDonald's marketing needs.
As analyzed by Vance Packard, television became the most
modern medium for the creation and fulfillment of the desire

5 Exactly

how children develop consumerization skills is
still debated.
The most convincing theory posits that a
child's processing of consumer information is dependent upon
his/her cognitive level, with a child reaching substantive
consumer awareness skills by ages eight or nine. Scott Ward,
Daniel B. Wackman, and Ellen Wartella, How Children Learn to
Buy:
The Development of Consumer Information-Processing
Skills
(Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications, 1977), 23,
178. Texas A & M marketing professor James McNeal, however,
suggests that parents' modelling of their own purchasing
habits, rather than the child's cognitive level per se,
enables a child to evaluate and differentiate between
products. Still, McNeal's thesis tacitly parallels Ward, et
al.'s findings in concluding that a child does not possess
legitimate independent purchasing power until age seven with
the acquisition of more mature discrimination skills. James
Utah McNeal, "The Development of Consumer Behavior Patterns in
Childhood"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Texas-Austin, 1964),
8, 61, 86.

5
for consumer goods. 6

Children were especially vulnerable

to the carefree images of what was thought to constitute the
"good life" for the post-World War II family.

In 1969, for

example, Ronald McDonald reached nearly 5.5 million children
aged two through eleven through the family television set,
via network advertising on Saturday mornings. 7

McDonald's

not only saturated children's television air-time with
Ronald commercials, but scored points with parents by
sponsoring educational and family prime-time programming.
To the chagrin of its competitors, McDonald's, through
television, parlayed children's personal love and friendship
for a fantasy character into a psychologically abstract, yet
unshakable loyalty toward a corporation.
Television alone, however, does not explain the
phenomenal success of McDonald's.

The McDonald brothers,

who had tripped their way through a series of odd jobs
during the Depression and World War II, provided McDonald's
with its operational formula for success:

a limited menu

with low prices delivered through an assembly-line system.
Ray Kroc, with his often garish sales skills, then developed
an innovative franchising program that nurtured
6 vance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders

(New York: David
McKay, Inc., 1957), 31.
Packard's sinister description of
children being covertly observed by motivational researchers
who recorded the youngsters' "happy or scornful" reactions to
television programs and commercials makes McDonald's early
emphasis on philanthropy seem almost innocent by comparison.
711 McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.

(November

1969),

McDonald's

6

entrepreneurship while protecting the corporation's need for
control.

And historical timing also played a crucial role.

Fast service restaurants were not totally novel in the
late 1940s; some stands were already two decades old, a
product of earlier interest in recreational motoring.

But

automobile ownership skyrocketed after World War II and
McDonald's became one of hundreds of small, upstart
businesses across the country that greeted American families
as they made their way across the burgeoning interstate
system.
The $26 billion interstate highway system linked the
fast sprouting suburbs to each other and to the cities they
encircled. 8

Without the phenomenal pace of suburbanization

in the 1950s and 1960s, the McDonald brothers' unique fastfood assembly line would have been stillborn.

Church

steeples, manicured lawns, bicycles in the driveways, and
station wagons were what McDonald's looked for when
surveying sites for early McDonald's franchises.

With 90%

of its business coming from the child-centered "family
trade," McDonald's tapped into one of the statistically and
culturally most significant phenomena of the twentieth

8 The

$26 billion represents monies appropriated in the
Interstate Highway Act of 1956. Historically, federal aid for
highways dates back to the end of World War I.
Mark Rose,
Interstate:
Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989, rev. ed.
(Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 8.

7

century:

the Baby Boom. 9

over 82 million children were born between 1945 and
1965, a demographic bulge that reversed a steadying decline
in the birth rate since 1900.

Looking for growing room and

eager to unwind after the tense years of Depression and war,
American families flocked to the suburbs, creating
communities geared, almost exclusively, to the raising of
children.

Postwar Americans confidently pointed to a

bustling domestic economy and eagerly embraced the newest
consumer goods, many of which catered to the needs of Baby
Boom youngsters.
As a corporation that found its niche catering to
America's youngest consumers, McDonald's reflected the
changes endemic to American society after World War II.
McDonald's solicitousness toward children mimicked the
doting behavior of their own parents.

Its wholesome image

netted almost instantaneous popularity and attested to
American families' dual needs for convenience and security.
Dubbing its hamburger, fries, and shake the "All-American
Meal," McDonald's capitalized on the patriotic boosterism of
the Cold War years.

Serving millions of meals annually in a

"patty-to-patron production line," McDonald's and its sleek
stainless steel interiors epitomized what Alfred Chandler

911 McDonald's:

Supplement to 1965 Annual Report,"
publicity brochure, 9, McDonald's Corporation Archives; Ray
Kroc, "Appealing to a Mass Market, " interview by Nation's
Business 56, no. 7 (July 1968): 73.

8

labelled the "modern business enterprise." 1

°

Finally, Ray

Kroc's hybrid franchising system successfully merged both
small-scale entrepreneurship and corporate conformity,
proving that the two polarities could be harmonized.

Thus,

a study of McDonald's becomes a prism both to analyze the
disparate social changes of the postwar decades and to view
their convergence under the golden arches.
Chapter 2 of this study examines the corporate history
of McDonald's, especially the contributions of the McDonald
brothers who delivered to Ray Kroc in 1955 a unique food
concept in its infancy.

Kroc "raised" McDonald's, even

protectively referred to it as "my baby," and instilled in
it his own unshakable belief in the American capitalist
system. 11
Chapter 3 takes a step back, analyzing McDonald's
precursors both in the convenience food industry and in the
marketing of consumer products to children.

McDonald's

corporate success drew upon the licensing experiences of
earlier roadside eateries, particularly that of Howard

10Max Boas and Steve Chain,

Big Mac:
The Unauthorized
Story of McDonald's (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1976), 23; Alfred
D. Chandler, Jr., The
Visible Hand:
The Managerial
Revolution in American Business
(Cambridge, MA:
Belknap
Press, 1977).
McDonald's exceeded Chandler's definition by
vertically integrating not only production and distribution,
but consumption as well, highlighting the importance of the
consumer whom Chandler glosses over.
11 Ray

Kroc, "I'm the Hamburger Man," interview by Julie
Woodman and Judy Shoen,
Institutions:
Volume Feeding
Management 71 (15 September 1972): 73.

9

Johnson's.

Similarly, McDonald's co-opted a host of proven

child marketing strategies developed by periodical and radio
advertisers since the 1890s.

Unlike the earlier child

marketers, however, McDonald's targeted an unprecedentedly
young audience for its products.

Thus, children aged three

to sixteen provide the focal point for this analysis of
child consumerism, with the major emphasis on the youngest
of these children.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 analyze McDonald's relationship to
children during the 1950s and 1960s.

Chapter 4 examines the

dominant social and cultural trends of these immediate
postwar decades and firmly situates McDonald's within the
context of an increasingly populous and suburban, yet
psychologically insecure consumer society.

McDonald's

marketing strategy from 1955 to 1963, that is, the years
prior to the creation of Ronald McDonald, forms the focus
for Chapter 5.

These years marked the emergence of

philanthropy as a marketing tool, at first on a small scale
and later expanding to a largess of billions of dollars.
Chapter 6 focuses on Ronald McDonald, who created an image
of McDonald's as fun and solidified McDonald's leadership in
the children's market.
The wholesome image of McDonald's, so carefully
nurtured by Ray Kroc since 1955, had, by 1980, become almost
irreparably sullied.

Chapter 7 examines the changing social

and political climate surrounding McDonald's during the

10
1970s and 1980s when a plunging birthrate forced McDonald's
to question its marketing commitment to children.

Chapter 8

details McDonald's recommitment to the children's market,
marked by a program of aggressive television advertising
that incurred the wrath of children's advocacy groups.
Finally, Chapter 9 offers some concluding analysis on
the role of McDonald's in the growing consumerism of
children, including children worldwide, and updates the
study to the present time.
as well.

This chapter looks at beginnings

It plants the seeds for further research and

offers an answer to the critics who decry child consumerism
as immoral or unethical.
Comments on Sources
In the past forty years, McDonald's has deliberately
molded an image of itself as a cultural institution, in the
vein of Sears, Roebuck earlier in this century.

Conscious

of its own history, McDonald's has developed an extensive
archival collection; it is this original source material
that forms the research core of this analysis.
Notable among the vast array of archival documents
examined are McDonald's monthly newsletters to all licensees
and the on-going editions of its "Marketing Manual."

The

"McDonald's Newsletter" clearly charts the corporation's
increasing interest in children from both a consumer and
philanthropic point of view.

Reflecting McDonald's own

evolution, the earliest years of the "Newsletter" stressed

11
basic operational concerns (equipment maintenance and food
supply and preparation) while the later years' issues
focused on advertising, public relations, and protecting the
image of McDonald's.

The various "Marketing Manuals,"

updated irregularly, hone the use of corporate philanthropy
as a marketing tool.

Together, the "Newsletters" and the

"Marketing Manuals" reveal how the evolving persona of
Ronald McDonald, from gimmick to friend, mirrored the
corporation's own increasingly complex commitment to
children.
Complementing the documentary archival material are the
dozens of McDonald's commercials collected by McDonald's
Archives.

These commercials aired on network television

from the late 1960s, when McDonald's intensified its efforts
at securing the children's market, to 1985--the terminus of
this study.

Primarily one-minute spots, these commercials

provide the mental meeting place for the dialogue between
Ronald McDonald and American youngsters.

It is here that

children are told that McDonald's is fun, that they and
their parents "deserve a break," and that all that
McDonald's does is done "for you."

Thus, they are an

important means of communication for both clown and
corporation.
Secondary source material included books and articles
specifically about McDonald's and more general works which
examined the expanding consumer function of children.

In

12
1983, Bowling Green University Popular Press published
Ronald Revisited:

The World of Ronald McDonald, updated

from the 1978 version and both edited by Marshall
Fishwick. 12

An eclectic anthology, the essays examined

McDonald's primarily from a material culture perspective,
with anthropological and ethnographic themes predominant
over historical ones.

Although Fishwick supplied an

introductory essay on the origins of clowning and Ronald
McDonald graces both title and cover of the work, there is
very little analysis of Ronald and, surprisingly, almost
nothing on children.
An analysis of McDonald's operations and corporate
history is John F. Love's McDonald's Behind the Arches. 13
Drawing upon the hundreds of interviews he conducted with
McDonald's corporate employees, suppliers, and licensees,
Love, a former editor of BusinessWeek, credited Ray Kroc
with creating a new form of franchising that minimizes
investors' risk.
Ray Kroc's own 1977 autobiography, Grinding It Out:
The Making of McDonald's, portrayed a salesman in a lifelong quest to fulfill the American capitalist promise of

12 Marshall Fishwick, ed., Ronald Revisited:

Ronald McDonald, rev. ed. (Bowling Green, OH:
University Popular Press, 1983).
13 John F. Love, McDonald's:

Bantam Books, 1986).

The World of
Bowling Green

Behind the Arches (New York:

13

becoming a self-made millionaire. 14

While occasionally

self-promoting, Kroc offered an insider's vision of
McDonald's place on the American cultural landscape, a
vision that continues to guide the corporation ten years
after Kroc's death.
McDonald's has changed the way Americans share their
traditional family meals.

John and Karen Hess' The Taste of

America provided insight into the nutritional debate
surrounding McDonald's in the 1970s and 1980s, though it
glossed over McDonald's broader social import. 15
Conversely, Joanne Finkelstein, in Dining Out:

A Sociology

of Modern Manners, correctly sensed that what McDonald's was
peddling was not only hamburgers and convenience but, more
important psychologically, a "sense of family unity.

1116

It was a unity that was cemented by the children, who
comprised the chief target audience for McDonald's
commercials.
Children all too often are seen as the recipients of
historical change, rather than as its agents.

Their

marginal power status dilutes their real significance and,
in the case of McDonald's, is deceptive.

Although

14 Ray Kroc with Robert Anderson,

Grinding It out:
The
Making of McDonald's (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1977;
reprint, Chicago: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987).
15 John

L.
and Karen Hess,
The Taste of America
(Greensboro, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).
16 Joanne

Manners

Finkelstein, Dining Out: A Sociology of Modern
(New York: New York University Press, 1989), 4.

14

McDonald's directed its earliest advertising at parents
through focused images of the restaurants' cleanliness,
convenience, and value, it simultaneously equated McDonald's
with "fun."

By the late 1960s, advertising primarily to

parents gave way as McDonald's went full throttle after the
children's market.
The filtering down of consumer behavior to a
preschooler level requires the child to prematurely assume
adult behavior patterns.
Growing Up in America:

Psychologist Joshua Meyrowitz, in
Historical Experiences, examined the

maturation process of post-World War II children and
concluded that television, McDonald's primary advertising
medium, has substantially flattened out the social
differences between adults and children.

By exposing

children to adult situations, including consumerism,
television has diminished the reality of childhood as
distinctively innocent. 17
generation of children,

Looking at an earlier
Small Worlds: Children and

Adolescents in America, 1850-1950, edited by Elliott West
and Paula Petrik, concluded that consumer behavior by
youngsters was widespread even before World War rr. 18
17 Joshua

Meyrowitz,
"The Adultlike Child and the
Childlike Adult:
Socialization in an Electronic Age," in
Harvey J. Graff, ed. Growing Up in America:
Historical
Experiences (Detroit, MI:
Wayne State University Press,
1987): 612-31.
18

Elliott West and Paula Petrik, eds., Small Worlds:
Children and Adolescents in America, 1850-1950 (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 1992).

CHAPTER 2
AN AMERICAN PHENOMENON
We're going to mow them down . . . . Look, it
is ridiculous to call this an industry. This
is not. This is rat eat rat, dog eat dog.
I'll kill 'em, and I'm going to kill 'em
before they kill me. You're talking about
the American way of survival of the
fittest. 1
Ray Kroc, Institutions:

Ray Kroc took his business seriously.

Volume Feeding

Although neither

he nor the McDonald brothers initially intended to change
history, Kroc was justified when he told McDonald's
shareholders in 1966 that "I sincerely believe that what we
[have] created is an institution.

112

With 1992 sales of

nearly $21.9 billion dollars, McDonald's Corporation has
peddled more than 80 billion hamburgers to consumers in the
United States and in 66 foreign countries, making it one of
the most recognized brands in this country and in the

1

Ray Kroc, "I'm the Hamburger Man," interview by Julie
Woodman and Judy Shoen,
Institutions:
Volume Feeding 71
(15 September 1972): 73.
2

Quoted in "McDonald's Newsletter"
(June 1966),
McDonald's Corporation Archives.
Kroc frequently used this
and similar lines in his public speeches and interviews.
16

17
world. 3
Before it became a "phenomenon" and a force for
cultural change, however, McDonald's had to distinguish
itself from the hundreds of eclectic drive-ins that dotted
post-World War II America.

This task required the unique

and combined contributions first of Richard and Maurice
McDonald, and, later, of Ray Kroc.

The McDonald brothers,

long fascinated by Henry Ford's streamlining success,
contributed the technological creativity that allowed
McDonald's to serve patrons a full meal in two minutes or
less.

Ray Kroc's creativity lay in his marketing skills,

honed through peddling everything from ribbons, to paper
cups, to Florida swampland.

Though often at odds with each

other--McDonald's Corporation frequently referred to Kroc as
its "founder," ignoring the brothers altogether--Kroc drew
upon Richard and Maurice McDonald's contributions in
creating what he later called his "personal monument to
capitalism.

114

Maurice (Mac) McDonald was born in 1900.
brother Richard (Dick) arrived in 1908.

His younger

Like Kroc, they

were American-born sons of immigrant parents.

Their parents

hailed from Ireland and settled in Manchester, New
3 McDonald's

Corporation Annual Report, 1992, McDonald's
Corporation Archives. Figures are for 1992.
4 Ray

Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out:
The
1977;
Making of McDonald's
(Chicago:
Henry Regnery,
reprint, Chicago: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 61. Page
references are to the reprint edition.

18
Hampshire, where their father worked in a shoe factory. The
senior Mr. McDonald evidently did quite well for himself as
both his sons were able to graduate from high school, still
a rarity for working class youth of the time.
prosperity did not last long.

The family's

By 1930, economic hard times

had taken a toll on Manchester's economy.

With his father

newly unemployed and no future prospects for himself, Mac
McDonald moved to California and found work in the fledgling
moving-picture trade in Hollywood. 5
The 1920s were robust years for the upstart industry
and even the browbeaten economy of the 1930s proved friendly
to the movies.

Dick McDonald soon joined his brother and

together they set up the cumbersome lighting and movie sets
needed on Hollywood's back lots. 6

Whatever their later

differences with Kroc, the McDonald brothers were equally
reaching for success, measured for them in owning their own
business. 7

In less than ten years, the brothers opened and

shuttered a movie theater, an orange juice stand, and a hot
dog concession.

There was opportunity in California's

burgeoning numbers--population increased over 87% between
1920 and 1940--but exactly where to find it eluded them,
5 John

York:

F. Love, McDonald's:
Bantam Books, 1986), 10.

Behind

the

Arches

(New

6Ellen Graham, "McDonald's Pickle:
He Began Fast Food
But Gets No Credit," Wall Street Journal, 15 August 1991,
sec. A, 1; Love, McDonald's Behind the Arches, 10;
Kroc
Grinding It Out, 70.
7 Love, McDonald's:

Behind the Arches, 10.

19
until 1937. 8
Then, the brothers teamed up with a local barbecue cook
and opened a small carhop drive-in restaurant in Arcadia,
near the Santa Anita racetrack.

Their customers, mostly the

regulars and tourists who visited the track, proved to the
brothers that the drive-in format had the potential for
success. 9

Other upstart businessmen were realizing the

same thing.

In 1932, the Pig Stand, recognized widely as

the first carhop drive-in, had debuted on the corner of
Sunset and Vermont in Hollywood. 10

By the early 1940s,

dozens of drive-ins dotted the major car routes on the West
Coast.

While some, like Carpenter's and Herbert's in Los

Angeles, were elaborate businesses complete with training
films for carhops, the majority were little more than
shacks. 11
In 1940, the brothers secured a· $5,000 loan from the
Bank of America and unveiled their new, bigger drive-in
8 Ibid.;

J. Kenneth Props, "The Tapes:
R.A.K. [Ray
Allen Kroc]
Remembered,"
23
January
1984,
McDonald's
Corporation Archives, 2-3.
Props is McDonald's informal
company historian.
He started with McDonald's in 1962 as a
real estate representative and became director of licensing
in 1970.
Although he did not serve under the McDonald
brothers, his research fills in many of the gaps of
McDonald's earliest years under the McDonald brothers; U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States, 1946 (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1946), table 6, pp. 6-7.
9 Kroc,

Grinding It Out, 70.

10 Love, McDonald's:

11 Ibid.' 10-11.

Behind the Arches, 11.

20
restaurant in San Bernardino. 12

Little more than a desert

town, San Bernardino was sixty miles east of Los Angeles,
where much of the earliest drive-in trade centered.

The

McDonalds' new drive-in, an octagonal shaped building, was
built with stainless steel and glass exterior walls and a
fully exposed kitchen, in keeping with the "circular
orthodoxy" of drive-in architectural design. 13

It also

took full advantage of San Bernardino's location.
Sitting at the end of Route 66, San Bernardino was the
gateway to the San Bernardino National Forest, the Death
Valley National Monument, and Palm Springs.

In the 1930s

and 1940s, it held the world's largest navel orange center
and was studded with manufacturing, retailing, mining, and
railroad industries.

In 1948, the city was on the verge of

a massive population growth.

Between 1950 and 1960,

population rose nearly 80% to over 800,000 people. 14

A

steady increase in suburbanization over the previous two
decades resulted in more than one-third of San Bernardino's

12 Kroc,

Grinding It Out, 70.

13 Harry

E.
Werner,
"Drive-In
Restaurants
and
Luncheonettes," Architectural Record 100 (September 1946):
105;
Jeffrey
L.
Meikle,
Twentieth
Century
Limited:
Industrial Design in America,
1925-1939
(Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1979), 171-72.
14

u. s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1965
(Washington, DC:
U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1965), table 12, pp. 17-18.
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residents living in suburban communities by 1959. 15

In

1948, these changes were still nascent, however, and
McDonald's earliest customers were tourists and workingclass laborers.

Within a decade, San Bernardino proved

itself "one of the West's and the country's, least
ballyhooed and most underrated markets.

1116

Dick and Mac McDonald had found a winner in their San
Bernardino restaurant.

They featured twenty-five different

menu items, specializing in ribs barbecued on an open pit in
the rear lot of the building.

By 1948, the drive-in

registered annual sales of over $200,000 and the brothers
comfortably split the $50,000 to $75,000 they were clearing
in profits.

But they were still dissatisfied with their

business. 1 7
Many of the drive-in's problems centered around their
female carhops.

Decked out in majorette costumes, the girls

attracted as much attention as did the food.

"Oh, what a

headache they were," Dick McDonald later remembered.

"The

fry cooks were always trying to date the carhops," and if
they were snubbed, they [the cooks] dallied filling the food
orders. 18

Customer complaints swelled on weekends when as

1511 Advertisers'

Guide
to
Marketing
Printers' Ink, 30 October 1959, 187-89.

for

16 Ibid.

17 Love, McDonald's Behind the Arches,
18 Ibid.,

12-13.

12; Graham, "McDonald's Pickle," 1.

1960,"
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many as 125 autos vied for both parking spaces and service
from the twenty carhops employed by Dick and Mac
McDonald. 19

The McDonald brothers were not alone in their

carhop troubles.

Other drive-ins were also experimenting

with eliminating carhops.

A 1949 BusinessWeek article

previewed the opening of the "Motormat" drive-in in Los
Angeles.

Plagued by slow carhops and customer complaints,

the Motormat used radiating conveyor belts to transport
meals to its customers, taking on the appearance of an
unwieldy, mechanical octopus. 20
Dick and Mac McDonald's solution was equally radical.
In the autumn of 1948, the brothers shut the door on their
money-making restaurant.

Autumn was typically a slower

season for drive-ins and the profitable summer season just
past gave the brothers the necessary capital for the
conversion they proposed.

Three months later, the McDonald

brothers' San Bernardino drive-in reopened as the first
modern fast-food restaurant.
Since the early 1930s when they opened their first food
stand, Dick and Mac McDonald, like other food entrepreneurs,
had been looking for a better way to prepare and serve food.
Even with rising sales, the average carhop could only handle
six cars simultaneously and it was difficult to extract

19 Graham,
2011 Eating

"McDonald's Pickle," 1.

on Assembly Line
BusinessWeek, 23 July 1949, 23.

at

California

Drive-In,"

23

profits from low-priced food when coupled with the high
employee costs. 21

Long fascinated by Henry Ford's

streamlining of automobile production, the brothers
deliberately adapted Ford's principles of standardization,
assembly-line procedures, and division of labor to create
their own modern experimental restaurant. 22

Applying "a

manufacturing style of thinking to a people-intensive
service" business, they modified every phase of their
operations. 23
First, they fired all the carhops.

That single action

addressed many of the brothers' frustrations, but created a
new dilemma of how to serve the food.

They found their

solution in converting the drive-in to a self-service
format, similar in concept to a cafeteria, with patrons
placing and picking up their own orders at several counters.
In three months, the brothers redesigned the kitchen layout
and equipment and retrained the few male employees they
needed to service the counters.

The most important aspect

the McDonald brothers redesigned, however, was their menu.
21 werner,

"Drive-In

Restaurants

and

Luncheonettes,"

100.
22 By

1940, the word "streamlining" connoted efficiency,
economy, and order, rather than its more precise definition
of "bringing distribution in line with production."
In
revamping their San Bernardino unit, the brothers responded
to
both the
denotative
and
connotative meanings
of
"streamlining." Meikle, Twentieth Century Limited, 179-80.
23 Theodore

Levitt,
"Production-line
Approach
to
Service," Harvard Business Review (September-October 1972):
45; Love, McDonald's Behind the Arches, 13.

24

The brothers chose a limited menu, much as Ford had limited
the options available on his Model T.

The efficiency of

this streamlined food preparation system resulted in a
lowering of operating costs for McDonald's and a decrease in
prices for its customers.

The result was a fifteen-cent

hamburger, an outrageously low price even for the 1940s.
The new McDonald's opened in December, 1948 to a flurry
of activity, but their customers were more than a little
confused.

They would "sit out front in their cars and honk

their horns . . . . They missed the carhops.

1124

The

drive-in's teenage patrons especially disliked the new
system and soon deserted McDonald's in search of the more
"traditional" carhop format.
not have been more pleased.

The McDonald brothers could
Teenage customers had always

been a second source of headaches for Dick and Mac McDonald.
Rowdy teenagers hot rodding their cars or motorcycles lent
an unsavory image to burgeoning drive-ins across the
country.

The teens loitered in the parking lots until late

in the evening, both attracting the attention of police and
discouraging families from stopping for a meal.

By 1948,

McDonald's was San Bernardino's "number one teenage hangout"
and the purchases the teens made simply did not compensate
for all the trouble necessary to keep them in line. 25

In

their newly redesigned restaurant, the brothers prohibited
24 Graham,

25 Ibid.

"McDonald's Pickle," 1.

25

loitering and posted private security guards to enforce
their "no hot rodding" rule.

The teens soon left.

With the

teens gone, the McDonald brothers happily welcomed those who
would become their most loyal consumers, the American
family.
In a telling omen of the future, the brothers' first
customer in their revamped drive-in was a young girl buying
a sack of hamburgers for the family dinner. 26

For every

teenage patron they lost, McDonald's gained a mother,
father, and two or three children.

Desiring convenience,

Mom and Dad found it in McDonald's quick and efficient
service.

Indeed, the real innovation of the brothers' new

system was to pre-grill the hamburgers based on a general
knowledge of how many burgers would be needed each hour.
The vigorous volume of patrons assured that no burger was
left standing for more than a few minutes.

Speed became the

key word in the revamped drive-in with the goal of filling
orders in "20 seconds rather than 20 minutes." 27

A small

hamburger-like man nicknamed "Speedee" became the
restaurant's new symbol and his smiling face matched the

26 Love,

McDonald's:
Behind the Arches, 16.
Love is
quoting McDonald's employee Art Bender, who was working the
counter window that day.
Dick McDonald agrees that the
first customer was a young girl, nine or ten years old, but
claims she purchased a ten-cent bag of fries.
But since
french fries were first added to the menu in 1949, a year
after the modified drive-in reopened, Bender's recollection
is likely more accurate. Graham, "McDonald's Pickle"'" 1.
27 Graham,

"McDonald's Pickle," 1.

26
brothers' own smiles as they watched their sales rise on a
cardboard thermometer placed in the window. 28
Although the fifteen-cent hamburger immediately became
popular with the family trade, its preposterously low price
also attracted the competition's attention.

The first

reaction of nearby drive-in managers was disbelief and
cynicism as they patiently waited for "dreamers" Dick and
Mac McDonald to go bankrupt operating a restaurant with only
pennies of profit on each item.

But the low price proved a

strong marketing edge against the other, less efficiently
operated drive-ins which were charging twice the amount.
What the cynics failed to account for was the enormous
volume of burgers sold.

Pennies of profit quickly added up

to thousands of dollars and McDonald's rapidly recouped the
costs of conversion and racked up solid profits.
The restaurant's extraordinary success prompted Dick
and Mac McDonald to join the franchising craze of the postWorld War II years.

Between 1945 and 1960, over 100,000

franchised outlets opened in the United States "selling
everything from hot dogs to water systems.

1129

Unlike the

28 The

McDonald brothers, continually irked over the
years that their contributions to the corporation's success
had been overlooked or denied, vehemently claimed authorship
of the thermometer idea.
The Corporation had casually
attributed the invention to Ray Kroc.
Graham, "McDonald's
Pickle," 1.
29 Thomas

S.
Dicke,
Franchising in America:
The
Development of a Business Method, 1940-1980 (Chapel Hill,
NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 126.
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earlier franchise push in the 1920s, typified by automobile
dealerships, franchising in the 1950s sold rights to an
entire business format, instead of merely a specific
product. 30

Thus, what the McDonald brothers pitched was

their system of efficiency, cost control, and limited menu,
rather than the specific recipes for their hamburgers and
fries.

Although savvy as fast-food restaurateurs, Dick and

Mac McDonald were both naive and inept at the franchising
game.
The McDonald brothers undermined their own franchising
efforts by unwittingly helping their competitors who had
shunned their initial skepticism and raced to duplicate the
brothers' formula for fast-food success.

Dick and Mac

McDonald graciously offered tours of the octagonal
restaurant and openly explained the rationale and
construction of the specially designed grills and fryers.
The brothers naively revealed their trade secrets before any
franchising agreements were signed or royalties paid and,
thus, were victimized by unscrupulous competitors who used
the brothers' ideas without offering compensation.

The

brothers were excited at their innovative solution to the
carhop problem, however, and innocently assumed they could
be equally successful at franchising. After the copycat
drive-ins appeared, the brothers admitted their franchising
inexperience and, in 1952, hired agent William Tansey to
30

rbid.

I

7-10 I

119-22.
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spearhead the franchising of McDonald's restaurants. 31
Even then, their efforts were modest at first, concentrating
primarily on southern California. 32
The first major flood of national interest in
McDonald's resulted from an advertisement Dick McDonald
penned for the September, 1952 issue of American Restaurant
Magazine.

Ill health had forced Tansey to postpone serious

work on McDonald's and the brothers themselves continued to
promote what they dubbed the "McDonald's System."

The ad

boasted "THE NEXT 60 SECONDS MAY ALTER THE COURSE OF YOUR
ENTIRE LIFE!"

In the minute it took to read the copy, the

entire concept of "the new 'McDonald's Self Service Drive
In'--The Most Revolutionary Development in the Restaurant
Industry During the Past 50 Years!" was explained.
Hyperbole aside, the brothers themselves were skeptical that
the advertisement would generate interest outside
California.
reaction,"

We wanted "to see if there would be any
Dick McDonald later recalled.

31 The

"There was

McDonald brothers had refused an earlier off er by
the Carnation Company, their malted milk supplier, to
finance expansion.
The Carnation offer would have forced
the brothers to both choose locations and licensees and
arrange for unit construction and equipment purchases.
"We
are going to be on the road all the time, in motels, looking
for locations, finding managers, " Mac McDonald told his
brother.
"I can see .
. a headache if we go into that
type of chain."
Love, McDonald's:
Behind the Arches, 23.
Tansey, however, assumed these duties, while the brothers
handled operational training.
This they had already been
doing gratis, even for their competition.
32 Props,

"R.A.K. Remembered," 3.
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reaction to spare and we received letters and telegrams from
all over the country asking for more information. . . . This
ad was probably the shot that started the entire fast-food
business. 1133

Whether Ray Kroc saw the September, 1952

advertisement is unknown, but he had heard other rumblings
of the McDonald brothers' success and, in his own words,
"booked my fifty-two-year-old bones onto the red-eye special
and flew west (to San Bernardino] to meet my future. 1134
Kroc was no newcomer to the food industry in 1954 when he
first met Maurice and Richard McDonald.

He had been hawking

kitchen wares since 1922 and, it seemed, was destined from
the age of three to find his success selling food.
Ray Allen Kroc was born October 5, 1902 on the
southwest side of Chicago.

His father, Louis Kroc, a native

of Prague, moved to Chicago in 1888 where he worked as a
messenger boy for Western Union.

The elder Kroc studied

bookkeeping at a local Y.M.C.A. night school and, at age
fifteen, found employment with American District Telegraph
(A.D.T.) as a security guard.

Louis Kroc stayed with

A.D.T., rising in rank to manager in New York, before
returning to Chicago in 1923.

The Kroc family's finances

were toppled by the crash of 1929.

Louis Kroc "seemed to

have a Midas touch" in his speculations in real estate that
33 Richard

J. McDonald, Bedford, New Hampshire, to Fred
[Turner], McDonald's Corporation Chairman of the Board,
29 December 1983, McDonald's Corporation Archives.
34 Kroc,

Grinding It Out, 68.
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had increased the family's savings throughout the 1920s.
But "when the market collapsed," Ray Kroc later wrote, "[my
father] was crushed beneath a pile of deeds he could not
sell. 1135

His father's despondency over the family's

losses contributed to his early death of a cerebral
hemorrhage in 1930.

"On his desk the day he died were two

pieces of paper--his last paycheck from the telegraph
company and a garnishment notice for the entire amount of
his wages. 1136

Louis Kroc's vulnerability left an

indelible impression on his son, who vowed to achieve the
financial success that eluded his father.
Ray Kroc believed that perseverance and determination,
not education, led to personal and financial success.

Thus,

Kroc, an average student at best, rejected his father's
admonitions to stay in high school.

Looking for adventure,

Kroc enlisted as a member of the World War I American Red
Cross Ambulance Corps.

But his departure for France was

abruptly halted by the Armistice, and Kroc relented and
returned for one more semester of high school.

Then he

began his career as a salesman. 37
Kroc's future career as a salesman seemed like destiny,

35 Ibid.,

41-42.

36 Ibid.,

42.

37 Ibid.,

19;
Ray
Kroc,
"Lessons
of
Leadership:
Appealing to a Mass Market," interview by Nation's Business
56, no. 7 (July 1968):
72.
This is one of the better
interviews with Ray Kroc.

31

or perhaps it became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

He enjoyed

telling the tale of how, as a toddler, he was taken to a
phrenologist, Doctor V.G. Lundquist, a practitioner of the
"science" which believed in determining an individual's
character by the size, shape, and number of bumps on one's
head.

Lundquist examined three-year-old Ray in October,

1905, and prophetically announced that the child would
someday become an important salesman in the food and drink
industry.
report.

"He will make more money," Lundquist wrote in his
"He will be more successful.

to people and to himself.

1138

He will do more good

Other than several stabs at

the sidewalk juice market, however, Kroc's career as a
salesman was put on hold until after his discharge from the
Ambulance Corps.
In 1922, after a rather lackluster series of salesman
jobs peddling coffee and dry goods, Kroc settled down with
the Sanitary Cup and Service Corporation which marketed
Lily-Tulip paper cups to restaurants, schools, and
hospitals. 39

A junior salesman, Kroc's major accounts

were the drugstores, diners, and street pushcart vendors
whose sales of ice cream or flavored ice were seasonal.

In

3811 Phrenograph

by V. G. Lundquist, Doctor of Science,"
October 1905, McDonald's Corporation Archives.
39 Disposable

paper cups were a
relatively recent
invention, capitalizing on public health concerns over
disease
transmission.
Drugstore
soda
fountains
and
also
used paper cups to
serve
restaurants,
however,
individual portions of ice cream or, in larger sizes, malted
milks. Kroc, Grinding It Out, 29, 40, 43.
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the winter months, he supplemented his day job with stints
playing the piano for local Chicago radio station WGES,
private parties, and occasionally "speakeasies."

In the

winter of 1925, with a wife and baby daughter to support,
Kroc even tried his hand at selling Florida marshland, a
scheme which failed as "muckraking stories in northern
newspapers .
boom.

.

pulled the plug on our big real estate

. . What a colossal blow! " 40

Kroc stayed with Lily-Tulip cups until 1937, when he
jumped at the opportunity to own his own business.

One of

Kroc's customers, Earl Prince, co-owned a chain of Chicago
ice cream parlors called Prince Castles and had recently
invented a new kind of blender for mixing milkshakes.
Impressed by Kroc's successful record at Lily Tulip--Kroc
had worked his way up to Midwestern sales manager--Prince
offered Kroc exclusive distribution rights for the new
product, dubbed the "Multimixer. 1141

The Multimixer

provided a unique opportunity for Kroc to finally make his
mark as a salesman.

The shake market was wide open, even

after the repeal of Prohibition diminished its role as an
alternative to alcohol, and Kroc had a unique product to
sell.

An impressive stainless steel machine that looked

like an upright octopus, the Multimixer could blend as many

40 Ibid.,

41 Kroc,

32.
"Appealing to a Mass Market,"

72-73.
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as six milkshakes simultaneously. 42

Kroc lugged the

product in his oversized sample case to every drugstore and
restaurant soda fountain in Chicago.

The time and labor-

saving implications of simultaneously mixing six shakes
instead of one were obvious enough, but even Kroc did not
foresee the popularity of the new machine.

By 1950,

Prince's shake machine had become a permanent fixture in
thousands of drugstore and restaurant soda fountains across
the country and Kroc, while pleased with his financial
success, was eager for a new challenge.

The McDonald

brothers' unique food concept provided that challenge.
Two of Kroc's best customers were Dick and Mac
McDonald.

The brothers had eight Multimixers simultaneously

grinding away forty milkshakes in their newly converted San
Bernardino drive-in.

Orders for the shake machine were also

flooding in from the copycat drive-ins who hoped to
duplicate the brothers' success.

On the heels of a sales

visit to Los Angeles in 1954, Kroc rented a car and drove
out to visit the brothers.

When Kroc arrived, he saw people

lined-up the length of the parking lot, patiently waiting
for the restaurant to open.

Kroc later recounted his first

impressions of the drive-in, "It was a restaurant stripped
down to the minimum in service and menu.
42 Prince

. .

. Hamburgers,

originally designed the Multimixer as a
revolving unit with six spindles.
The frequent spilling of
shakes from the turning machine convinced Prince to later
reconfigure it as a stationary unit and to reduce the number
of spindles to five.
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fries, and beverages were prepared on an assembly line
basis, and, to the amazement of everyone . . . the thing
worked!

I felt like some latter-day Newton who'd just had

an Idaho potato caromed off his skull." 43
Kroc and the brothers discussed at length the
"McDonald's System" and their previous, rather half-hearted
efforts at local franchising.

Before ill health forced him

to relinquish the McDonald's account, agent William Tansey
had contracted for numerous additional McDonald's licenses,
only some of which had become operating units. 44

What

McDonald's lacked was a high-powered salesman who could take
control of the idea, promote it, and make it successful.

"I

give him credit," Dick McDonald admitted after Kroc's death.
"He was a dynamic guy, aggressive.

43 Kroc,
44 The

Hours meant nothing to

Grinding It Out, 66.

actual number of licenses Tansey granted versus
how many actually opened as operating units is unclear. Ken
Props,
McDonald's licensing director,
remembers eleven
licenses sold,
resulting in eight actual restaurants.
Props, "R.A.K. Remembered," 3; "Store Openings By Date and
Location (As of December 31, 1961)," McDonald's Corporation
Archives, 1.
Ray Kroc recollects only ten licenses, but
concurs that eight restaurants were operative when he took
over in 1954.
Kroc, Grinding It Out, 79.
John Love,
writing
what
McDonald's
Corporation
has
called
its
"definitive history," cites fifteen early franchises with
ten operating units. Love, McDonald's:
Behind the Arches,
22; "McDonald's Chronological History Report," 55. Rounding
out the confusion is Ellen Graham's interview with Dick
McDonald which cites twenty-one licenses granted with nine
becoming operative.
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1.
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him.

He was more enthused about the prospects than my

brother and me [sic]." 45

While they were the great

innovators behind McDonald's, the brothers had neither the
desire nor the experience to lead the charge.
Kroc found the brothers lack of dynamism disturbing;
neither brother had children, both were financially
comfortable, and neither McDonald desired the ulcerous
lifestyle of travelling salesmen. 46

"See that big white

house," Mac McDonald asked Kroc, pointing to the home that
overlooked the octagonal restaurant. "We sit out on the
porch in the evenings and watch the sunset and look down on
our place here.
problems.

It's peaceful.

We don't need any more

We are in a position to enjoy life now, and

that's just what we intend to do." 47

Dick and Mac

McDonald had accomplished their goal of financial
independence and preferred to spend their time tinkering
wi~h

improving their existing restaurants rather than with

developing new franchising contacts. 48
45 Graham,

46 Kroc,

But Kroc wanted

"McDonald's Pickle," 1.

Grinding It Out, 12.

47 Ibid.
48 one

of these "tinkerings" produced McDonald's nowfamous golden arches.
Dick McDonald designed the twentyfi ve foot neon double arches to intersect the width of the
building, newly shaped as a rectangle with red and white
"peppermint" tiled walls rather than as a stainless steel
octagon. McDonald's Corporation scaled down the arches when
they redesigned the restaurants from drive-ins to full
service units beginning in 1968.
Love, McDonald's:
Behind
the Arches, 21.
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McDonald's.

He knew the food industry intimately from his

dealings with Lily-Tulip and Multimixer customers.

The fit

was perfect and Ray Kroc convinced the McDonalds to contract
him as the exclusive licensing agent for the "McDonald's
Speedee System."
Kroc's early years as agent for the McDonald's brothers
are documented in a series of dictaphone tapes dated 1957 to
1959.

Short and chatty in his messages, Kroc often fought

against the constraints written into his ten-year franchise
agreement with the brothers, amended in 1960 to ninety-nine
years. 49

"Each license," the agreement read, "shall

conform to the model franchise . . . no license

. shall

in anyway modify, alter, change, omit, add to or otherwise
differ from the . . . said model franchise without prior
written consent.

1150

As written, the contract did not even

allow Kroc to install a furnace in a unit, an important
necessity in the northern United States, but unnecessary in
the temperate San Bernardino climate.

The contract further

mandated that all deviations must be approved in writing.
Kroc continually fought the brothers for written permission
to make common-sense modifications to the physical layout of
the restaurants.

The brothers freely offered verbal

4911 Modified

Franchise Agreement Between Richard and
Maurice McDonald and Ray Kroc," 5 February 1960, McDonald's
Corporation Archives; Kroc, Grinding It Out, 72.
5011 Franchise

Agreement
McDonald
and
Ray
Kroc, "
Corporation Archives.

Between Richard and Maurice
19
August
1954,
McDonald's
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authorization, but withheld written confirmation on the
advice of their attorney, Frank Cotter, who distrusted
Kroc's ability and motivations. 51
While it seemed to Kroc that Dick and Mac McDonald were
trying to sabotage his success before he even started, the
brothers had at least one legitimate reason to question
Kroc's intentions.

Kroc told the brothers up front that his

primary interest in building more McDonald's was to sell his
Multimixer machines, just as his earliest interest in
Multimixers was to sell more Lily-Tulip paper cups.

"I was

just carried away," Kroc later remembered, "by the thought
of McDonald's drive-ins proliferating like rabbits with
eight Multimixers in each one." 52

While Dick and Mac

McDonald would benefit from skimming a .5% royalty fee off
of gross sales, Kroc would benefit from the increased
Multimixer sales.

But the mutual distrust between the

brothers and Kroc was inevitable.

Kroc was hard-driving and

often abrasive, qualities which irked the more complacent
brothers who were often indifferent to McDonald's success.
The relationship worsened and climaxed in a "bloody" buy-out
of the McDonald brothers' interest in 1961 and the "erasing"
from the Corporation's official memory many of Dick and Mac

51 Love, McDonald's:
52 Kroc,

Market," 72.

Behind the Arches, 192-93.

Grinding It Out, 71; Kroc, "Appealing to a Mass
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McDonald's contributions to the system. 53
Undaunted by his awkward relationship with the McDonald
brothers, Ray Kroc's first task was to open his own
McDonald's restaurant as a showcase unit for prospective
licensees.

Since he knew the Chicago area best, Kroc chose

Des Plaines, a small middle-class suburb northwest of the
city, close to his own home in Arlington Heights and on the
train line to his Multimixer job in downtown Chicago. 54
Kroc arrived at the Des Plaines unit early each morning to
set up, hopped the train to the Loop, put in an eight or ten
hour day peddling milkshake machines, and returned to the
restaurant for the evening supper hour rush and for closing.
Kroc knew the success of McDonald's pivoted on the
willingness of licensees to pour all their money and energy
into McDonald's, as he himself was doing.
53 Graham,

"McDonald's
Pickle,"
1.
McDonald's
Corporation Annual Report, 1968 erroneously hailed Kroc as
the "founder of McDonald's" (p.10). As late as 1989, a twopart series on McDonald's by Restaurants and Institutions
magazine mentions merely that in 1961, "Kroc buys the
McDonald's
name
from
the McDonald brothers. "
Lisa
Bertagnoli, "McDonald's," Restaurants and Institutions, 10
July 1989, 33.
54 The

location of Kroc's first store highlights the
tension between Kroc and the McDonald brothers.
While
negotiating with Kroc to grant him sole licensing rights
nationwide, the brothers also conferred exclusive rights
upon the Frejlich Ice Cream Company for all of Cook County,
Illinois, in which Des Plaines resided.
Kroc had to buy
back Frejlich's contract, at a time when he was "already in
debt for all I was worth," before he could legally open his
Des Plaines unit.
After the fiasco, Kroc felt confirmed in
his belief that the brothers were naive and incompetent
businessmen.
Kroc, Grinding It Out, 79; Love, McDonald's:
Behind the Arches, 69-71.
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Although comfortable by the standards of the mid-1950s,
a stylish suburban home, late-model cars, financial
independence, Ray Kroc at age fifty-two risked it all on the
success of a fifteen-cent hamburger.

This was not the first

time that Kroc had staked his family's future on his
business intuition.

In 1937, Kroc's wife Ethel gasped when

he told her he was abandoning his job at Lily-Tulip to chase
the future of an octopus-shaped milkshake machine.

Ethel

Kroc's reaction in 1954 to her husband's excited
announcement that he was sinking their life's savings into a
hamburger stand was decidedly more vocal. "Ethel was
incensed by the whole thing," Kroc later wrote. "I had done
it again, and once too often as far as she was
concerned. 1155 Their home had been mortgaged and remortgaged before, all to finance Kroc's business schemes,
but the latest announcement created, in Kroc's words, "a
veritable Wagnerian opera of strife. 1156

It eventually

dissolved the marriage.
Kroc's true love was always the adventure in selling a
hard prospect, in devising a new way to peddle an old
product, or, in the case of the Multimixer and the
McDonald's System, having something entirely new and unique
to present to the world.

By the time he died in 1984, Kroc

had been married three times and divorced twice.
55 Kroc,
56 Ibid.

Grinding It Out, 73.

He
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expected that same self less dedication to the job in his
earliest employees and licensees, but found, at first, few
followers.
Kroc recognized that the same fear of default and
bankruptcy that worried his wife impeded prospective
licensees' willingness to risk financial ruin by opening a
hamburger stand.

To help ensure his licensees' success,

Kroc devised a franchising system that stressed the
viability of the licensees' individual units over the
bottom-line profits of the central corporation.

In essence,

Kroc staked his own success not on the royalty payments he
received from his franchises, the common practice among
licensing agents, but rather on the long-term sales of each
restaurant.
Kroc, whose father had been broken by Wall Street's
financial indiscretions, committed himself to a franchising
program that made the licensee an equal partner in the
corporation's success.

Unlike other drive-in chains, even

unlike the McDonald brothers' earlier franchises, Kroc
provided ongoing training, negotiated discount pricing from
food suppliers, and created a management infrastructure
ready to assist licensees.

Howard Johnson's had provided

many of these same benefits to its own franchisees twenty
years earlier. 57

57 Jack

But Kroc rejected the large territorial

Alexander, "Host of
Evening Post, 19 July 1958, 16.

the

Highways,"

Saturday
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franchises which Howard Johnson's, A & W Root Beer, and
newcomer Kentucky Fried Chicken were offering.

Large

franchises resulted in indifferent absentee owners who
tolerated lax operating procedures and poor food quality,
two items which were eventually reflected on the bottom
line.

Kroc enforced strict operating regulations and

stringent quality controls.

Licensees in violation of

Kroc's rules received fist-pounding lectures and risked
forfeiting their unit.

In return for being effective on-

site managers and team players, however, the licensees could
become quite wealthy.
Kroc's earliest franchises, granted in 1955 with a
twenty year term, required an initial financed outlay of
$80,000 (for the physical building, food supplies, and
equipment) as well as an additional 1.9% of annual gross
sales and an up front $950 franchise fee.

58

The riskiness

of the venture became painfully clear to Kroc as he traveled
across the country seeking his first licensees, officially

58 of

Kroc's 1. 9%, however, . 5% was given to Dick and
Mac McDonald as their royalty payment.
J. Kenneth Props,
"Experiences
I
Remember"
(October
1983),
McDonald's
Corporation Archives,
11-12.
Unlike other fast food
franchises which required up to $250, 000 initial capital,
McDonald's comparatively inexpensive set-up costs opened up
ownership to a broader spectrum of middle-class Americans.
Love, McDonald's:
Behind the Arches, 7 2; Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, "McDonald's Corporation Prospectus," 20
April 1965, McDonald's Corporation Archives, 9.
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known in McDonald's parlance as owner/operators. 59
In an attempt to "jumpstart" the process, Kroc turned
to his friends at the Rolling Green Country Club in
northwest suburban Chicago for some of his earliest
franchising contacts.

He granted eighteen licenses but

quickly became disillusioned with his friends.

They had

eagerly become owner/operators but refused Kroc's directives
of uniformity in menu, food preparation, and service.

They

approached their restaurants as merely part-time hobbies and
tinkered with the formula that, for Kroc, was gospel truth.
Kroc quickly shifted his licensing focus from established
businessmen to small-scale entrepreneurs who, he thought,
would be willing to sacrifice almost anything for the real
product that Ray Kroc was offering, the American Dream.
McDonald's succeeded, in part, because Kroc tapped into
the nineteenth century image of the self-made man.

Horatio

Alger was alive and well in post-World War II America and
his most recent incarnation was in the person of Ray Kroc,
whose dynamic success frequented the pages of the food
industry's trade magazines.

As in Alger's rags-to-riches

tales, Kroc's eventual success in marketing McDonald's
relied upon hard work, faith in the outcome, and a generous

terms
"owner/operator" are
analysis.

"franchisee,"
"licensee, "
used interchangeably throughout

and
this
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dose of well-earned good luck. 6

°

Kroc was unwilling to

admit even the possibility of defeat and coached his team of
managers and owner/operators to set high goals for
themselves and their units.
Even Fortune magazine decried the lack of business
initiative and risk taking among the postwar generation and
published Alger-like success stories to "re-enthuse men
about their chances to go it alone." But their attempt fell
largely on deaf ears. 61

It was no longer the 1890s or

even the 1920s, when maverick entrepreneurs leveraged their
futures with insurmountable debt.

Kroc diluted licensees'

risks by absorbing more of it into the corporation.
Kroc's franchising program updated the nineteenth
century tradition of the lone venture capitalist by
situating entrepreneurialism within a more rigid corporate
structure.

Individual licensees enjoyed substantial local

autonomy in advertising, product development, and community
relations and were, in many respects, independent
businessmen.

Food preparation and serving methods, on the

60 Richard

Weiss, The American Myth of Success:
Horatio Alger to Norman Vincent Peale (New York:
Books, Inc., 1969), 53.
61 nonald Meyer,

From
Basic

The Positive Thinkers:
Religion as Pop
Psychology from Mary Baker Eddy to Oral Roberts,
2d ed.
(New York:
Pantheon Books, 1980), 171-72.
Meyer examines
two Fortune Magazine publications, 100 Stories of Business
Success (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1954) and The Art of
Success (Philadelphia:
J.B. Lippincott Co.,
1956) as
indicative of the literature urging American men into
entrepreneurial ventures after World War II.
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other hand, were jealously guarded by Kroc, who believed
that the key to McDonald's success was the consistency it
maintained in quality, service, and cleanliness.

Kroc made

Q, S & C McDonald's corporate motto in 1957 and he brazenly
conducted unannounced inspections and berated negligent
operators.
According to the revised ninety-nine year franchise
agreement between Kroc and the McDonald brothers, all
restaurant units bearing the name "McDonald's" were to be
identical in architecture, decor, layout, procedures, and
menus. 62

This consistency, legally mandated by the

brothers and religiously adhered to by Kroc, created and
continuously reinforced the public's expectations of what a
visit to McDonald's would be like.

The same food, the same

quick service, the same look, and the same feel contributed
to what McDonald's has more recently labelled "the
McDonald's Experience. 1163
The receipts from Kroc's first day of business at the
Des Plaines unit totalled a modest $366.12. 64

A scant

62 Prices,

however, were set by the licensees and were
dependent upon the profit margin desired,
the
local
wholesale costs of food, and what the competition was
charging.
Prices between uni ts, however, usually did not
fluctuate more than a few pennies. Lisa Bertagnoli, "Inside
McDonald's," Restaurants and Institutions, 21 August 1989,
58; Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 75, 145.
63 McDonald's

Corporation
Annual
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 7.
6411 McDonald's

December 1990,

Report,

Chronological
History
Report,"
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 12.

1973,
12
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eighteen licenses were sold that first year, but more rapid
development soon followed.

By 1959, a total of 145

individual McDonald's units had sold 100 million hamburgers,
generating $21 million in systemwide sales (see Figures 1
and 2). 65

The "system" included both licensed stores as

well as units directly owned and operated by the
corporation.

The prospect of financial independence lured a

cross spectrum of Americans to McDonald's and by 1959, 85
registered applicants were placed on a waiting list. 66
Ten years after Kroc opened his Des Plaines showcase unit,
McDonald's boasted system sales of $171 million from 738
individual units and in 1966 was admitted to the prestigious
ranks of the New York Stock Exchange, an honor to be
exceeded only by its 1985 inclusion on the Dow Jones 30
Industrials list. 67

McDonald's would ultimately join the

financial powerhouses of General Motors, IBM, Sears, General

65 McDonald's

Corporation
Annual
Report,
1963,
McDonald's Corporation Archives.
McDonald's first Annual
Report was issued in 1963, two years after the buyout of the
McDonald brothers.
The 1963 report contained figures
retroactive to 1959.
66 "McDonald's

Twentieth Anniversary, "
commemorative
brochure (April 1975), McDonald's Corporation Archives, 7.
67 Love,

McDonald's:
Behind the
Arches,
241-42.
McDonald's became the first fast-food corporation to be
awarded member status on the Exchange.
Its SecretaryTreasurer, June Martino, was only the second woman allowed
on the floor of the Exchange (the first was Queen Elizabeth
I I) .
Making the Dow Jones list, an index of America's
premier corporations, instantly gave McDonald's worldwide
financial credibility.
"McDonald's Chronological History
Report," 24.
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Fig. 1. Number of McDonald's Units, 1954-1985. McDonald's
expanded slowly its first decade, but, by the early 1970s,
enjoyed a double-digit annual rate of growth. McDonald's
Corporation Annual Report, 1963-1985; "McDonald's
Chronological History Report," McDonald's Corporation
Archives.
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Fig. 2. McDonald's Systemwide Sales, 1954-1985. McDonald's
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Electric, and AT & T as barometers of the nation's economic
health.
McDonald's did not rise to the ranks of the financial
elite solely on the volume of its hamburger sales.

Ray Kroc

may have been a marketing and franchising dynamo, but to him
the "language of high finance (was] mumbo-jumbo.

1168

in late 1961, Kroc desperately needed big money.

And

He decided

he had suffered enough from the tortuous limitations of his
contract with the McDonald brothers.

Indeed, from the very

beginning of the contract he was in legal default since Dick
and Mac McDonald had never authorized in writing the
addition of basements to the units Kroc built, nor the
substitution of gas grills for the more costly electric
ones.

Kroc and Frank Cotter, the brothers' lawyer, were "at

dagger's point all the time" with Cotter continually
reminding Kroc of his precarious legal position.

69

Kroc,

who was virtually "shock-proof" in negotiating a business
deal, was dazed when Dick McDonald told him the price at
which he and his brother were willing to sell their
interest:

$2.75 million--cash.

"I dropped the phone, my

teeth, and everything else," Kroc recalled in his
autobiography.

Dick McDonald asked him what the noise was

and Kroc told him "that was me jumping out of the 20th floor

68

Kroc, Grinding It Out, 157.

69

Ibid., 120-21.
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of the LaSalle-Wacker Building." 7

°

Kroc had no idea how

to raise that much money--merely raising $65,000 to pay his
court costs to divorce Ethel seemed insurmountable to him-but one of the basic components of McDonald's franchising
program pointed the way. 71
In May, 1955, Kroc had hired Harry Sonneborn, a former
vice-president of competitor Tastee Freeze, to handle
financial operations.

Sonneborn made McDonald's a financial

powerhouse by having McDonald's purchase the real estate on
which the individually-licensed units sat.

Thus, McDonald's

received not only an up front licensing fee and royalty cut,
but also rent. 72

Under Sonneborn's plan, McDonald's

actually made more money through the real estate tie-in than
through the franchising fees.

In 1970, for example,

McDonald's earned $8.9 million in franchising and service
fees, while it grossed nearly $28.7 million in rental
income.

While McDonald's was more colloquially identifiable

as a drive-in restaurant, its unique real estate base gave

70

Ibid.

I

121.

71 Ibid.,

119-20.
Kroc eventually came up with the
divorce settlement money by selling Prince Castle Sales, the
independent company he started to market the Multimixer.
72 In

1956, the rental fee was 5% of gross sales,
compared to the 1.9% franchising service fee.
By 1983, the
service fee had risen to 3% and the rental assessment to
8.5%. As is obvious, McDonald's made more money through the
real estate tie-in than through the actual franchising
contract.
J. Kenneth Props,
"Experiences I Remember"
(October 1983), McDonald's Corporation Archives, 14.
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from its location in America's burgeoning suburbs.
When asked how McDonald's decided where to locate new
restaurants, Ray Kroc casually replied, "We count church
steeples."

McDonald's licensing director, Ken Props,

boasted, "You could throw a rock out almost anywhere and the
[McDonald's] unit would be successful." 76

New York Times

Magazine quoted another McDonald's official with a more
precise answer, "Our prime target is a family in which the
father is 27, the mother is 25, with two children and
another on the way, making over $10,000 and living in the
suburb of a major city.n 77
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, McDonald's focused its
efforts on working- and middle-class suburbs and the
residential neighborhoods of medium-sized cities.

Although

an urban "downtowner" restaurant was bandied about, Kroc
himself did most of the site selection in the early years
and was firmly committed to "a choice location keyed to the
important emphasis on family trade . . . churches, schools

76 Kroc,

"Appealing to
"Experiences I Remember," 8.
77 J.

a

Mass

Market,"

74;

Props,

Anthony Lukas,
"As American as a McDonald's
Hamburger on the Fourth of July,"
New York Times Magazine
4 July 1971,
sec. 6, pp. 4-5.
The McDonald's official
preferred to remain anonymous,
a common choice given
McDonald's almost paranoid preoccupation with corporate
security.
The
corporation hesitates
to
join trade
associations or attend industry conferences where discussion
of operational procedures or marketing might divulge inhouse
information.
It
finally
joined the
National
Restaurant Association in 1985.
Bertagnoli,
"Inside
McDonald's," 21 August 1989, 44.
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and homes . . . the basics of community living.

1178

The

fact that competition was less in the suburbs than in the
city only reinforced the decision.

By the late 1960s and

early 1970s, however, analysts' fears of market saturation
and a weakening economy plagued by high inflation forced
McDonald's to broaden its base of growth.

McDonald's

readjusted its focus and turned attention to urban
locations, including the 1972 debut of three units in
Manhattan, as well as to newly developing sites in large
shopping centers and strip malls. 79
In its urban locations, McDonald's offered the same
quality, service and cleanliness (value was later tacked on)

as in its suburban units.

McDonald's success in achieving a

national image of consistency and efficiency was lauded by
Time magazine in 1987.

"McDonald's has become such a

pervasive reference point in American life," Time reported,
"that many consumers think of the company as a public
institution--one that is more reliable than the post office

7811

The Birth of McDonald's," supplement to the 1966
McDonald Corporation Annual Report, McDonald's Corporation
Archives.
As early as 1958, McDonald's toyed with building
small-scaled units in urban business districts, an idea that
came to fruition during the 1970s and 1980s. Props, "R.A.K.
Remembered, " 3;
Dictaphone memo from Fred Turner [head of
operations] to Richard and Maurice McDonald, 13 June 1958,
reprinted in The Legacy Series, dictaphone tape transcript,
(Oak Brook, IL: McDonald's Corporation, 1988), 31-34.
79

McDonald' s
Corporation
Annual
Report,
1972,
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 9. Other major urban areas
targeted in the early 1970s were Boston, Chicago, and
Pittsburgh.
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or the phone company.

1180

Not only more reliable, but

given that 19 million Americans--a full 8% of the
population--ate at a McDonald's each day in 1985, also a
seemingly indispensable part of American daily life. 81
The 1970s and 1980s were boom decades for McDonald's,
building upon the success engineered by Ray Kroc in the
1960s and Richard and Maurice McDonald in the 1950s.
Breaking away from the competition through aggressive
advertising and strict quality control, McDonald's led the
fast-food industry with 18.4% of all fast-food sales. 82
At the height of the 1970s recession, McDonald's averaged an
annual growth rate of 15%, giving the corporation a
reputation of being "recession-proof.

1183

Of course,

McDonald's grew so rapidly because its licensees provided
much of the initial capital to open a unit.

That

franchising arrangement allowed the corporation to expend
its own resources on new product development, national

80

stephen Koepp,
"Big Mac Strikes Back:
Bashers, watch Out!
McDonald's is on a Roll!"
April 1987, 58.

Burger
Time, 13

81McDonald's

Corporation
Annual
Report,
1985,
McDonald's Corporation Archives; Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1985, 6.
82

Doyle,
"McDonald's Corporation," table 1, p.
4.
Figure for 1974.
This reflects nearly a 100% increase over
the 1969 market share figure, resulting from McDonald's
television marketing blitz in the early 1970s.
83

rbid., 31.
Pre-recession growth between 1965-1972
was moderately less, averaging only 11% per annum, still a
respectable figure.
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network advertising, and international expansion.
By 1985, a new McDonald's was opening somewhere in the
world every seventeen hours, "which is another way of saying
that every day the sun rises on another McDonald's. 1184
With just over 8,900 restaurants in 43 countries worldwide,
McDonald's celebrated its thirtieth birthday by converting
Ray Kroc's original Des Plaines unit into a McDonald's
Museum. 85

While 80% of McDonald's restaurants were still

located in the same kind of residential neighborhoods that
attracted Ray Kroc, McDonald's could also be found in 1,700
shopping malls, 24 tollway stops, and in hospital, school,
and museum cafeterias across the country. 86
What was it about McDonald's that earned it the loyalty
first, of so many millions of Americans, and later, of
millions worldwide?

In the 1950s and 1960s, McDonald's

served American families a simple meal--a hamburger, fries,
and a milkshake--for the low price of 45 cents.

Dubbed the

"All-American Meal," reflecting and pandering to Cold War
sensibilities, this trio provided a convenient alternative
to the traditional meal prepared at home.

Indeed, the sheer

convenience of receiving lunch or supper in thirty seconds
or less was a strong draw among busy parents ferrying
children to music lessons, baseball games, and scout
84McDonald's Corporation Annual Report,

1985, 21.

8511 McDonald's Chronological History Report," 53.
86McDonald's Corporation Annual Report,

1985, 24, 27.
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meetings.
The convenience of McDonald's, of course, was made
possible by the efficiency of its operations.

Richard and

Maurice McDonald never quite grasped the significance of
their tinkerings with format, menu, and price in the 1948
conversion of their San Bernardino drive-in.

They were

experimenting primarily to rid themselves of their carhop
problems.

But the changes the McDonald brothers made, in

effect, created the fast-food industry and linked it to the
mass industrialism of the previous half century.

Ford's

massive assembly lines had their offspring in the glistening
stainless steel kitchens, the regimented, almost automated
movements of the burger crew, and the daily outpouring of
tens of thousands of cloned hamburgers with interchangeable
tastes and smells.

The assembly-line automobile could

fittingly be called the symbol of American progress in the
first three decades of this century.

In the thirty years

after World War II, that honor belonged to a McDonald's
hamburger.
Ray Kroc built upon what the McDonald brothers
bequeathed to him in their licensing agreements and in the
later buyout.

Kroc never expressed a strong religious or

political bent, but his belief in the American capitalist
system was akin to the most ardent of fervors.

The success

of capitalism, Kroc was convinced, rested on the overarching
ambition of average Americans to succeed.
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McDonald's doesn't confer success on anyone.
It
takes guts and staying power to make it with one of our
restaurants. At the same time, it doesn't require any
unusual aptitude or intellect. Any man with common
sense, dedication to principles, and a love of hard work
can do it. And I have . . . asserted that any man who
gets a McDonald's store today and works at it
relentlessly will become a success, and many will become
millionaires--no question. 87
Horatio Alger could not have asked for a more loyal follower
in the 1950s.
The success that had made McDonald's an "American
Phenomenon," however, had a stronger foundation than the
combined tinkerings of the McDonald brothers and Ray Kroc's
optimism.

Before McDonald's could raise its arches to feed

America's children, it had to first forge an identity within
a fledgling industry catering to convenience.

When the

McDonald brothers "invented" fast-food, they were building
upon decades of food service innovations geared to preparing
large volumes of food quickly and cheaply.

When Ray Kroc

outlined his own distinctive franchising program, he drew
upon the franchising success stories and failures of prior
restaurant chains.

Most important, when McDonald's

consciously targeted children as its primary customer, it
harkened back to a fifty year history of marketing consumer
products to children.

By 1955, the radio, television, and

toy industries all had sophisticated market strategies
87 Kroc,

Grinding It Out, 111.
Kroc was not being
necessarily sexist here.
Husband-wife teams provided
McDonald's with some of their best licensees in the early
years and by the mid-1970s, it was not uncommon to have a
lone female owner/operator at the helm of a McDonald's unit.
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directed at children.

It was these early precursors in food

service, licensing, and children's marketing that provided
the textbook for McDonald's later meteoric success.

CHAPTER 3
THE CONVENIENCE FOOD INDUSTRY AND
CHILD CONSUMERISM BEFORE MCDONALD'S
Two-car garages out back; modest weekend
motor jaunts; roadside inns and hot dog
stands do a rushing business; the kids get a
good deal of fun out of the comic strips; the
children earnestly follow numerous [radio]
programs; sometimes the 'small fry' is sent
to the store. It's good training for him;
and Jane is excited about being moved up into
the allowance-receiving ranks; a glamorous $5
bill monthly lust for movies, sodas and
notions . . .
J.C. Furnas, Ladies' Home Journal
In 1948, when Richard and Maurice McDonald redesigned
their octagonal restaurant in the shadow of Route 66,
America's obsession with automobile travel and petty
consumerism was well underway.

Seven years earlier, the

Ladies' Home Journal had documented it in How America Lives,
a portrait of middle-class American families on the brink of
World War II.

Instead of finding an America fearful of war,

the Ladies' Home Journal discovered a country that found
security in the consumer goods that it owned and the
services it could purchase.

Such an environment had

1 J.

C. Furnas and Ladies' Home Journal, How America
Lives (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1941), 66, 87, 304,
105, 93, 299, 207, jacket cover, respectively. Overall, the
book sketches the life of sixteen families, representing
various racial, ethnic, social, and economic backgrounds.
58
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provided fertile ground for both the rise of roadside
eateries and the increasing prevalence of childhood
consumerism.

Ultimately, McDonald's would marry these two

disparate trends, and find its own success in appealing to
this same need for security.
On the Road:

The Convenience Food Industry

Long before McDonald's, entrepreneurs in the 1920s had
already begun to develop an industry catering to the
automobile.

Gas stations fulfilled an obvious and immediate

need, while campgrounds grew up around the See America First
movement's emphasis on recreational motoring.

And roadside

eateries quickly sprang up as a convenient and inexpensive
alternative to packing a lunch for Americans "on the
road.

112

Edgar Waldo (Billy) Ingram unleashed America's first
roadside hamburger chain in Wichita, Kansas, in 1921. 3
Somewhat brazenly christened "White Castle 11 - - 11 white for
purity . . . castle for strength"--Ingram's modest

2A good analysis of Americans' obsession with motoring
is Warren James Belasco, Americans on the Road:
From
Autocamp to Motel. 1910-1945
(Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press,
1979).
3 Ingram's

partner in White Castle was Walt Anderson who
had operated a remodeled streetcar as a restaurant in
Wichita in 1916.
Ingram purchased Anderson's interest in
White Castle in 1933.
Jim Oliphant, "The Tower and the
Glory," Chicago Tribune, 25 February 1991, sec. 5, p. 1; Ray
B. Browne, review of Body Food, Soul Food:
The American
Restaurant Then and Now, by Richard Pillsbury, in Journal of
Popular Culture 26, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 174-75.
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restaurants served a greasy, onion-laden, two-and-one-halfinch square hamburger selling for five cents. 4

Ingram's

food retailing operations quickly traversed eleven states
from Kansas to New York.
chain of White Castles.

Ingram personally owned the entire
His refusal to take on any long-

term debt to expand--his own credo was "he who owes no money
can't go broke 11 --or to open up ownership to franchisees
effectively negated the head start he had in the convenience
food industry. 5

In contrast to McDonald's, White Castle

targeted an adult, rather than family, market.

Open round-

the-clock, it appealed mainly to truckers or workers late at
night or early in the morning.
Following on the heels of White Castle, the A & W Root

4

oliphant, "The Tower and the Glory, " 1; J. Anthony
Lukas, "As American as a McDonald's Hamburger on the Fourth
of July," New York Times Magazine, 4 July 1971, sec. 6,
pp. 4-5.
Ingram added his own innovation to streamline the
frying of hamburgers. He pierced five holes into each patty
before steaming them, thirty-six at a time, on a large
griddle.
The holes allowed the hamburgers to thoroughly
cook without being flipped over.
5 oliphant,

"The Tower and the Glory,"
2;
Love,
McDonald's:
Behind the Arches, 19, 163.
McDonald's
expansion, in contrast, was financed not only through
franchising, but also through extensive leveraging.
Ray
Kroc's buyout of the McDonald's brothers, for example, was
only made possible through a complicated debt transaction
involving twelve different lenders, dubbed the "Twelve
Apostles."
The entire transaction cost McDonald's over $14
million, only $2.7 million of which was the principal amount
paid to Dick and Mac McDonald.
Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, "McDonald's Corporation Prospectus," 20 April 1965,
6; Ray Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out:
The
Making of McDonald's (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1977;
reprint, Chicago:
St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 121-23.
Page references are to the reprint edition.
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Beer chain, named after founders Allen and White, opened in
1924.

Capitalizing on Prohibition, Allen and White

developed a unique non-alcoholic syrup recipe and sold it to
investors willing to sign on as franchisees.

In exchange

for a $2,000 fee, high compared to McDonald's $950
franchising fee thirty years later, A & W licensees received
extensive territorial franchises granting exclusive control
of the A & W Root Beer trade over a city, state, or
region. 6
Allen and White's root beer recipe quickly became
popular, and the partners added a full line of hamburgers
and hot dogs.

Their real profit, however, came from

licensees' on going orders for the patented root beer syrup.
The terms of Allen and White's contracts with their
franchisees required that only A & W's syrup be purchased,
at prices set by the parent company.

The franchisees were,

in effect, hostages to Allen and White's control of the flow
of syrup. 7

Franchisors preferred this type of product tie-

in arrangement, since it gave the parent company not only
the up front franchise fee but also a steady, guaranteed

6 Love,

McDonald's:
Behind the Arches, 49.
Although
A & W still exists, it is not a major competitor in the
fast-food industry.
One of Allen and White's early
franchisees, however, used his Washington, DC territorial
license as breeding ground for one of America's largest
hotel chains. The licensee's name was J. Willard Marriott.
7

Ibid.; Thomas Dicke, Franchising in America:
The
Development of a Business Method, 1840-1980
(Chapel Hill
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 119.
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income.
Territorial franchising and tie-ins were perfected
under two of the "hottest and most lucrative franchise
operations in the country

. market leader [the soft-

serve ice cream market] Dairy Queen and arch rival Tastee
Freeze.

118

Both drive-ins took advantage of innovations in

the serving of ice cream, specifically, the chilling of a
dairy mix in a large stainless steel vat which was then
served through an attached spigot, similar to the drafting
of beer.

Between 1944 and 1948, Dairy Queen opened 2,500

outlets through territorial franchising with up front
franchising fees as exorbitant as $50,000 per territory and
a surcharge of 45 cents per gallon of soft serve. 9

Harry

Axene, a former farm equipment salesman who had pioneered
Dairy Queen's expansion at the end of World War II,
established competitor Tastee Freeze in 1950, with a format
similar to Dairy Queen, but using improved machinery.
Although the hefty up-front franchising fees made Axene and
his partners immediate millionaires, both companies were
plagued by incompetent and poorly trained licensees and lack
of consistent national images.
It was Howard Johnson's which provided the closest
parallel to McDonald's.

Unlike White Castle, A & W, Dairy

Queen, and Tastee Freeze, which stranded their franchises
8 Love, McDonald's:
9 Ibid.,

50-51.

Behind the Arches, 36.

63

after the contract was signed, Howard Johnson's restaurant
chain provided on going training, corporate supervisors, and
a thick operations manual dubbed "Howard Johnson's
Bible. 1110

Howard Johnson's, however, served a full sit-

down dinner in restaurant units located along the emerging
highway system, drawing primarily upon tourists for
customers.

Like Kroc, Johnson had not planned on going into

the restaurant business.
Saddled with $18,000 in debt owed by his father's
defunct cigar business, Johnson took over the management of
a floundering drugstore in his hometown of Wollaston,
Massachusetts. 11

Johnson turned the store around in four

years, relying on the popularity of its homemade ice cream.
Then, Johnson expanded his operations to include several
walk-up ice cream stands on nearby beaches. 12

Johnson's

new stands, little more than shacks, were so popular that on
opening day, twelve police officers were summoned to control
the crowd. 13
By 1935, Johnson was ready for further capital
expansion--he already had twenty-five company-owned units
10 Jack

Alexander, "Host of
Evening Post, 19 July 1958, 48.
11 Ibid.'

the

Highways,"

Saturday

48-50.

12 I b i. d . ,

.
50.
Jo h nson d i. d not create t h e ice
cream
recipe himself; rather he purchased it from an elderly
German pushcart vendor who lived nearby.
The secret to the
recipe was the increased butterfat content in the ice cream.
13

Dicke, Franchising in America, 120.

64
dotting Massachusetts' highways--but was stymied by local
banks that refused to lend to him. 14

Like McDonald's with

its distinctive arches, Howard Johnson's restaurants boasted
recognizable blue and orange exteriors topped with roof-line
cupolas.

Creditors' concerns that the buildings were too

distinctive to be reusable should Johnson default, forced
Johnson into locating alternative financing.

That

alternative was franchising.
In 1935, Johnson sold his first franchise to a
restauranteur on Cape Cod.

Johnson supplied all the

foodstuffs from his corporate commissary, provided initial
training, and gave on going consultation. 15

By 1940,

Howard Johnson's had grown to 132 restaurants, 92 of which
were franchised.

Of the $207 million that Howard Johnson's

earned that year, $132 million was directly produced by the
continual food sales to franchisees. 16
Aside from his franchising savvy, Howard Johnson was
successful because he created an image of his restaurants as

14 rbid.;

Alexander, "Host of the Highways," 50.

15 Dicke,

Franchising in America, 120-21.

16 Ibid.,

121.
Unlike McDonald's, Howard Johnson's
later expanded into highway motor lodges, responding to
travelers'
need for
reliable,
secure,
and affordable
shelter.
By July 1958, there were 47 of these lodges
operational or under construction. Less than a decade later
(1966),
Howard Johnson's
220
lodges attested to the
influence of the new interstate system on the continued
popularity of motoring.
Alexander, "Host of the Highways,"
16; Russell Lynes, "Fast Food and Footloose Americans,"
Harpers 232 (January 1966): 31.
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targeted parents, who either read the magazines to their
younger children or screened them for their older ones.
Youth's Companion, premiering in 1827, was the first
magazine to offer children premiums, or free gifts, for
their parents' paid subscriptions:

dolls, books, and magic

lanterns (a prototype of the modern slide projector) were
common examples.

St. Nicholas, founded in 1873, never

directly promoted a product to children, but frequently ran
adult-targeted advertisements that included word games for
young readers or promotions for children to create their own
ads. 19
After 1900, advertisers developed a more direct
approach using illustrations and copy appealing to
children's tastes rather than to their parents' concerns.
The "copy stressed fun • . . or taste • . . whereas earlier
[when the ads were targeted to parents] it might have
emphasized instruction or nutrition." 20

An example of the

latter was a Quaker Oats advertisement, circa 1900, reading
"Fretful children are nervous, peevish, and ill-tempered
because of lack of proper and sufficient nourishment . . . .
Quaker Oats will build up the child's body and--then comes

19 william

Delmar Jenkins, Jr., "A Content Analysis of
Children's Print Advertising,
1948-1974"
(Ph.D.
diss.,
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill,
1976),
4-5.
Al though the bulk of Jenkins' longitudinal analysis deals
with the post-World War II years, he surveys the earlier
history of children's print advertising.
20 Ibid.,

1.
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goo d na t ure . . . . 1121

Proof of the former was the more

sophisticated approach convincing children that purchasing a
specific consumer product was fun.

Jello gelatin (invented

in 1897) was fun because it squiggled in the hand while
Campbell soups (1898) drew on the image of a hot meal after
playing in the snow.

In a longitudinal ranking of the major

lure in children's print advertisements, "fun" consistently
placed near the top (see Figure 3).

And fun could be a

strong lure.
National Biscuit Company's (Nabisco) Cream of Wheat
offered readers of the August 30, 1900 edition of the
Youth's Companion two scenic photogravures (photographs
reproduced with engraved plates or cylinders) with the
purchase of two boxes of cereal.

In November, 1902, cereal

manufacturer Ralston-Purina, enticed St. Nicholas readers
with a free bank in return for one box top off a cereal
package. 22

While print advertising failed to reach the

youngest ranks of the children's market, it did set a
precedent for the strong leadership of the food industry in
child marketing.
In 1877, food advertising accounted for less than 1% of
commissions recorded by N.W. Ayer, one of the largest
21 Quoted

in Dwight Macdonald, "Profiles:
A Caste, A
Culture, A Market," New Yorker 34 (22 November 1958):
77.
This was a two-part series on Eugene Gilbert, a pioneer in
youth marketing research.
22 Jenkins,

Advertising," 7.
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1948

1952

Fig. 3.
"Fun" in Children's Print Ads, 1948-1974. After
World War II, "fun" consistently ranked high as a lure in
children's print advertising.
It was a lure that worked
well on television, too. William Delmar Jenkins, "A Content
Analysis of Children's Print Advertising, 1948-1974," (Ph.D.
diss., University of North Carolina--Chapel Hill, 1976),
244-47.
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national advertising agencies of the time.

By 1901, food

advertising had jumped to 15% and remained the single
largest client base until overtaken by auto advertising at
the end of the decade. 23

And the precedents set in the

first decades of the century continued unabated:

food

products accounted for nearly one-quarter of all print
advertisements directed at children between 1948 and
1974. 24

Print advertising, however, failed to reach

consumers younger than seven or eight.

The first real

forays into kindergarten consumption were accomplished
through the food industry's use of "host selling" on radio.
Little Orphan Annie pitched ovaltine, Jack Armstrong
spoke for Wheaties, cowboy hero Tom Mix touted Kix, and Babe
Ruth batted for Quaker Oats. 25

Radio relied extensively

on a real or fictitious character's friendship with
youngsters to sell a product, a concept known as "host

23 Harvey

A. Levenstein, Revolution at the Table:
The
Transformation of the American Diet (New York:
Oxford
University Press, 1988), 35.
24 Jenkins,

"A Content Analysis of Children's Print
Advertising," 29.
Toy advertising was a close runner-up
accounting for another one-fifth of print ads for this time
period.
25 The

litany
of
character
or
celebrity-endorsed
products confirms the dominance of the food industry:
Sergeant Preston - Quaker Oats
Gene Autry - Wrigley gum
Superman - Kellogg's
Roy Rogers - Post.
Captain Midnight - oval tine
Sky King
Peter Pan
peanut butter
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selling." 26

The packaged food industry, primarily cereal

manufacturers, dominated the child's advertising field
during the 1930s and 1940s, mapping a route for McDonald's
to follow two decades later.
Unlike television, radio shows were typically
underwritten by a single sponsor.

The sole sponsorship

format resulted in a cohesive marketing message for each
show, with the sponsor and its agency dictating program
format, content, and, occasionally, even character
dialogue. 27

Frequently, the identity of the sponsor was

itself part of the show's title, as in "Tom Mix and the
Ralston Straight Shooters," or was prominent in the show's
opening theme.
"Wheaties, the breakfast of champions presents .
Jack Armstrong!
American Boy!"

JACK ARMSTRONG!

JACK ARMSTRONG! The All-

Premiering in 1933 on the Columbia

Broadcasting System (CBS) network, Jack Armstrong, along

26 Host

selling was not limited to radio.
A comparison
study of advertising in the Sunday comics for the years 1947
and 1955 revealed that a constant 96% of ads incorporated
the products' names into the story-line of the strips, using
the characters to pitch the products.
Francis E. Barcus,
"Advertising in the Sunday Comics," Journalism Quarterly 39,
no. 2 (Spring 1962): 200-201.
27 Llewellyn

White, The American Radio: A Report on the
Broadcasting Industry in the United States from the
Commission on Freedom of the Press (Chicago:
University of
Chicago Press, 1947; reprint, New York:
Arno Press, New
York Times, 1971), 56-57. Page references are to the reprint
edition; Eric Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the
United States, vol. 2 (New York:
Oxford University Press,
1968) f 96-98 •
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with his sister Betty and best friend Billy, tackled the
menacing villains, Black Vulture, and the Silencer.

In his

spare time, he was a marketing spokesman for General Foods'
Wheaties brand cereal.
General Foods so inextricably linked together the
attributes of the boy hero and the Wheaties brand that the
two became indistinguishable.

Unclear to young children, of

course, was that Jack Armstrong was a fictitious character,
an actor reading a script, not a live teenage boy.

But the

Wheaties jingle reinforced the charade nevertheless:
Have you tried Wheaties? They're whole wheat with all
the bran. / Won't you try Wheaties? for wheat is the
best food of man! / They're crispy and crunchy the whole
year through. / "Jack Armstrong" never tires of them;
and neither will you.
So just buy Wheaties--the best
breakfast food in the land! 28
The success of the Wheaties jingle was challenged and
matched by the competition, with Little Orphan Annie singing
for Ovaltine and the Nabisco's children's chorus praising
Cream of Wheat.
Jingles were an innovation that transcended the mere
descriptive phrases of print advertising.

Even the youngest

listeners remembered a catchy tune, and its constant
repetition, while annoying to adults, nonetheless reinforced
brand-name awareness and recognition for both parents and

28 Frank

Buxton and Bill Owen, The Big Broadcast:
19201950, rev. ed. (New York: Viking Press, 1972), 121-22.

72

children. 29

These radio jingles also foreshadowed

McDonald's own musical forays ("Grab a bucket and mop ... "
and "You, you're the one ... ) as well as McDonald's own
"Twoallbeefpatties ...

11

tongue-twister several decades later.

The use of host selling and jingles, however, still
fell short of making the sale.

Because of their general

inexperience and naivete, it is tempting to underestimate
the consumer savvy of youngsters.

With children's interest

in radio beginning at age four and peaking at age ten,
however, the eight to thirteen year old audience were both
devout listeners and wizened consumers. 30

One eleven-

year-old boy, already jaded with the novelty of radio,
commented in the mid-1940s, "I don't listen to the radio too
much anymore because the commercials have gotten so thick
they've gotten me disgusted.

1131

Sponsors' use of

29 Ron

Lackman, Remember Radio (New York:
G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 1970), 3.
Lackman claimed he could still sing the
Cream of Wheat jingle thirty years later.
3011 child'

s Likes and Dislikes of Radio Turn Corner at
10 Years of Age," New York Times, 9 June 1935, reprinted in
Childhood, Youth and Society, ed. Fred M. Hechinger (New
York:
New York Times/Arno Press, 1980), 67; Roy De Verl
Willey and Helen Ann Young, Radio in Elementary Education
(Boston: D. C. Heath, 1948), 10-13; Charles Hull Wolfe,
Modern Radio Advertising (New York:
Funk & Wagnalls,
Printers' Ink, 1949), 175-76.
By 1949, Wolfe was a veteran
radio ad-man who wrote commercials for the "Red Skelton
Show," the "Jack Benny Show," and "Inner Sanctum." He also
developed the "Programeter," a device to measure audience
response to radio advertisements.
31

Quoted
in
Albert
N.
Williams,
Listening:
A
Collection of Critical Articles on Radio (Freeport, NY:
Books for Libraries Press, 1948; reprint, 1968), 89.
Page
references are to the reprint edition.
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complimentary premiums, updating the enticement used by turn
of the century periodicals, proved such a lure that even
jaded listeners responded.
In addition to hawking adventure and Wheaties, Jack
Armstrong promoted a host of child consumer goods including
whistling rings, a spy decoder, toy bomb sights, and similar
gadgets necessary to waging cold and hot war intrigue in the
backyard on a summer afternoon. 32

These childish gizmos,

occasionally free but frequently costing a few pennies or
nickels apiece, had been widely used in older periodical
advertisements and were simply co-opted by radio.

Spy

paraphernalia was especially popular on children's serials
during and immediately after World War II.

Reflecting new

Cold War sensibilities, Tom Mix and General Mills' Kix
cereal teamed up in 1947 to offer atomic bomb rings which
sparkled in a darkened room, reminiscent of the glow of
radioactive fallout. 33

32 More

than just pitching consumerism, children's radio
characters
also
"reaffirmed
the
nation's
homefront
patriotism."
Jack Armstrong, for example, convinced one
million children to join the "Write-A-Fighter" campaign in
1943.
Planting victory gardens and conserving scrap paper,
metals, and glass were other wartime uses of the hostselling tactic which overall points to the effectiveness of
radio marketing (whether ideas or products) to children.
William M. Tuttle, Jr., "The Homefront Children's Popular
Culture:
Radio, Movies, Comics--Adventure, Patriotism, and
Sex-Typing," in Small Worlds:
Children and Adolescents in
America, 1850-1950, eds. Elliott West and Paula Petrik
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 145.
33 G.

Howard Poteet,
Publishing, 1975), 59.
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The impact of radio advertising on the creation of a
children's consumer consciousness is undeniable.

While

radio's advertising volume was marginal compared with
newspapers, the personal nature of the medium extended
consumer awareness to youngsters old enough to follow the
simple plots of "Terry and the Pirates" or "Captain
Midnight."

With 30 million radio sets transmitting in 22.9

million American homes in 1935, the radio was the "most
widely owned of the various articles usually associated with
the American standard of living.

1134

Radio was the

preeminent family entertainment during the 1920s and 1930s.
Its function of culturally assimilating Americans while
informing, entertaining, and advertising to them validated
the prominent status radio assumed in American living
rooms. 35
Ironically, children's radio was a programming
afterthought.

The hours from 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm were "dead

34 In

comparison, 22 million passenger cars were in use,
representing approximately 18 million automobile-owning
families.
Only about 11 million families had telephones in
1935.
Herman S. Hettinger and Walter J. Neff, Practical
Radio Advertising (New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1938), 37;
Wolfe, Modern Radio Advertising, 94-95.
35 A

powerful image of the importance of radio to
Americans is in N. Ray Hiner's "Seen But Not Heard:
Children in American Photographs."
Hiner reprints a 1941
picture of Georgia farm children in threadbare clothes,
standing in their equally worn and sparsely decorated home.
Very prominent in the picture, however, is the family radio,
resting on a clean and pressed doily, presumably one of this
family's few precious links to the modern world.
Small
Worlds: Children and Adolescents in America, 194.
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time," long past women's programming slots in the morning
and early afternoon, but too early for the evening's news.
The empty air time, however, coincided perfectly with the
end of the school day.

While children's programs were

originally intended to be fillers, they tapped into an
audience of restless youngsters with free time on their
hands before dinner.

Inexpensive to produce, they had the

net effect of training young children to make consumer
choices. 36
Radio sponsors never intended to create a distinct
children's market, though they had made significant headway
into segmenting it by World War II.

Three- to eight-year-

olds preferred fairy tales; eight- to thirteen-year-olds
listened to adventure serials; and teenagers chose news and
sporting programs. 37

A 1940s survey by International

Business Machines (IBM) confirmed the extent of children's
listening habits.

Over 99% of American children had a radio

at home, with 44.4% of youngsters enjoying the privacy of a

36 This

marginal role of children's programming, and
hence, advertising, is revealed in the percentages of
programming devoted to children.
In 19 3 3, the National
Broadcasting Company (NBC) developed only 3.6% of its
overall programming for children, small compared to the 5.3%
undertaken by CBS.
Moreover, in a programming crunch,
children's shows were the first to be cut.
In 1939, NBC had
reduced children's shows to only 2.9% and CBS, to only 3.1%
of its overall programming, devoting the former children's
airtime to reporting on the European theater of war. White,
The American Radio, 66.
37 wolfe,

Modern Radio Advertising, 175-76;
and Neff, Practical Radio Advertising, 119-20.

Hettinger
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radio in their own bedrooms.

These children listened to an

average of sixteen different programs weekly with 69.3% of
children claiming that radio was a primary influence in
purchasing a consumer product. 38
The legitimacy of advertising to children was
repeatedly validated.

In a survey of the ten most commonly

cited criticisms of radio advertising, the fact that
advertisers targeted children did not even appear; rather,
that the ads were dull, silly, or misrepresented
products. 39

And in 1948, New York educator Dorothy

Gordon, moderator of the New York Times Youth Forum
affirmed:
We are living in a world of commerce, and children can
learn a great deal about trade products and raw
materials through a commercial message brought to them
by an intelligent advertiser. There is untold drama in
the history of consumer goods . . . . Advertisers are
def eating their own ends by ignoring the large potential
buying power of the present younger generation and
neglecting to pav attention to developing the consumer
of the future." 40
Gordon was mistaken in claiming that advertisers were
ignoring the children's market.
it did not need for attention.

While it lacked priority,
But it received both in

generous doses from Walt Disney and his alter-ego, Mickey

38 wolfe,

Modern Radio Advertising, 175.
Wolfe himself
has only two pages out of six hundred devoted to children's
advertising.
39 The

is unknown.

survey was conducted in the 1940s; precise date
Wolfe, Modern Radio Advertising, 594-95.

40 Quoted in Williams, Listening,

100-101.
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Mouse, who irrevocably legitimized child marketing by
shrouding it in a cloak of traditional family values, a
technique that McDonald's later perfected.
Walt Disney enjoyed early success as an animator
selling seven-minute animated reels retelling the tales of
Cinderella, Alice in Wonderland, and Red Riding Hood. 41
This success, however, soon turned sour.

Inexperienced at

the legalities of his craft, Disney had carelessly neglected
to copyright his first original character, Oswald the
Rabbit.

The oversight left him in the late 1920s without a

character, near personal bankruptcy, and made him
scrupulously cautious in protecting his characters. 42
Disney rebounded with the creation of Mickey Mouse.
Mickey was created as an adventurous, animated parallel to
real-life aviator, Charles Lindbergh.
flick,

His first short

"Plane Crazy" (carrying through the Lindbergh

allusion), was only an adequate filler.

Disney,

capitalizing on the sound innovation pioneered in Al
Jolson's The Jazz Singer, made Mickey's third flick,
"Steamboat Willie," a "talkie."
Talking pictures revolutionized the motion picture
industry, although children had already been a mainstay of
41 These

were crudely animated short flicks that were
used in theaters as filler, not the full-length animated
features for which Disney was subsequently famous.
42 Richard

Collier, "Wish Upon a Star:
The Magical
Kingdoms of Walt Disney, " Readers' Digest (October 19 71) :
231-33.
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cinema audiences two decades before Jolson's 1927
experiment.

As early as 1908, social reformer John Collier

observed, "The nickelodeon is the creation of the
child." 43

Collier estimated that in 1910, between 500,000

and 600,000 children trekked to the cinema daily. 44

Walt

Disney launched his "Steamboat Willie" into this world of
children's cinema and held his breath for their response.
An immediate success, "Steamboat Willie" unleashed a
barrage of praise on Disney, yet the costs of reproducing
the hundreds of animated pieces of celluloid film ("eels")
for a seven-minute reel exceeded the incoming revenues from
its theatrical release.

Like Kroc, who turned to real

estate acquisition to pad revenues and provide loan
collateral, Disney turned to trademark licensing in 1932 to
keep his constantly teetering studio out of bankruptcy.
Mickey's face made its way onto watches, roller skates,
sweatshirts, pianos, and greeting cards, a handful of the
hundreds of licenses Disney granted.

By 1965, 5,000

43 John

Collier, "Cheap Amusements," Chari ties and the
Commons 20 ( 11 April 1908):
75.
Quoted in David Nasaw,
"Children and Commercial Culture: Moving Pictures in the
Early Twentieth Century," in Small Worlds, eds. West and
Petrik, 25.
44

Quoted in John Collier, "The Motion Picture," in
Proceedings of the Child Conference for Research and Welfare
( 1910),
reprinted in Nasaw,
"Children and Commercial
Culture," 17, 19, 24.
Clutching their nickels, these
children constituted a statistically significant audience
for film-makers and distributors who relied upon children,
as radio did, to fill theaters during the late afternoon,
early evening, and weekend hours.
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different items promoted Mickey Mouse. 45

Pandering to the

comic book craze, Mickey and later raspy-voiced Donald Duck
each had their own series.

Lionel Toy Corporation, who had

been among the first manufacturers to directly market to
children in the early 1900s, was saved from bankruptcy in
1933 by Mickey Mouse.

Lionel sold 250,000 Mickey miniature

railroad engines in a scant three weeks, preempting its
financial collapse.

Sixty other firms were likewise saved

by the venerable Mickey. 46
The licensing tie-in encouraged in childhood
consumerism on an unprecedented scale.

Parents sanctioned

it because Disney's films validated parental authority and
reinforced

traditional family roles.

Cinderella was

deferential and compliant, even to her unrelentingly abusive
step-mother.

And Mickey Mouse, a typically adventurous

youth, was equally wholesome.

His radio show, "The Mickey

Mouse Theater of the Air," debuted on NBC in 1937 and was
immediately popular. 47

Disney offered parents wholesome

pre-packaged adventure for their children without risks, a
strategy later carried through in the Disney theme parks and
in television's "The Mickey Mouse Club."

It was a strategy

that would later work for McDonald's as well.

45 R.

Collier, "Wish Upon a Star," 235.

46 rbid.,

235-36;
Jenkins,
Children's Print Advertising," 8.

"A

Content

47 Buxton and Owen, The Big Broadcast,
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McDonald's did not create drive-in eating, nor was it
the first corporation to market products to children.

Ray

Kroc, bolstered by his own twenty years in the food
industry, consciously imitated the successes of others and
avoided their errors.

From the roadside eateries of the

1920s and 1930s, McDonald's learned that forcing a
franchisee to purchase tie-in products was ultimately selfdefeating.

It left the licensee vulnerable to exorbitant

price increases by the parent company or, worse, left bare
the licensee's risk of being completely severed should the
licensee and parent company quarrel. 48

Similarly, the

experiences of A & W, Tastee Freeze, and Dairy Queen taught
Kroc to avoid territorial licensing; thus, with a few early
exceptions, McDonald's granted its licenses one restaurant
at a time to discourage absentee operators.

McDonald's

learned its greatest lessons, however, from Howard
Johnson's.
Howard Johnson based his company's success on the
profitability of his licensees.

His competitive franchise

fee of $1,000 (in 1940) enabled franchisees to focus capital
on establishing quality control and uniform service, which

48

Kroc, Grinding It Out, 84.
Though McDonald's policy
of requiring franchisees to rent land from the corporation
could be considered a tie-in, a 1980 court ruling upheld
McDonald's policy.
The
location of McDonald's uni ts in
family neighborhoods, the ruling concluded, was an integral
part of the package that McDonald's sold to licensees, and,
therefore, could be regulated by the corporation.
Dicke,
Franchising in America, 129.
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Johnson oversaw through a corps of "special investigators"
and undercover "shoppers.

1149

Equally important, Howard

Johnson's showed that catering to the family trade could be
highly profitable.

Johnson provided standardized sit-down

meals tailored to families on vacation, and even provided
high chairs and youth booster seats, novel for the time. 50
Kroc emulated Johnson by keeping franchising fees low,
thus opening up licensing to the small, middle-class
entrepreneur.

McDonald's own hefty operations manuals

paralleled Johnson's "Bible," and the corporation employed a
similar fleet of field inspectors to regulate quality.
Finally, McDonald's followed Howard Johnson's into the
family trade, creating for itself a similar image of
wholesomeness and Americanism that exploited families' needs
for secure eating away from home.

And McDonald's eventually

surpassed Howard Johnson's in catering to children by giving
children their own Happy Meal, their own Playlands, and
their own friend, Ronald McDonald.

Howard Johnson's made

visiting a restaurant with children possible; McDonald's
made it preferable to eating at home.
The experiences of the periodical and radio advertisers
who marketed consumer products to children before World War
II also set important precedents for McDonald's.

Print

advertisers stressed the "fun" of their products over the
49

Dicke, Franchising in America, 121-22.

50

Alexander, "Host of the Highways," 48.
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less emotional attributes of quality, price, or reliability,
while the use of premiums encouraged children to actively
lobby parents for consumer products.

The dominance of the

food industry in radio advertising to children set a
precedent for host selling, blurring the line between an
actor and the fantasy character he played.
McDonald's drew upon these marketing innovations in
their own promotions.

As early as 1958, the McDonald

brothers had suggested using children's premiums to Ray
Kroc.

Free toys would be fun for the kids, the brothers

reasoned, and would help to draw in the parents.

Kroc

initially hesitated at the brothers' proposal, concerned
that premiums would dilute McDonald's quality image, though
he was willing to experiment with offering brownies or
gingerbread for children "strictly as a commercial item for
profit [selling] for about 12 cents. 1151

Kroc later

changed his mind and McDonald's now offers an endless series
of premiums in its Happy Meal product.
McDonald's also built upon the tradition of Walt
Disney.

Disney recognized the emerging children's market

and legitimized it by offering parents a safe and wholesome
recreational outlet for their children.

McDonald's co-opted

those images of security and wholesomeness and infused them
into the experience of eating a rushed meal surrounded by
51 Dictaphone

memo from Dick McDonald to Ray Kroc and
reply from Ray Kroc to Dick and Mac McDonald (October 1957),
reprinted in The Legacy Series, 16-18.
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restless youngsters.

McDonald's even exceeded Disney by

encouraging families to visit daily or weekly, making a stop
at McDonald's a normal routine rather than the occasional
treat that a trip to Disneyland implied. 52

And McDonald's

patterned Ronald after Mickey Mouse, realizing that a
smiling face and a cheery disposition would result in happy
children and a profitable corporation.
McDonald's took the lessons that it had learned from
the food and restaurant industry and applied them to the
1950s, capitalizing on the postwar phenomena of the Baby
Boom and suburbanization.

These predecessors had bequeathed

to McDonald's an emerging children's market, more
potentiality than actuality, but one, to which the 250,000
sales of Mickey's Lionel train attests, was filled with
great promise.

52 with

recorders,
every day.

the recent development of home-based video
however, Disney films can now be seen routinely

CHAPTER 4
"WHEN YOU'RE GREEN, YOU'RE GROWING
THE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES

.

11

:

As long as you're green you're growin?, as
soon as you're ripe you start to rot.
Ray Kroc, Grinding It Out
After two decades of depression and war, Americans were
on the verge of fulfilling the hopes of social planners who
had envisioned an America marked by secure boundaries,
affluence, and a revitalization of family and community.
Yet their optimism was prematurely marred by anxiety over a
smoldering Cold War.

Affluence was praised as patriotic,

yet criticized as shallow and conformist, while the sanctity
of the home was challenged by sensationalized images of
juvenile delinquency and crime.
McDonald's responded to these contradictions by
aggressive image building.

Ordering a hamburger, fries, and

a shake took on a more compelling and underlying cultural
subtext.

For the Cold Warrior, the "All-American" meal

described not only the product, but also the patron.

To the

investor, a McDonald's franchise demonstrated confidence in

1 Ray

The
Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out:
1977;
Making of McDonald's
(Chicago:
Henry Regnery,
Page
reprint, Chicago:
St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 6.
references are to the reprint edition.
84

85

American capitalism and economic superiority.

The parents

who thronged to McDonald's in their station wagons tacitly
reinforced the new consumer ethos, unconcerned that
McDonald's was subtly "consumerizing" their children.
Americans in the 1950s and 1960s were constructing a new
social and cultural framework, anchored by their concerns
over the Cold War, their increasing affluence, and, above
all, the raising of their children.

In suburb and station

wagon, in ranch house and drive-in, America was being
redefined in the 1950s and 1960s.

In the words of Ray Kroc,

it was "green and growing," and so was McDonald's.
Trailing Americans to the suburbs--in some cases,
preceding them with keen foresight--McDonald's validated
home and community.

With a "come as you are" approach,

McDonald's offered an image of itself as a home away from
home, ironic given the restaurant's dictum that a patron's
visit last no more than twenty minutes.

Responding to

suburbanites' preoccupation with rebuilding the physical and
intangible structures of community life, McDonald's became
the good neighbor, eager to offer a meeting room and free
hamburgers to community groups.

In an era where concerns

over safety and security transcended the evening news and
reached deep into Americans' daily lives,

McDonald's

promised a "company vision of itself as guardian of the
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nuclear family. 112

It crystallized this vision through its

advertising and marketing.
In 1962, less than a year after Ray Kroc's $2.7 million
buyout of the McDonald brothers, McDonald's issued its first
corporate advertising manual.

Although some licensees

questioned the necessity of the manual, Kroc felt that the
guidelines were crucial to maintaining one consistent
national image for the rapidly expanding chain.

Refusing to

leave anything to chance, Kroc and his marketing staff
provided franchisees with acceptable and approved sample ads
that reflected the image that Kroc wanted for McDonald's.
Mom likes McDonald's, too (claimed a teenage boy in an
early McDonald's print advertisement].
[She] says she
can feed us for less there than she can at home.
She
likes the speedy service . . no car hops . . . no
tipping . . . plenty of parking space . . . but most of
all no dishes to wash and no fussing in the kitchen.
Dinin~ at McDonald's is one of the good things of
life.
Appealing to the freedom from cooking or cleaning was the
hallmark of McDonald's advertising to mothers.

"Youngsters

love McDonald's Hamburgers--and you will, too!

Everything

at McDonald's is so inviting . . . so spotlessly clean. 114
As Elaine Tyler May has noted, housekeeping in the 1950s had
more than a sanitary purpose.

Keeping a clean and tidy

2 chip

Brown, "Life in the Fast-Food Lane:
Nobody's
Done It Like McDonald's," Washington Post, 23 February 1981,
sec. 1, p. 4.
311 McDonald's

4 Ibid.

f

9•

Advertising Manual, 1962,"

8.
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house proportionately reflected a mother's love for her
family, kept her yearnings for autonomy in check (she was,
after all, the "lady of the house"), and bolstered the
family's peace of mind by providing a physically and
psychologically uncluttered retreat from the chaos of the
outside world. 5
McDonald's clever exploitation of women's near
obsession with domestic tasks reinforced prevailing social
mores and positioned McDonald's as wholesome and mainstream,
two images which eluded their competition.

In July, 1965,

Mrs. M. Rogers of Newark, Delaware, wrote McDonald's that
she was very impressed with their cleanliness when she took
her son's scout troop on tour there.

McDonald's changed her

preconceived ideas of what a hamburger stand looked like,
she continued, and she ended her letter with a ringing
endorsement.

"As for my own family, we will be stopping by

for those delicious hamburgers and f rench fries more
often!

116

First came cleanliness in this mother's mind, and

only then the tastiness of the meal.
Rarely, however, was a McDonald's advertisement
targeted to parents without reference to their children.
The corporation took full advantage of the spiraling birth
rate during and immediately after World War II to develop a
5

Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound:
American Families
in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 3-15.
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Newsletter"
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(July
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long term customer base.

The October, 1960 issue of the

"McDonald's Newsletter" recapped that each of 180 million
Americans had consumed 2.2 hamburgers that year, at the
expense of approximately 100,000 cattle.

"And with 11,000

babies born every day . . . and McDonald's units opening as
rapidly as they are . . . Man!

What a potential!

McDonald's multiplication was correct.

117

In 1960, an

average of 11,634 babies were born each day, contributing to
the large cohort known as "Baby Boom" children. 8

From 1945

to 1965, over 80 million children were born, peaking in 1957
with 4.3 million live births.

The birth rate steadily

increased until it peaked in 1957 at 25.3 births per 1,000
population.

The marriage rate actually had its own peak

earlier in 1945, reflecting the obvious lag of time between
marriage and childbearing. 9

This massive statistical

increase in births created a society newly geared to the
raising of children.
In his historical analysis of childbearing, Lloyd de
Mause postulated six distinct "modes of parental attitudes"
toward children.

711 McDonald's

The last two modes, spanning the twentieth

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.

(October

1960),

McDonald's

8

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States:
1965 (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1965), table 46, p. 47.
9 considering

that a woman's childbearing year_s spans
two decades, it is conceivable that many of the couples who
married in 1945 were still having children by 1957.
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century, clarify the postwar parent/child relationship.
Prior to World War II, the dominant mode of interaction was
a "socialization mode."

Operant conditioning and

psychoanalysis formed the dual foundations of this mode with
the primary role of parent as educator.

By the 1950s,

however, parents retreated from being overt tutors to
allowing children's own developmental levels to dictate
their actions.

Parents took a more passive role in this

"helping mode," guiding, rather than coercing children's
behavior.

For the first time, de Mause continued, children

were considered legitimate and full persons in their own
right. 10

To McDonald's benefit, one of the newly

legitimated roles assigned to children was a consumer one.
Echoing de Mause, but on a more practical and popular level,
was Dr. Benjamin Spock.
Dr. Spock has become a cultural icon in his own right,
hailed in the 1950s as an expert on affective and effective
childbearing, yet condemned a decade later for creating an
undisciplined generation of children accustomed to
permissiveness and rebellion toward authority.

Central to

Spock's advice, however, was the belief that each child be
given the opportunity to develop an independent

10 Lloyd

de Ma use, The History of Childhood (New York:
Harper & Row, 1974), 1-6, 52-54.
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personality. 11

In effect, Dr. Spock's advice created a

generation of parents who willingly allowed young children
"practice" making economic decisions.

Permitting a

youngster, for example, to choose where to eat or what
cereal to buy, gave the child a concrete lesson in decisionmaking and consumerism, skills transferable as the child
matured.
With the exception of Howard Johnson's, McDonald's was
the only national restaurant chain which provided consumer
learning experiences for young children.

McDonald's put the

straws, napkins, and condiments within children's reach,
giving even three-year-olds a role in the family meal.
Older children, five- and six-year-olds, were encouraged by
both McDonald's and parents to do the actual ordering.
Aided by an extremely limited menu and a bolstering parent a
few feet away, children who ordered their families' food
received a simultaneous lesson in self-confidence and
consumerism.

A mother whose family visited a Portland,

Oregon, McDonald's in December, 1960 wrote that her children
were "thrilled" with ordering their own lunches. 12

A

Hermosa Beach, California, mother wrote McDonald's in

11 Nancy

Pottishman Wells, "Mother, the Invention of
Necessity:
Dr. Benjamin Spock's Baby and Child Care," in
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Children in Historical Perspective,
eds.
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Ray Hiner and Joseph M. Hawes
(Urbana,
IL:
University of Illinois Press, 1985), 293-96.
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September, 1964 that "my little boy" had ordered their food.
When he took it to his waiting mother, she noticed that the
counterman had given her son too much change. 13

The

minutiae of consumerism took awhile to learn.
McDonald's continually encouraged children to order
their own hamburger and fries, even providing a stepstool
for children too young to reach the counter on their own.
The corporation's message, however, did not always reach
individual licensees and managers and fueled a constant
stream of letters from parents whose respective "McDonald's
Experiences" fell short of the rhetoric.

Addressing

parents' complaints of children being ignored, McDonald's
Corporation issued a reminder in one of its 1982
Newsletters:
And then, you know, some things just might make little
kids cry.
If you're three feet tall and all you need is
a straw or a napkin for Mom and Dad, it may not seem
like much to some people but at that moment, it's
possibly the most important responsibility in the world
to that little person. Being ignored for five minutes
by chattering counter people is enough to bring tears to
the eyes of even the most staunch junior citizens. 14
McDonald's not only provided children with a valuable
learning experience, it also offered parents a means of

1311 McDonald's

Newsletter"
McDonald's Corporation Archives.
1411 McDonald's

(January/February

1965),

Newsletter" (November 1982), McDonald's
Corporation
Archives.
Obviously,
this
has
been
a
longstanding problem for the corporation.
It is interesting
to note that this reminder, written in 1982, has the same
tone and tenor of McDonald's earlier missives to licensees
in the 1950s and 1960s.
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showering their children with love, attention, and praise.
"Over a million kids a day eat at McDonald's.

Why not treat

yourself and the kids to a lunch at McDonald's today? 1115
McDonald's elevated even lunch to the status of being a
special treat for children.

But the "treat" was also for

the parent:
If you're too busy to fix lunch todal, why not come to
McDonald's. The kids will love it. 1
Or,
If fixing dinner for your family is a problem tonight,
take them to McDonald's. The kids will love it.
So
will you.1 7
A sense of conspiracy was even added in this commercial,
Hey Mom! Hide the pots and pans. McDonald's has dinner
ready right now. And you can come as you are. 18
While McDonald's was obviously a treat for the kids, it
was only so for the parents if it did not require a lot of
preparation.

The emphasis on- "come as you are 11 equated

McDonald's with home, where no one dressed up for meals and
where the atmosphere was relaxed, casual, and comfortable,
in other words, familial.

McDonald's persuaded parents of

1511 McDonald's Marketing Manual, 1969-1971, 11 McDonald's
Corporation Archives, Advertisement #13, Code #307-McD-20.
This was a local twenty second television spot ad done by
the D'Arcy, Masius, Benton, & Bowles Advertising Agency
(D 'Arey).
16
Ibid.,
second spot.
17

commercial Code# 307-McD-10.

This was a ten

Ibid., Advertisement #15, Code #309-McD-20.
a twenty second spot from 1969.
18

This was

Ibid.
This commercial is listed as a variant of the
preceding one. Both were done by D'Arcy in 1969.
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the 1950s and 1960s that they and their young children were
indeed welcomed at McDonald's.
necessary.

The persuasion was

Most restaurants frowned on child patrons;

juvenile antics at the dinner table could be tolerated at
home but became embarrassing in a restaurant.

Parents

unaccustomed to dining out with their children became
quickly enamored of the novelty of a restaurant that
actually catered to their youngsters.

One mother from

Libertyville, Indiana, wrote:
I do really appreciate them [McDonald's drive-ins] as
our children are too small to take to a restaurant.
This gives me a chance to eat out and with the children.
. . . I have a feeling we are going to be a part of the
McDonald's family for years to come. 19
Also, McDonald's was convenient because it was so close
to home.

Unlike Dick and Mac McDonald who built their San

Bernardino unit to attract a cross-section of local
residents, tourists, and railroad and orange grove laborers,
Ray Kroc originally concentrated his McDonald's in the
growing suburban neighborhoods, areas increasingly defined
as "home" for middle-class Americans.

"The big cities are

not for us," Kroc told the McDonald brothers in a dictaphone
memo in March; 1958.

"The big cities are too blase.

They

don't even turn their head [sic] to see a new kind of a
hamburger place, but in [the] towns, they brag about us.
They talk about us.

1911 McDonald's

They are loyal.
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By 1945, over 15% of Americans called themselves
"suburbanites."

The trend toward suburbanization continued

with a full third of Americans living in the suburbs by
1965. 21

McDonald's followed Americans out to the suburbs,

though they were nearly equally, yet quietly, committed to
urban areas.

McDonald's fostered an image of itself, in its

earliest years, as an exclusively suburban phenomenon.

That

image, however, ignores the large number of major cities in
which McDonald's located units.

Of McDonald's first forty

stores, approximately half were built in urban areas,
including Los Angeles, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Dallas. 22
Additionally, another quarter were located in areas which
would not be fully suburbanized for another decade, such as
Joliet, Illinois, or Kenosha, Wisconsin.
Kroc himself pref erred suburban locations for their
aura of newness, cleanliness, and family solidarity.

A

native Chicagoan, he relocated his own family to northwest
suburban Arlington Heights in 1937, long before the
20 Dictaphone

memo from Ray Kroc to Richard and Maurice
McDonald (March 1958), reprinted in The Legacy Series,
dictaphone tape transcript (Oak Brook, IL:
McDonald's
Corporation, 1988), 25.
21 Carl Abbott,

Urban America in the Modern Age, 1920 to
the Present (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1987),
7.
22 J.

Kenneth Props, "McDonald's Early History," (July
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northwestern corridor became a haven for disaffected
Chicagoans in the 1960s and 1970s.

A suburbanite by choice,

Kroc nevertheless encouraged the development of urban
McDonald's units in order to maximize public exposure and
acceptance.
All McDonald's restaurants, whether urban or suburban,
had to be located in family neighborhoods--on this Kroc was
adamant.

And he could be obstinate if proposed sites did

not meet his "station wagon" or "church steeple" criteria.
In 1958, McDonald's operations head, Fred Turner, proposed
that McDonald's build an experimental "downtowner" unit,
appealing to commuters and downtown residents.

Knowing that

a downtown unit had limited family appeal, Turner
circumvented Kroc and, instead, suggested it directly to the
McDonald brothers. 2 3
It is easy to see why Kroc liked suburbia.

Suburbs

provided the perfect fertile ground for McDonald's
expansion.

Kroc envisioned McDonald's as innovative and

distinctive, technologically superior to either standard
drive-ins or so-called "greasy spoons."

The newest of the

planned suburban developments in the 1950s and early 1960s
seemed to be grasping at the same image.
Some of the most famous of these new communities were
23 Dictaphone

memo from Fred Turner to Richard and
Maurice McDonald, 13 June 1958, The Legacy Series, 31-34.
The "downtowner" idea was eventually shelved for financial
reasons, primarily the exorbitant price of downtown real
estate.
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developer William Levitt's "Levittowns. 11

Sociologist

Herbert Gans' study of Levittown, New Jersey, confirms its
distinctive qualities.

Levitt offered residents not only

new homes, prefabricated in the latest mass production
technology, but also completed schools, shopping centers,
and even neighborhood pools. 24

Levitt gave his residents

a "jump start" on suburban living by prefabricating those
elements of community infrastructure which normally develop
only over time.

Thus, as McDonald's integrated its supply,

distribution, and consumption functions, William Levitt was
similarly integrating the residential functions of home,
school, and community. 25

While not all suburban expansion

was developed "from scratch 11 --significant numbers of neosuburbanites lived in older towns which had been co-opted by
b~lging

cities and transformed into peripheral residential

communities--Levitt's towns represented a cohesive and
conscious attempt at creating a new model of American
middle-class life in the 1950s. 26

They serve as an

24 Herbert

J. Gans, The Levittowners:
Ways of Life and
Poli tics in a New Suburban Community (New York:
Pantheon
Books, 1967), 4-7.
Gans himself was one of the original
residents of Levittown; the insight he offers combines the
dual-perspective of insider and sociologist.
25

Dorothy Barclay, "Children Within Suburban Limits,"
New York Times Magazine, 10 February 1957, 42.
26 Levittowns

were not unique here.
Rexford Tugwell' s
"Garden Cities" program in the 1930s was an equally
conscious attempt to reconfigure residential and community
patterns.
Even earlier examples were the distinct_factory
communities such as the Pullman neighborhood in Chicago
(housing Pullman's railroad car workers)
and Cudahy,
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effective counterpoint to McDonald's, which similarly
attempted and accomplished the same end.
Suburbia's popularity increased as Baby Boom parents
looked to the new developments to provide affordable homes
to house the spiraling child population.

Although historian

Kenneth T. Jackson credited America's frenzied pace of
postwar suburbanization to a racist rejection of the city,
the reason most often given by Gans' Levittowners for moving
to the suburbs was the desire to own one's own home. 27

In

1948, over two million couples were still living with
relatives, most often, their own parents.

With both the

Wisconsin, the southside Milwaukee suburb built for Patrick
Cudahy' s meatpackers.
Even the development of the more
culturally-isolated "bedroom" suburbs, (Scarsdale, NY, for
instance), frequently bereft of significant commercial,
industrial, or community institutions, reflected a desire to
reshape American family life.
The history of American
suburbanization has been diverse and experimental in nature,
fueled not only by developers' goals, but also by local and
regional preferences and norms.
27

Kenneth
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University Press, 1985), 289-93; Gans, Levittowners, 32-34.
Herbert Gans had spearheaded the argument that postwar
suburbanization was fueled by the desire to purchase an
affordable home.
Kenneth T. Jackson's research, however,
showed the entire phenomenon of American suburbanization to
be a racist response to the ethnic and racial diversity
inherent in urban life, hence, "white flight."
The logical
problem with
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course,
is
the
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Levittown, New Jersey, in the late 1950s.
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weakness is that he used one motive to rationalize the
entire two hundred year history of suburbanization in
America, dismissing the contextual importance of time and
place.
Al though both are seminal works -- Gans for his
insider's perspective and Jackson for his inclusivity
neither study provides a comprehensive understanding of
American suburbanization.
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birthrate and per capita income on the rise--from $593 in
1940 to an inflationary $1501 ten years later--more
Americans could afford their own homes.

To postwar parents,

suburbia provided a "fusion of need and desire.

1128

In 1940, new housing starts in the U.S. amounted to
603,000, large in comparison to the depressed market of the
1930s, but meager when measured against the nearly two
million of 1950. 29

Propelling this growth rate were the

creation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in 1934
and the Veterans Administration (VA) in 1944.

The FHA's

goal was to stimulate the construction industry by
stabilizing the mortgage market.

The agency insured long-

term, fixed rate loans made by private lenders to workingand middle-class Americans buying into "stable
neighborhoods," defined until the mid-1960s almost
exclusively as white, suburban neighborhoods. 30

In 1948

alone, the FHA backed $2.7 billion in mortgage loans and
joined leagues with the newly created Veterans
Administration to provide home loans for returning

28
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servicemen. 31
Authorized by the 1944 Servicemen's Readjustment Act
(G.I. Bill), the VA insured low-interest, no down payment
loans to veterans, many of whom purchased into subdivisions
like Levittown.

"I worked very closely with the FHA,"

Levitt said in a 1983 interview with Esquire, "Got together
a little group . . . and we sat down with then commissioner
Abner Ferguson and we explained to him the only way we were
going to get a volume of housing was to grant to the
veteran, in effect, a one hundred percent mortgage.
[sic] he had no cash.

1132

'Cause

The VA's loan program peaked at

$7.1 billion in 1955 and, combined with the FHA's efforts
and the linking of the nation's suburbs through the
Interstate Highway Act of 1956, signalled an unprecedented
federal commitment to suburban development, frequently at
the expense of urban areas. 33
The freeing up of mortgage money, however, did not
31
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32
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For a discussion of
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For an analysis
of the inequities between the federal subsidy of America's
postwar cities and suburbs, see Richard o. Davies, The Age
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J. B. Lippincott,
1975.
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totally account for the jump in postwar home ownership.
Advances in residential archtecture also had an impact,
particularly the stylistic innovations of the ranch and,
later, the split-level style of homes.

The popularity and

affordability of these new forms created an unprecedented
level of demand for single-family housing in the postwar
decade.

By 1956, a full 59% of Americans owned their own

homes. 34
Ranch housing "represented the ultimate in
'livability, '

'comfort, ' and 'convenience. '" 35

Open and

airy compared to urban bungalows, the 1950s ranch with its
expansive picture windows sought to recreate the imagined
relaxation of a California sunporch.

Even the name "ranch"

conjured up images of the Western outdoors.

More tangible

benefits were the one story design, especially suited to
families with toddlers, the emphasis on large and
utilitarian kitchens, and the use of casual "family rooms"
to replace the more formal Victorian duet of parlor and
sitting room.
Although aesthetically distinctive only in their
34 Interdepartmental

Committee on Children and Youth,
Children in a Changing World (Washington, DC:
White House
Conference on Children and Youth, 1960), 9.
This figure
includes homes both paid in full and those with outstanding
mortgages.
It also represents only non-farm families; the
ownership rate for farmers in 1956 was higher, at 70%.
35 clifford

E.
Clark,
Jr.,
"Ranch-House
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Ideals and Realities," in Recasting America:
Culture and
Politics in the Age of the Cold War, ed. Lary May (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989), 171, 177.
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simplicity, ranch homes offered an innovative response to
the millions of parents who heeded Dr. Spock's dictum of
child-centered parenting.

The Baby Boom had forced a

redefinition of family life, just as it forced the McDonald
brothers to similarly rethink their drive-in restaurant.
Parents, who moved to the suburbs "for the good of the
children," idealized family life in their new neighborhoods.
Brochures advertising tree-lined streets, manicured lawns,
and tidy rows of ranches reinforced the image of suburbia as
carefree, yet structured.

In essence, suburbs offered

Americans the opportunity to start fresh, to recreate the
definition of American life centered on the values of family
and community.
One of the challenges to this new definition of
American life was urban juvenile delinquency.

Kroc stressed

McDonald's suburban roots, in part, to counter the standard
images of the drive-in as a teen hangout. In hindsight, Kroc
and suburban parents overreacted to fears of urban crime and
wayward youths.

While Children's Bureau statistics reported

a 45% rise in juvenile crimes between 1945 and 1953, they
generalized from a small statistical sample which was not
representative for all urban areas.

The FBI's Uniform Crime

Reports, which used equally skewed numbers and continually
expanded the definition of delinquency to include legal but
antisocial behaviors, ''sensationalized and distorted" the
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actual extent of a juvenile crime wave. 36

The

postwar antidote to the perceived spiraling in juvenile
crimes was a tight-knit home, guarded by firm yet loving
parents who would provide the strong role models that
children needed.

FBI Director Hoover's "terrifying vision

of a juvenile crime wave once the children born during the
war and in the subsequent baby boom reached the dangerous
teen years," impelled parents even of babies and toddlers to
see in the new suburbs a fresh start, free from the
established patterns of urban crime. 37
McDonald's continually reassured parents of its
wholesomeness, safety, and family appeal.

A 1961 essay on

youth and automobiles shows that 18.5% of all licensed
drivers were under twenty-four years old; automobile
ownership and use were not only prolific for this age
cohort, but were interpreted as the medium for teenagers
acting out their tensions and anxieties.
36 James
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cruising, and dangerously exhibitionist driving habits were
perceived as a revolt against the strictures society placed
on teen behavior. 38

This, combined with the correlation

between juvenile delinquency and car use (auto theft and
traffic violations were two of the most common teenage
crimes) makes it clear why McDonald's needed to continually
reinforce a wholesome image for itself, accomplished, in
part, by disowning teenage patrons. 39
"Teen-agers, and their patronage, should be accepted
but not solicited," McDonald's Chicago headquarters told its
field managers and licensees in 1966. 40

McDonald's main

problems with teenagers were between 7 pm and closing, after
the main family meal times of lunch and supper.

While

McDonald's ambivalence toward teen patrons tarnished its
image as a wholesome, family restaurant, it contradicted
McDonald's sales goals to unilaterally prohibit teenagers.
In 1965, for example, teenagers accounted for one-third of
McDonald's total sales volume. 41

The best that McDonald's

could do was to control the teens as much as possible,

38 Ross

A. McFarland and Roland C. Moore, "Youth and the
Automobile," in Values and Ideals of American Youth, ed. Eli
Ginzberg (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961), 17175.
39 rbid;

Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage, 69-71.

4011 McDonald's

Newsletter"
(April
1966),
McDonald's
Corporation Archives. Emphasis is in the original.
4111 McDonald' s

Newsletter"
McDonald's Corporation Archives.

(November/December

1965),
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riding a fine line between needing their patronage, and not
alienating the family trade which accounted for the other
two-thirds of its sales.
Kroc tried to forestall the teenage problem, as did the
McDonald brothers earlier in San Bernardino, by enacting
strict and precise rules of behavior for teens who visited
McDonald's:

no loitering, no shouting, no hot rodding, no

alcohol on the premises, and no blaring radios.

Kroc hoped

the presence of husky lot men (basically "bouncers") and the
lack of telephones and jukeboxes, combined with an
exhaustive list of prohibited behaviors, would stem
teenagers' rowdiness. 42
double-edged.

The teenage problem, however, was

Not only did teens comprise a sizable

percentage of McDonald's patrons (McDonald's family image
notwithstanding), but teenagers also formed the core of
McDonald's front line employees, its "crew."
Even in the 1950s and 1960s, McDonald's attracted a
large percentage of high school and college aged employees.
The seasonal nature of the drive-in industry (although
McDonald's was open year-round, revenues were highest in the
summer months) combined with typically low starting wages
predictably meant that a significant proportion of employees
were young.

For them, McDonald's was a full-time summer or

part-time year-round job.

42 rbid;

The corporation even boasted that

"McDonald's
Newsletter"
McDonald's Corporation Archives.

(April

1966),
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its mass production food system required little in the way
of employee training, the perfect job situation for
inexperienced teens.

Harvard Business School professor

Theodore Levitt likened McDonald's to a "highly
sophisticated piece of technology . . . with the capability
of producing a predictably standardized, customer-satisfying
output while minimizing the operating discretion of its
attendant . . . • It is a machine that produces, with the
help of totally unskilled machine tenders, a highly polished
product." 43

The problem for Ray Kroc, however, was that

not only did he have to control his teenage patrons in order
to maintain McDonald's family image, he also needed to
create an image of wholesomeness for his teenage employees.
To underscore this image, Ray Kroc set strict standards
of employee personal appearances.

Clean and starched

uniforms, a prohibition against mustaches or beards, and a
mandated length for haircuts ("Beatle" haircuts were
expressly forbidden) created the wholesome 1950s and 1960s
teen look that Norman Rockwell later immortalized in "A
Happy Adventure," commissioned by McDonald's in 1971. 44
Kroc was quite fastidious about his own appearance, and much
43 Theodore

Levitt,
"Production-line
Approach
to
Service," Harvard Business Review (September-October 1972):
46.
44 "McDonald's

Newsletter"
(June
1964),
McDonald's
Corporation Archives.
"A Happy Adventure" showed a cleancut crewman surrounded by a group of smiling children.
The
painting hangs in the lobby of McDonald's Corporation
Archives in Elk Grove Village, Illinois.
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of McDonald's personal appearance regulations stemmed as
much from Kroc's own quirks as from the need to maintain a
family image.

And, taking a cue from the McDonald brothers'

problems with female carhops, Kroc hired males exclusively
in McDonald's company-owned units (called "McOpCo" stores)
and encouraged his licensees to do the same.
Owner/operators, many of whom were husband-wife teams,
obviously found Kroc's dictum unworkable since the success
of the unit frequently necessitated the on site presence of
both husband and wife.

The rule was also necessarily

ignored in the few cases where a lone woman was contracted
as a franchisee.

By the late 1960s, however, it was obvious

even to Ray Kroc that his prohibition of female crew members
was neither practical nor being obeyed.

In 1968, McDonald's

Corporation formally rescinded the prohibition and openly
hired female employees in all its units. 45
Kroc's concerns over female crew members, however
impractical, stemmed from the strong sexual associations
revolving around carhops, fry cooks, and male teenage
patrons.

Although drive-ins occasionally experimented with

alternatives to carhops--Los Angeles' "Motormat" drive-in
45 "McDonald's

Chronological History Report," 26.
This
prohibition applied only to crew positions.
McDonald's
continued to hire women into office positions at its
corporate headquarters, including June Martino who began as
Ray
Kroc's
secretary
and
eventually
graduated
to
Secretary /Treasurer of McDonald's
Board of
Directors.
Overall, however, Martino was the exception rather than the
rule, and McDonald's managerial staff and crew during the
1950s and 1960s continued to be overwhelmingly male.
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with its high speed conveyor system was an example--female
restaurant attendants were still the norm for most drive-ins
in the 1950s. 46

Beyond the sexual association was the

growing societal prescription that a woman could best serve
her family and her own interests within the domestic sphere.
The 1950s woman, as opposed to her temporarily independent
wartime sister, was told that society needed her to be
sexually demure, physically nurturing, and psychologically
supportive of husband and children. 47

The female carhop's

sexuality and employment in a culturally marginal
institution (a drive-in restaurant) represented an outright
rejection and rebellion against this new definition of the
postwar "modern" woman.

It was a rebellion which McDonald's

could not afford to promote.

Thus, through its continual

emphasis on cleanliness, convenience, and the American
family, McDonald's catered to the newly defined image of the
postwar suburban homemaker.
"Our theme is kinda [sic] synonymous with Sunday
School, the Girl Scouts and the YMCA [Young Men's Christian
Association].

McDonald's is clean and wholesome.

the family with youngsters.
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It is for

Ray Kroc continually honed

this message, in the 1965 Newsweek interview quoted here,
4611 Eating

Goes Assembly Line at California Drive-in,"
BusinessWeek, 23 July, 1949, 22-23.
47 E.
48 Ray

May, Homeward Bound, 62-70.

Kroc, "The Hamburger King," interview,
13 September 1965, 74-75.

Newsweek,
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and in nearly every one of McDonald's press releases or
promotional brochures.

Mothers eagerly responded to

McDonald's appeals, even writing to McDonald's corporate
headquarters to request that more restaurants be built in
their neighborhoods. 49

The lures of convenience and

wholesomeness partly explained parents' acquiescence to
their youngsters' demands for McDonald's.

On a more basic

level, what made all these visits to McDonald's possible was
a new and unprecedentedly positive attitude toward
consumerism.
Cleansed of the extravagant and wasteful connotations
plaguing it in the 1920s, domestic consumerism, that is,
purchases made for the home or to benefit the family,
provided an outlet for female initiative, family nurturing,
and Cold war containment.so

It also became a major factor

driving McDonald's success.

McDonald's provided children

with a controlled consumer learning experience, an
experience parents considered essential to their children's
maturation.

Parents who themselves became enamored with the

"untold drama of the history of consumer goods" inevitably
passed that trait on to their children.s 1
49 "McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.

By the mid-

(September 19 61) ,

McDonald's

soE. May, Homeward Bound, 162-68.
SlQuote by Dorothy Gordon, moderator of the 1948 New
York Times Youth Forum, reprinted in Albert N. Williams,
Listening:
A Collection of Critical Articles on Radio
(Freeport, NY:
Books for Libraries Press, 1948; reprint,
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1960s, the "nickel consumerism" of the grocery store or
"five and dime" had been expanded into a multi-billion
dollar industry.
That children became the targets of Madison Avenue
advertisers is not, in and of itself, surprising.

Preteens

and teenagers, especially, were increasingly perceived
throughout the 1950s and 1960s as independent moral and
social agents, rather than passive adjuncts to their
parents.

The public outcry over juvenile delinquency and

the correlative belief that youth was responsible for its
actions, attested to this shift in the perception of
children.

But critics, like Vance Packard in the 1950s and

Peggy Charren of Action for Children's Television (ACT) in
the 1970s and 1980s, erroneously faulted the advertising
industry for creating consumer desires among children.

In

so doing, they missed the role that parents and the larger
society played in socializing the young. 52
1968), 100-101.
52 Myrna

References are to the reprint edition.

Carol
Morris,
"Consumer
Socialization of
Preschool Children:
The Parental View," (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Georgia - Athens, 1975), 13, 52-54.
Morris
studied children aged two to seven in a Clarke County,
Georgia,
nursery school and concluded that children's
interest in and readiness for consumer roles was directly
related to the degree that their parents (primarily mothers)
encouraged such behavior. Taking children along on shopping
errands, prompting children to make small purchases for
themselves, and giving them an allowance at an early age all
indicated the parental sanctioning of child consumerism
(pp. 93-98).
Morris's thesis was later reinforced by a
1985 study offering the same conclusions.
Les Carlson,
"Parental Style and the Consumer Socialization of Children,"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1985), 26.
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Long before the 1950s, consumerism had become a
national craze, into which children increasingly became
swept.

Even before World War I, cultural historian Neil

Harris has observed, "the buying drama had begun to serve
[as] a symbol for modernity and the buying experience had
become a ritual . . . a metaphor for national mobility,
social climbing, economic competition, and moral
deterioration.

1153

Consumerism following World War II

retained all these metaphors and added one:

national

security.
The connection between security and consumption was not
new.

In the 1700s and 1800s, consumption provided a false

sense of security in one's spiritual state. 54

But by the

mid-twentieth century, personal security took on a more
secular cast.

What made the 1959 Nixon/Khrushchev Moscow

"kitchen debate" unique, even humorous from a 1990s
perspective, was the use of household appliances as the
measure of a nation's strength and prestige.

In the 1950s

Both
Morris
and
Carlson
assumed
that
only
mothers
significantly affected their children's consumer behavior.
Mothers, frequently with children in tow, made the bulk of
the family's routine purchases.
The major family purchases
in which the father was involved--buying a new home or a new
car--ordinarily did not take the children's preferences into
account.
53

Neil Harris, "The Drama of Consumer Desire," in
Cultural Excursions:
Marketing Appetites and Cultural
Tastes in Modern America (Chicago:
University of Chicago
Press, 1990), 183.
54 Ibid.,

175.
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and 1960s, toasters, refrigerators, and washing machines
transcended their obvious mechanical functions, even
transcended the less tangible promises of convenience or
efficiency.

They became weapons in a Cold War that was

waged as much in Sears, Roebuck or Macy's as it was in
partitioned Germany or smoldering Korea.

While the United

States temporarily trailed in the space race and an exact
missile parity proved elusive, America in 1959 could claim
unilateral victory in the consumer race.

In redefining the

parameters of the Cold War, the United States guaranteed
itself at least a rhetorical edge.ss
While not front line soldiers in the consumer war,
children, especially teenagers, became early recruits.

In

August, 1959, the same month that Newsweek and U.S. News and
World Report covered the Moscow "kitchen debate," Life
reported on the "New, $10-Billion Power:
Consumer."

the U.S. Teen-age

To put teens' spending power in perspective,

that $10 billion, Life continued, exceeded by a billion
dollars the total sales of General Motors.s 6

High school

students in 1959 had, on average, about four times the
spending money of their counterparts in 1945, enjoying $10 a

ssE. May, Homeward Bound, 162-64.
S 611 New,

$10-Billion
Power:
Consumer," Life, 31 August 1959, 78.

The

U.S.

Teen-age
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week compared to the $2.50 of 1945. 57

While 38% of their

total spending went for miscellaneous items, including
transportation, books, and personal grooming, the largest
line item expenditure was for food, presumably eating out.
The analysis of teenage spending patterns sparked
either intense criticism or awe, depending on who was doing
the reporting and for what audience.

Eugene Gilbert, whose

longitudinal study of teens from 1945 to 1959 revealed the
differences in spending money cited above, established one
of the earliest marketing research firms specifically
detailing the consumer preferences of children, preteens,
teens, and young adults. 58

A two-part series in Harpers

in 1959 hailed Gilbert's profession as new and innovative.

57

Eugene Gilbert,
"Why Today's Teen-agers Seem So
Different," Harpers 219 (November 1959):
77.
Gilbert's
methodology was unique for the 1950s and consisted of having
specially
trained
teenaged
interviewers
conduct
the
marketing research questioning sessions.
Gilbert correctly
assumed that teens would more openly relate to a peer rather
than to an adult.
Gilbert then sold this information to
companies seeking to capitalize on the growing youth market.
58 Arri ving

at a precise and consistent definition of
these stages of a young person's life is elusive.
overall,
however, the sources suggest that "child" is a youngster
under age ten or eleven, while "preteen" (also ref erred to
as "tween") covers the ages ten to thirteen.
"Teenager" is
more definitionally precise, ranging from ages thirteen
through nineteen.
"Young adult" is more elusive, though
tends to refer specifically to married youth (which in the
late 1950s included many eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds)
as well as persons in their twenties who were financially
and residentially dependent upon their parents.
These
categories
became
further
confused
in
the
1960s
as
"children" were further broken down into preschooler versus
school-aged and when the status of semi-independent college
students clouded the distinctions.
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And by 1975, more than fifteen national child research
firms, including Gilbert's, his early competitor Rand Youth
Poll (established 1953), and the National Baby Panel, all
offered the latest marketing data on babies, children, and
youth. 59

But a 1963 article in Marriage and Family Living

stressed the need for "money management programs" to teach
teens prudent consumerism, while The PTA Magazine echoed
parents' worries that "making things too easy" for their
children amounted to insulating them from the economic
realities of the non-suburban, non-middle-class world. 60
The economic importance of the teen market over the
younger children's market lay in teens' more expansive and
more immediate consumer role.

Because of its peer-

referenced nature, the teen market was a continual "hot
market," changing in tune with regional and national fads.
The fluidity of the market required constant flexibility by
marketers, but the effort was rewarded in securing brand
loyalty. 61

Overall, the lack of frugality among

teenagers, their attention to fads, their increasing
5911

companies to Consider in Researching CHILD, YOUTH &
STUDENT MARKETS," Journal of Advertising Research 15, no. 4
(August 1975): 35-36.
6 °Kathryn

Summers Powell and David A. Gover, "The
Adolescent as a Consumer: Facts and Implications," Marriage
and Family Living 25, no. 3 (August 1963):
364; Dale and
Elizabeth Harris, "The Affluent Child," The PTA Magazine 58,
no. 6 (March 1964): 27-29.
61 June

Sochen, Cafeteria America:
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Contemporary Life (Ames, IA:
Iowa State University, 1988),
66.
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disposable income, and their freedom from household expenses
made them an ideal market. 62

But the younger children's

market was not totally bypassed.

In a mid-1950s survey for

CBS, Eugene Gilbert discovered that over half of the four
million children who watched the children's television show
"Captain Kangaroo" tagged along with their mothers on
grocery errands and specifically requested the products that
were advertised on Bob Keeshan's (Captain Kangaroo)
show. 63

Although McDonald's was unique among drive-in

restaurant chains in its appeal to children and families,
other types of corporations were equally creative and
adamant in developing the children's market.
As they did in the 1920s and 1930s, cereal
manufacturers continued to take an aggressive lead.

From

1955 to 1956, Quaker Oats offered children "FREE GOLD RUSH
LAND" as a product premium.

The ads did not lie; the

children were indeed entitled to a share of the "land in the
fabulous Klondike Gold Country of the Yukon 11 --a whole square

62 Helen

B. Shaffer, "Youth Market," Editorial Research
Reports,
25 August
1965,
626.
Affiliated with the
Congressional Quarterly Service, Editorial Research Reports
dispatched up-to-date information on social trends to
newspapers, magazines, radio, and television.
Fred D.
Lindsey, "Expanding Markets:
The Young Adults, " Nation's
Business 46 (March 1958):
70-72; Grace and Fred M.
Hechinger, "In the Time it Takes You to Read These Lines the
American Teen-Ager Will Have Spent $2,378.22," Esquire (July
1965): 65.
63 Macdonald,

"Profiles: A Caste, A Culture, A Market,"
New Yorker 34 (22 November 1958): 78.
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inch's worth. 64

Blevins Popcorn Company mimicked Quaker

Oat's successful ploy by offering their own one square inch
of "Davy Crockett Land," exploiting the popularity of
Disney's legendary western adventure hero. 65

McDonald's

and other advertisers hoped enticing the children would
bring in the parents.

Children's real economic value, they

believed, was in influencing their parents' decisions on
where to eat, what cereals to purchase, and what clothing or
toys to buy, in contrast to the more independent economic
role they would assume in the 1970s and 1980s.

Thus,

McDonald's used children to tap into the increasingly
affluent middle-class.
In 1935, the per capita personal income of Americans
was $474.

Twenty years later, the accumulated economic

gains of war and prosperity had pushed this figure to $1881,
an increase of nearly 300%. 66

More disposable income

meant increased restaurant visits.

Since McDonald's in the

1950s was still perceived as a "treat," rather than as the
routine meal stop it became by the 1970s, disposable income
levels assumed a greater importance to the corporation's

64 rbid.
65 Ibid.

u.s. Bureau of the Census,
vol. 1, Series F 17-30, p. 225.
66

Historical

Statistics,
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early success. 67

Fueling the increase in disposable

income was a reorientation of the American workforce into
white-collar, middle management, and professional ranks.
Between 1950 and 1958, the number of professional and
technical workers increased 50%, compared to only a 4% rise
in the demand for highly skilled labor. 68

These numbers

reflected not only the increasing technological orientation
of postwar society, but the success of the federal
government's program to revitalize and professionalize
American workers.

While the G.I. Bill had the intended

impact of siphoning off large cohorts of veterans from the
job pool, it also contributed to a realignment of social
class. 69
The Bill's small business provisions provided seed
capital to finance postwar entrepreneurialism, giving Ray
Kroc's franchising efforts a boost.

World War II had

interrupted Americans' career paths; the rethinking of one's
~

67

A more recent critique of McDonald's is that it is
now immune in fluctuations in income levels. For example,
inner-city minorities, with little disposable income, tend
to patronize McDonald's at levels disproportionate to their
income.
While this has left McDonald's vulnerable to
charges of exploitation, it reveals just how routine a visit
to McDonald's has become.
Alix M. Freedman, "Fast-Food
Chains Play Central Role in Diet of the Inner-City Poor,"
Wall Street Journal, 19 December 1990, sec. A, 1.
68
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w. Olson, The G.I. Bill, the Veterans and the
Colleges (Lexington, KY:
University Press of Kentucky,
1974), 21-24.
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occupational life after the war was just part of Americans'
overall reorganization of their private lives. 70

Between

1946 and 1947, for example, Americans purchased more than
1.2 million businesses with over half of these in the
service and retail industries, the sector into which drivein restaurants fell. 71

Equally important, Title II of the

G.I. Bill subsidized the continuing education of veterans in
colleges, universities, and vocational schools.

In 1947,

1.15 million veterans utilized Title II provisions,
comprising more than 49% of all students enrolled in higher
education that year. 72

Its net impact not only created

the technologically trained workers needed by postwar
industry, but precipitated a swelling in middle-class ranks.
While McDonald's was arguably committed to both
suburban and urban neighborhoods in the 1950s and 1960s, its
target audience was consistently middle-claSj>.

The station

wagons, bicycles, and ranch homes that Kroc centered on
became iconographic symbols for a society that increasingly
defined itself as child-centered, suburban, and middleincome.

The symbolism, however, proved shallow.

It not

70 Thomas

s. Dicke, Franchising in America:
The
Development of a Business Method, 1840-1980 (Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 124.
71 Ibid.

72 olson,

G.I. Bill, table 1, p. 44.
The impact of the
vets on America's colleges, however, was temporary.
By
1953, most veterans had graduated and their ranks dwindled
to only 6% of all college or university students.
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only betrayed the urban, ethnic, and racial diversity of
postwar America, but it also lacked substance, because what
"middle-class" meant in 1955 was still largely undefined.
The old nineteenth century middle-class had been
maverick entrepreneurs who had shunned corporate ties in
search of independent wealth.

The new middle-class,

identifiable by their formal "white-collar" uniform, were
bound to the whims of the corporation and reinforced the
status quo rather than challenged it. 73

The postwar

emphasis on a consumer-driven economy required a coordinated
corporate bureaucracy with predictable job responsibilities,
privileges, and advancement.

The "team" replaced the

individual as the agent of economic production while the
individualistic Protestant work ethic succumbed to a new
"social ethic" in which the needs of the organization became
paramount. 74

McDonald's was able to integrate both

....

polarities in its franchising program, offering rapid
expansion to the corporation through an individualistic
franchising program that respected its owner/operators as
independent entrepreneurs.
An October, 1963 McDonald's market research suFvey

c. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle
Classes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), xiv-xvi.
Although Mills spoke of the middle-classes, in plural, his
thesis limited them to an essentially single, homogeneous,
and unidimensional entity.
73

74 William

City, NY:

H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man · (Garden
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), 3.
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showed that 43% of Americans did not eat at drive-in
restaurants, a 3% drop from a year earlier. 75

Ray Kroc

was intent on convincing the other 57% that McDonald's, in
particular, was one drive-in worth visiting.

While Kroc's

emphasis on the family trade promised solid results--83% of
those who did eat at drive-ins had children aged thirteen or
younger--the primary way to attract more potential customers
was through rapid and large-scale expansion of units, an
ambitious goal possible only through aggressive
franchising.

76

Ray Kroc liked to boast that McDonald's franchising was
respectable, not the "rackets" that he dubbed the
competition, by appealing to the reputations of some of his
earliest franchisees.

77

lMost well-known among this

pioneering circle was John

w.

Gibson, Assistant Secretary of

Labor from 1945 to 1950, who with partner Oscar Goldstein
enjoyed one of the few territorial franchises Kroc ever
approved, in the District of Columbia/Alexandria, Virginia,
area.

While Gibson and Goldstein would later shine as the

creators of the Ronald McDonald character, Gibson's early
importance was the inherent air of respectability which he
lent to McDonald's franchising.
7511 McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.
76

The vast majority of Kroc's
(March

1964),

McDonald's

rbid.

77 Dictaphone

memo from Ray Kroc to Richard and Maurice
McDonald (October 1957), reprinted in The Legacy Series, 10.
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licensees, however, were ordinary men and women, frequently
husband and wife teams, who hoped that McDonald's was the
great pearl hidden among the many franchising fads in the
1950s.
"Be Your Own Boss--With that age-old dream in mind,
62,000 would-be bosses . . . paid $1 each to investigate
businesses ranging from pizza parlors to paperback-book
forums, from chimney cleaning to insect control.

1178

l

Newsweek's reporting of the 1962 "Start Your Own Business"
exposition revealed one of the most frequently cited reasons
for entering into a licensing arrangement:

security.

"You've got 50% of your problems licked with a franchise,"
claimed a newly minted and confident Mister Donut
franchisee.
with me."

"I get expert advice, I've got someone walking
The franchisee, who had recently folded an

independently owned sporting goods store after a discount
house moved in, was confident that the security of "a
nationally advertised concern" would give him the head start
and endurance needed for success. 79

Although McDonald's

was probably not represented at the fair--by late 1961,
McDonald's already had a year's backlog of franchisees

7811 The

Everlasting Dream
Newsweek, 12 February 1962, 68.
79

Ibid., 69.

Be

Your

Own

Boss, "
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waiting for their units--it offered the same security. 80
Kroc correctly believed that adherence to his quality,
service, and cleanliness credo combined with targeting the

family niche would create a distinctive national image for
McDonald's unlike that of

its~competitors.

McDonald's arch-

rival, Burger King, for example, offered large territorial
franchises strung together by a weak central corporation.
The lack of on going training, coordinated advertising, and,
most importantly, the failure to create a consistent company
image, prevented Burger King from being a serious threat to
McDonald's until 1977, when Burger King lured away
McDonald's executive Donald Smith to "McDonaldize" Burger
King. 81
The America that McDonald's was born in offered the
ideal mix of place, time, and circumstance.

Overshadowed by

the threat of Soviet aggression, Americans redefined their
private and public lives along the new imperatives of
security and stability.

Domesticity was more than a

personal choice; it became the last bulwark against
encroaching communism.

The Baby Boom and the correlative

urban exodus represented a search for utopian families and
communities, all the more desired because of the encroaching
ao"Meat, Potatoes and Money," Time, 3 November 1961,
81;
Paine,
Webber,
Jackson
and
Curtis,
"McDonald's
Corporation Prospectus," 20 April 1965, 8-9.
81 "Burger

King Corporation," International Directory of
Company Histories:
Food Services & Retailers, ed.. Lisa
Mirabile (Chicago: St. James Press, 1990), 613-14.
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threat of juvenile

delinque~cy.

Consumerism not only lost

its extravagant connotations, but became a line of paramilitary defense equal to an act of patriotism.

And

increases in discretionary income simultaneous with the
swelling of middle-class ranks legitimized America's claim
of victory in the ongoing rhetorical sparring with the
Soviet Union.

McDonald's unconsciously reflected,

benefitted from, and exploited all these ideologically
intertwined, yet diverse strands of postwar American
society.
Something as simple as naming its anchor entree the
"All-American Meal" and flying the American flag round-theclock created an image of McDonald's as boosterist, if not
outright patriotic.

The needs of the newly redefined

American family, quixotically isolated and private yet
charged with the intensely public mission of defending
democracy, were met with unmatched precision by the McDonald
brothers and Ray Kroc.

McDonald's provided child-oriented

meals in a familial setting, allowing families to eat in the
privacy of their cars, publicly surrounded by dozens of
families doing the same.

McDonald's catered to Baby Boom

children using them to reach parents.

Parents willingly

acquiesced to their children because routine dining out with
children had become both novel and convenient.

Located in

primarily middle-class neighborhoods, McDonald's drew upon
the bulging numbers of child-centered, suburban families.

123

Their success

be~ame

McDonald's own.

.I

CHAPTER 5
GIVING SOMETHING BACK
What people remember is that McDonald's helps
needy children; homes for the aged; destitute
families . . . . People don't forget this, and
it is places such as this that they like to
patronize, a restaurant with a heart, a
McDonald's. 1
"McDonald's Newsletter"

McDonald's had one goal in the 1950s and 1960s:

to

create a market for themselves distinct from other drive-in
restaurants.

They accomplished this by targeting young

families whose needs for convenience and desires for
wholesomeness matched what McDonald's offered.

To

strengthen their hold on the family market, McDonald's
created, in effect, a "good neighbor policy" which
emphasized beneficence and community concern.

Corporate

philanthropy was the key to this policy.
McDonald's believed that parents needed to be assured
that the restaurant was socially good for their children
before they acquiesced to the demands for a hamburger and

111 McDonald's

Newsletter"
McDonald's Corporation Archives.
124

(January/February

1966),

125

Mc~onald's provided these assurances through a

fries. 2

comprehensive strategy of public relations which included
corporate sponsorship of Little League baseball and scout
troops, curriculum materials for elementary school students,
opportunities for extra-curricular activities, and funding
for children's medical needs.

McDonald's was neither the

first nor most prolific benefactor of children.

The Ford,

Rockefeller, and Carnegie Foundations all predated
McDonald's philanthropic efforts and indulged on a larger
scale.

Other foundations, however, did not make explicit,

as McDonald's did, the connection between benefactor and
beneficiary, or in this case, between corporation and
customer.
McDonald's sponsorship of Little League baseball, for
example, was done one team at a time, each by an individual
owner/operator who boasted that he, and by implication,
McDonald's systemwide, supported community activities.
McDonald's philanthropy was personal, even intimate, as when
a Norwalk, California, owner opened his unit early,
specifically to accommodate a young girl who had just had a
tooth pulled and wanted a shake. 3

While Ray Kroc's own

2 Given

the negative image of most drive-in restaurants
in the 1950s and 1960s, parents were primarily concerned
about McDonald's social wholesomeness.
Questions about
McDonald's nutritional value or criticisms over McDonald's
advertising did not arise until the 1970s.
311 McDonald'
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ind~fendent

philanthropy frequently followed the standard

pattern of donating to medical research institutes,
McDonald's beneficence, especially in the early years, was
local, personal, and heartwarming.

But it was not without

fanfare.
Although Ray Kroc genuinely believed in "giving
something back" to the communities which sustained
McDonald's success, he understood and exploited the public
relations value which the philanthropy generated.

Every

program, every donation, every sponsorship produced its own
series of public relations press releases.

Corporate

headquarters produced ''canned" releases, pre-written,
generic announcements ostensibly tailored to the specific
event, which were available to licensees to send to the
local press.

The press became an unwitting accomplice in

McDonald's marketing strategy, writing up unit openings,
tours, or product promotions as human interest stories.
Although the uniqueness of McDonald's made it legitimately
newsworthy, the goodwill generated through these stories
provided McDonald's in the 1950s and 1960s with a level of
customer loyalty second only to Kroc's marketing idol,
Sears, Roebuck.
McDonald's initially intended its philanthropy to serve
primarily as a marketing tool, to create and reinforce the
image of McDonald's as a company with a heart in order to
increase sales.

Regardless of Kroc's sincerity in h1s own
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personal philanthropy, McDonald's original intent was
clearly profit-motivated.

While they no doubt contributed

to their respective communities, McDonald's owner/operators
could be callous in exploiting customer goodwill.

Like Ray

Kroc who was rarely ever pictured without a hamburger in
hand, operators frequently made media events out of simple
class tours or a few free hamburgers.
Children were only the ostensible targets of McDonald's
philanthropy.

Although McDonald's philanthropy was (and

continues to be) primarily child-centered, the real people
to reach, of course, were the parents who actually
controlled the family purse strings.

In the 1950s and

1960s, an image of McDonald's as wholesome or good was
essential to reaching the expanding customer base of young
families.

Later, in the 1970s and 1980s, it was crucial for

encouraging the parental acquiescence necessary to assure a
more independent child consumer market for McDonald's
products.

Equally important, the goodwill created would

serve as a hedge against the increasing number of social
criticisms levelled against McDonald's in these latter
decades.
The focus of McDonald's philanthropy shifted after the
early 1970s.

Considered a novelty in 1955 or 1960,

McDonald's by the 1970s had become a cultural institution in
its own right.

Like Sears, Roebuck and its long term

sponsorship of the children's show "Mr. Rogers," McDonald's
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took on the role of national, rather than merely local,
benefactor.

In 1960, an individual McDonald's operator

might sponsor a local Little League team; in 1985,
McDonald's donated $2.6 million to the Muscular Dystrophy
Association (MDA) alone. 4

As the philanthropy expanded and

became inherently less personal, McDonald's called upon
Ronald McDonald to personalize its corporate giving, just as
he personalized McDonald's advertising.
After Ronald McDonald became McDonald's official
corporate spokesman in 1966, philanthropy became decidedly
more complex.

Ronald completed the shift of McDonald's

corporate beneficence from pure utilitarianism to a more
genuine yet self-interested sincerity.

Although McDonald's

philanthropy was still marketing-driven, the increasingly
personal relationship that Ronald McDonald developed with
children encouraged, even forced, McDonald's to become more
interested in philanthropy for its own sake.

As Ronald

became more of a friend, he was increasingly expected to
help his young friends when they were sick, bored, or in
need of education.

Through advertising rhetoric and Ronald

McDonald, McDonald's raised customer's expectations of the
restaurants and achieved its goals of differentiating itself
from the competition and guaranteeing parental acceptance.
But it had also locked itself into a mandatory pattern of
411 Presence

Builds
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Department," publicity brochure
(May
Corporation Archives, 12.

Communications
1986),
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philanthropy, which not only had to be grandiose, but also
sincere.
McDonald's philanthropy started with Ray Kroc.
Although the McDonald brothers had suggested offering candy
premiums to children in 1957, their explicit intent was to
bolster sales, not to establish a long term pattern of
corporate beneficence.

Kroc balked at the brothers' simple

suggestion since he felt that token premiums cheapened
McDonald's quality image.

Instead, Kroc developed a more

sophisticated approach promising both increased sales and
customer goodwill.

That same year, Kroc retained Cooper and

Golin (later Golin/Harris Communications), a small Chicago
public relations firm, on a monthly retainer of $500.
McDonald's financial chief Harry Sonneborn was "mad as hell"
that Kroc splurged with McDonald's very limited income when
corporate employees were being asked to forgo pay raises so
the corporation could meet payroll and pay its suppliers.
Kroc defended his actions on a hunch; initially even he was
unsure exactly how a public relations firm would benefit
McDonald's.

In retrospect, however, Kroc credited Max

Cooper and Al Golin with "making McDonald's a household
word.

115

First, Al Golin maneuvered to get Ray Kroc's and

5 Ray

Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out:
The
Making of McDonald's
(Chicago:
Henry Regnery, 1977;
reprint, Chicago:
St. Martin's Press, 1987), 114.
Page
references are to the reprint edition.
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McDonald's story in dozens of major newspapers across the
country.

In 1959, Golin convinced the Associated Press to

send columnist Hal Boyle, a Pulitzer Prize war
correspondent, to interview Kroc.

That one story generated

immediate national exposure in one of the most widely
syndicated columns in the United States.

By the next

morning, McDonald's name appeared in over six hundred
newspapers and requests for franchising information poured
in.

Within weeks, every major newspaper or periodical

wanted to interview Kroc. 6

Both Ray Kroc and Harry

Sonneborn quickly realized the important role that public
relations would play for McDonald's.
The national image that Cooper and Golin created for
McDonald's played on the themes of convenience, family
wholesomeness, efficiency, and economic opportunity for
licensees.

On the local front, however, the public

relations' firm emphasized neighborhood commitment, personal
attention, and the tangible benefits that a community
received from hosting a McDonald's.

Most important among

the latter was the commitment each McDonald's explicitly
made to being a community booster.

"Be a Joiner . . . Be a

Promoter . . . Be Charitable . . . Be a Handshaker

" 7

While some individual licensees balked at the extra
6

Ibid . ' 12 7 - 2 8 ; J 0 hn F . Love ' : . :M:. :C: .:D:, .,O:o.,:n. ,.a=l'""d,_'-=s:;_:_:_....:B=e=h=i=n=d==----=t=h=-=e
Arches (New York: Bantam Books, 1986), 210-12.
7 "McDonald's
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effort and expense required--they were already required to
allocate 2 1/2% of gross sales for direct advertising--most
operators realized the financial benefits of a goodwill
campaign. 8

Owner/operators quickly became members of the

their communities' Chambers of Commerce and, where
appropriate, joined the local Elks or Kiwanis. 9

Although

association membership garnered a degree of community
respect for McDonald's among the local business and
political elites, the primary community emphasis remained on
small-scale philanthropy as a way to reach individual
consumers either unfamiliar or uncomfortable with
McDonald's.
Opportunities for free press and local goodwill
abounded for those operators who, like Ray Kroc, looked at
every opportunity as a marketing one.

An Ohio operator

provided complimentary cups and Coca-Cola syrup for a
funeral breakfast.

A St. Louis licensee sent one thousand

free burgers to a local elementary school as a special
luncheon treat.

A Fort Wayne, Indiana, operator sponsored a

8

By 1977, the required percentage had risen to 4. 5%.
"Dictaphone memo from Ray Kroc to Richard and Maurice
McDonald"
(September-October
1959),
dictaphone
tape
transcript, reprinted in The Legacy Series (Oak Brook, IL:
McDonald's Corporation, 1988), 74; "McDonald's Newsletter"
(February 1960), McDonald's Corporation Archives; "The FastFood
Stars:
Three
Strategies
for
Fast
Growth,"
Businessweek, 11 July 1977, 59.
9

"McDonald's Community Relations Kit, " in "McDonald's
Marketing
Manual,
1969-1973,"
McDonald's
Corporation
Archives.

132
Little League dinner and provided free orange drinks at the
county fair. 10

Each incident in itself was merely a small

act of generosity, but compounded by the hundreds, became a
significant marketing strategy.

So formalized had

McDonald's policy of "spontaneous" local generosity become
by the late 1960s, that the 1969-1973 edition of its
"Marketing Manual" listed specific guidelines on "How to
Handle Local Charity Requests," "How to Use the Orange
Bowl," and "How to Use the Prize Steer Program. " 11

In the

Orange Bowl program, McDonald's loaned the use of its
oversized orange drink dispenser, the Orange Bowl, to
community groups, providing them with free drink mix and
cups.

The Prize Steer program referred to an ongoing

practice by enterprising licensees to buy the prized steer
at a county fair and donate it to charity.

The mere act of

buying the winning steer reinforced the quality image of
McDonald's beef while donating it scored extra points toward
goodwill . 12
Of all the national drive-in restaurant chains,
McDonald's alone engaged in any significant and formalized
level of community philanthropy.

White Tower and White

Castle both had local followings, but never turned to
10 "McDonald's

Newsletter"
(September
1964);
(July
1960); (August 1960), McDonald's Corporation Archives.
11 "McDonald's

12 rbid.;

Marketing Manual, 1969-1973."

"McDonald's
Newsletter"
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(October

1964),
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organized philanthropy to give themselves a marketing edge.
In the 1960s, Kentucky Fried Chicken was preoccupied with
finding full sit-down restaurants which would take on its
chicken as a house specialty.

Neither Burger King nor

Burger Chef had a substantial national image prior to the
1970s, and, even then, their decentralized organizational
structures prevented coordinated corporate-wide efforts at
philanthropy. 13
In January, 1961, McDonald's was already located in
thirty states and boasted print public relations coverage of
2,200 column inches in newspapers with a combined
circulation of 46 million readers.

George A. Glenn, editor

of the retail trade publication Chain Store Age, publicly
congratulated McDonald's on its keen marketing use of public
relations.

"We could all take a lesson," Glenn reiterated,

"from the McDonald's chain of drive-in restaurants when it
comes to public relations.

1114

This was high praise for a

national chain less than ten years old, relying solely on
revenues generated by the sale of a fifteen cent hamburger.
Kroc's policy of "giving something back," however, attracted
not only the industry's attention but the notice of
individual customers as well.
1311 Burger

King Corporation," International Directory of
Company Histories:
Food Services & Retailers, ed. Lisa
Mirabile (Chicago:
St. James Press, 1990), 613-14; Love,
McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 280-81.
14 Quoted

in "McDonald's Newsletter"
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(January
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Testimonials from satisfied parents crowd McDonald's
newsletters from the 1950s, 1960s, and even 1970s.

Although

the newsletters contained an obvious self-reporting bias,
parents seemed genuinely amazed that a business would take
the time to indulge in a local act of generosity, especially
toward children.

A common promotion, for example, was to

send youngsters a birthday card with a coupon for a free
McDonald's hamburger.

The promotion was effective in spite

of a less than inspiring verse:
We want to add to your good cheer
On this your natal day.
So bring this card when you appear
For a little treat McDonald's way.
The mother of a young birthday boy later wrote the
corporation,
What a wonderful surprise when your card was received by
our little boy. He was thrilled beyond words at the
thought of the "All American Meal." It's a friendly act
you're performing and children do remember. Our
patronage is yours anytime we feel the "All American"
urge. 15
Sending a birthday card was a guaranteed success strategy
for McDonald's.

Goodwill such as this simply could not be

purchased through a standard advertising approach.

The

corporation's financial cleverness was equally obvious when
the youngster came to redeem the coupon for his
complimentary birthday meal, with parents and siblings in
tow.

For the price of one free meal, McDonald's tallied up
1511 McDonald's

Newsletter"
(July
1961),
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several extra sales and a lot of goodwill.
Adults were not the only ones gushing with gratitude
towards McDonald's.

One seven-year-old from Royal Oak,

Michigan, wrote on hers, and presumably, her brother's
behalf,
Dear MacDonald,[sic]
We like your milkshakes and
hamburgers.
Love,
Lynn--and Scott 16
McDonald's even made an honorable mention in one fourth
grader's Thanksgiving prayer.

When asked to write what they

should be thankful for at Thanksgiving, the youngster wrote,
"I am thankful we have nice cars to drive and eat hamburgers
in.

1117

The teacher obviously assumed the child equated

"hamburgers" with "McDonald's" and sent the child's innocent
quip to the corporation.

But the letter was no laughing

matter; it and the scores of similar ones reprinted in
McDonald's newsletters through the years confirm the
increasingly personal relationship between McDonald's and
its customers.

McDonald's, however, was not unique it is

unorthodox approach to marketing.
In 1958, Harvard University business professor Theodore
Levitt examined what he called "The Dangers of Social
Responsibility" for the autumn issue of the Harvard Business
1611 McDonald's

(November

1960),

McDonald's

1711 McDonald's

(January

1962),
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Review.

Levitt, who later became famous in McDonald's

circles after his 1972 article extolling McDonald's
production-line approach to food service, criticized the
socially responsible pose assumed by American businesses in
the 1950s,
Occasionally, somebody exhumes the apparently antique
notion that the business of business is profits; that
virtue lies in the vigorous, undiluted assertion of the
corporation's profit-making function.
But these people
get no embossed invitations to speak at the big,
prestigeful [sic], and splashy business conferences-where social responsibility echoes as a new tyranny of
fad and fancy. 18
Although Levitt conceded that the "social
responsibility syndrome" is a "game" which corporations play
to defuse criticism of their practices, or to drum up sales
(as in McDonald's case), he nonetheless saw it as dangerous.
"What people say," Levitt continued, "they ultimately come
to believe if they say it enough, and what they believe
affects what they do . . . . The talk about social
responsibility is already more than talk.

It is leading

into the believing stage; it has become a design for
change." 19

In McDonald's case, it became the total

embodiment of the corporation's relationship with its
18 Theodore

Levitt,
"The
Dangers
of
Social
Responsibility," Harvard Business Review (September-October
1958):
42.
Levitt's criticisms were intended to rebut a
series of articles, previously published in the Harvard
Business
Review,
which
extolled
corporate
social
responsiveness as the future of American capitalism. Levitt
strongly disagreed and urged a refocusing on the financial,
rather than the social, responsibilities of the corporation.
19 Ibid.,

43-44.
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customers.
Thirty years of McDonald's internal memoranda,
newsletters, and marketing manuals confirm Levitt's premise.
The 1969-1973 edition of McDonald's "Marketing Manual"
placed first and foremost the image-making opportunities of
community philanthropy.

"In weighing local charity

requests, the important thing is what the tie-in will do for
your image in the community.

Key factors should be the

worthiness of the cause, city-wide enthusiasm and
acceptance." 20

While image enhancement was a priority for

many American corporations in the 1950s, McDonald's was in
the unenviable position of needing to repudiate the
delinquent overtones of its predecessors and competitors in
the restaurant drive-in industry.

Although McDonald's never

masked its marketing motivations, a developing strain of
sincere corporate responsibility co-existed.
Not all of McDonald's largess received widespread
publication.

Although many operators were slick at public

relations, other licensees took a more subtle tack.

A

Midwest operator, a "family man himself," quietly folded the
check for a class trip of youngsters eating lunch at
McDonald's and discreetly placed it in his pocket.

No

fanfare; most likely the only person aware of the

20 "How

to
Handle
Local
Charity
"McDonald's Advertising Manual, 1969-1973."
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philanthropy was the teacher. 21

At Christmas time, 1960,

a Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, licensee treated a group of
local orphans to a meal. 22

Obviously, these children did

not have the family ties that justified and rationalized so
much of McDonald's philanthropic efforts.

There were no

parents or siblings to drag to McDonald's; these children,
because of their social situation, were not among McDonald's
target audience and were not in the position to develop long
term brand loyalty to McDonald's products.

The operator's

gesture merely reflected a simple concern for orphaned
children at Christmas.

A purely altruistic motive for

McDonald's generosity, however, was the exception rather
than the rule, and flowed more from the personalities of
individual operators than from the corporation's marketing
directives.

Overall, McDonald's corporate emphasis

throughout the 1950s and 1960s was on image enhancement
through community involvement and beneficence.

In this,

McDonald's immensely succeeded.
McDonald's first formalized marketing manual, in 1962,
cited the restaurant's "business mission" as "bringing

2111 McDonald's
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This small act of generosity,
however,
could not escape headquarters' watchful eye.
Complicated tally sheets tracked outgoing food and incoming
cash, making it difficult for any owner/operator to either
intentionally defraud the company or even engage in
unheralded generosity.
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customers to your windows as you capitalize on the favorable
nationwide corporate image of McDonald's.

1123

By the 1970s

and 1980s, McDonald's had fulfilled its mission to the point
where McDonald's image was no longer under its own control.
True to the basic precepts of public relations, McDonald's
and Cooper and Golin had fixed an image of McDonald's in
Americans' minds, and as Levitt had warned, once fixed, the
image would be difficult, if not impossible, to
displace. 24

Since McDonald's image was inextricably tied

to an increasingly high level of corporate largess,
McDonald's, by the 1970s, found itself locked into a pattern
of philanthropy.

Because of the image it had itself

perpetuated, McDonald's needed to continually regenerate its
largess while simultaneously making it seem less
commercialized.

McDonald's corporate quandary, although one

of its own choosing, locked the restaurant into expending
more money on philanthropy without commensurate public
recognition for it.

McDonald's solution was using "Ronald

McDonald" as the spokesman for both its community-based and
its national philanthropic programs.
In a 1989 cover story on McDonald's, Restaurants and
Institutions magazine interviewed McDonald's top corporate
executives as well as a sampling of its suppliers,
licensees, and crewpersons.
2311 McDonald's

24 Levitt,
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senior vice president of marketing, "Ronald McDonald does
not sell products.

You see him interacting with children--

he's more the McDonald's spirit."

"The clown," concluded

Restaurants and Institutions reporter Lisa Bertagnoli, "is a
symbol of goodwill, not moneymaking.

1125

McDonald's Nelson

was correct in asserting that Ronald "does not sell
products"; although the clown was initially developed as a
hard-hitting salesman to children, by the 1970s, his image
was significantly diluted to that of big brother or friend.
Bertagnoli, however, was further off the mark.

McDonald's

goodwill emphasis is inherently and by definition a moneymaking function of the corporation.

Regardless of

McDonald's public posture regarding its philanthropy,
bottom-line profits continued to be a powerful motivation.
The judgmental error, however, is in assuming that the
inextricable linking of the two motives in any way
diminishes the very tangible financial and social benefits
McDonald's has wrought.

On the contrary, after McDonald's

adoption of Ronald McDonald as company spokesman in 1966,
McDonald's philanthropy benefitted more Americans,
especially children, than ever before.
Although still strongly community-oriented, McDonald's
philanthropy after Ronald assumed the form and function of
more traditional corporate beneficence.

25 Lisa

While individual

Bertagnoli, "Inside McDonald's," Restaurants and
Institutions, 21 August 1989, 64.
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operators still sponsored bowling or baseball teams, and
scout troops were always welcome to tour, McDonald's overall
was redefining its philanthropy through the national persona
of Ronald McDonald.

Before Ronald, the corporation's

marketing emphasis was only vaguely national with the
primary advertising medium being occasional print
advertisements in Readers' Digest or the Saturday Evening
Post and the many interviews that Ray Kroc gave to the
national press.

Local marketing was much more crucial in

the 1950s and 1960s since McDonald's was in an intense
expansion mode and continually needed to convince local
communities of the benefits of hosting a McDonald's.

By the

late 1960s and 1970s, McDonald's had become fully
nationalized, with more than 3,300 units by 1975, and could
pull back from intense community lobbying efforts and rely
more on the coordinated national marketing message of Ronald
McDonald. 26
Probably the most immediate connection McDonald's made
between Ronald McDonald and McDonald's national philanthropy
was the "Ronald McDonald House.''

In 1973, Kim Hill,

daughter of Philadelphia Eagles tight end Fred Hill, was
being treated for leukemia at Children's Hospital in
Philadelphia.

Her illness became the rallying cry for the

Eagles to raise $800,000 for the hospital and for some type

26McDonald's

Corporation
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of residential facility for families with seriously ill
children. 27

The local Philadelphia McDonald's restaurants

were solicited as part of the Eagles' overall fundraising
efforts and what resulted was an ongoing three-way
partnership between the National Football League (NFL),
McDonald's, and various children's hospitals across the
country.
McDonald's did not take sole credit for the Houses.
The Seven-Up Bottling Company, Serta Mattress, Campbell
soups, Zenith, Sunbeam, Nabisco, Keebler, Panasonic,
Westinghouse, and Coca-Cola all substantially donated their
products for use in the Houses. 28

Because of its inherent

connection to children, however, McDonald's went one step
further.

Through the Ronald McDonald Children's Fund, a

foundation established by Ray Kroc's friends in 1977 as a
seventy-fifth birthday present to Kroc, each Ronald McDonald
House was provided up to $25,000 "seed money" to capitalize
the facility.

Absorbed into Ronald McDonald Children's

Charities (RMCC) after 1984, the Fund by 1988 had provided
nearly $995,000 to help establish more than 100 Ronald
McDonald Houses across the United States. 29

2711 Ronald
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McDonald's motivation in funding the Ronald McDonald
Houses, was, like all its other philanthropic activities, a
mixture of genuine concern and corporate self-interest.
"Over the past fifteen years," McDonald's President and
Chief Operating Officer Ed Rensi recalled, "people have
asked me why our company became so involved in the Ronald
McDonald House.

It has nothing to do, even remotely, with

the hamburger business.

I tell them that the two businesses

have one important common denominator, people." 30

Rensi's

posturing ignored several important connections between
McDonald's hamburger business and the Houses.

Ronald

McDonald's name and face were highly associated with the
Houses; the annual March sale of Shamrock Shakes provided
much of the seed money for fledgling new Houses; and
Golin/Harris Communications in Chicago, McDonald's own
public relations firm, wrote and distributed the "Ronald
McDonald House Newsletter."

And it was the Elkman

Advertising Agency, consultant to the Philadelphia area
McDonald's operators, who originally proposed the idea of
McDonald's sponsorship of the first House. 31

McDonald's,

among the dozens of corporations that donated to the Houses,
enjoyed the immediate and continuous recognition as primary
benefactor.

Known as "The House That Love Built," the

30 "The

Ronald McDonald House Report" [formerly
"Ronald McDonald House Newsletter"] (Summer 1989), 5.
31 Love, McDonald's:

Behind the Arches, 214.
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Houses equally could be perceived as "The House That Ronald
Built."
Although McDonald's did not initiate the Ronald
McDonald House idea, it was an opportunity they could not
ignore.

In the Conceptual Foundations of Business, Richard

Eells and Clarence Walton described six different models of
corporate social responsibility.

Three of the models viewed

social responsibility as "obligations imposed;" the other
three saw it as "responsibilities assumed." 32

Ray Kroc,

however, considered social responsibility as opportunities
embraced.

Kroc was by no means a theorist; he often chided

American higher education for wallowing in theory to the
detriment of action. 33

But Kroc understood the important

role of social responsibility in creating a positive, even
familiar, image for his restaurant chain.
Eells and Walton further described corporate
philanthropy as an "indirect benefit," a rupture of the
common-law rule that corporate funds be spent on a guid pro
guo basis, that is, only on activities which directly
benefitted the corporation. 34

Rather, Eells and Walton

continued, corporate philanthropy should be utilized to
"influence the American 'style of life' . . . by seeking to
32 Richard

Eells
and
Clarence
Walton,
Foundations of Business, rev. ed. (Homewood, IL:
Irwin, 1969), 198-201.
33 Kroc,
34 Ibid.,
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help shape and influence the evolution of the culture
itself." 35

In other words, corporations should take on

the role, not merely of economic profit-center, but of
social institution.

McDonald's is the example that proves

Eells and Walton's thesis.
When Ray Kroc told McDonald's shareholders in 1966 that
he had seen McDonald's become a national institution he was
far from exaggerating.

Not only is an institution highly

organized and recognizable, but it touches many different
facets of individuals' lives.

Religion and government, two

of the most prominent institutional forces in twentieth
century America, affect Americans from birth through death.
Obviously, McDonald's does not have the theological or
philosophical bases of religion or government, but its
influence on people can be similarly multidimensional.
On children, especially, McDonald's impact has been
inordinately strong.

In addition to the Ronald McDonald

Houses and Ray Kroc's own privately funded foundation for
medical research, McDonald sponsors the All-American
Basketball Team, the All-American High School Band, the Ray
A. Kroc Youth Achievement Award to outstanding high school
seniors, the McDonald's American Cup in youth gymnastics,
the McDonald's Hispanic Heritage Art Contest for elementary
school children, and the Academic, Cultural, Technological
and Scientific Olympics (ACT-30), a scholastic competition
35 Ibid.,

212.
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among African-American teenagers. 36

"McDonald's

commitment to charities is so wide and deep," Restaurants
and Institutions reported in 1989, "that competitors do not
even try to imitate it.

1137

(see Appendix)

Even more

pointed, the competition would not know where to begin.
The McDonald's All-American Basketball Team first
suited up in 1977 and featured the top twenty-five high
school basketball players in the U.S.

By 1985, more than

$475,000 had been raised through game ticket sales to
directly fund Ronald McDonald Children's Charities, which in
1984 became McDonald's umbrella foundation for all its
children's philanthropy.

The roster of players who have

played for the Golden Arches team is indeed impressive:
Earvin "Magic" Johnson, Michael Jordan, Patrick Ewing, and
Isiah Thomas all played in the McDonald's tournament while
in high school. 38

For many players, the McDonald's game

provided them with their first taste of national exposure
and corporate sponsorship, and, as the above listing
attests, a National Basketball Association (NBA) future
awaited many of McDonald's players.
3611 McDonald'

s Public Relations Department," publicity
brochure
( 198 7) ,
McDonald's
Corporation
Archives;
"McDonald's Community Service and Social Investment Report,
1981-1982," McDonald's Corporation Archives, 8-12.
37 Bertagnoli,

"Inside McDonald's,"
Institutions, 21 August 1989, 70.
3811 Presence

Builds
Preference:
Department, " publicity brochure
(May
Corporation Archives, 12.
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The McDonald's All-American High School Band, nicknamed
"The Band Whose Pants Don't Match," debuted as a last minute
entry in the 1967 Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade, the same
forum which had nationally introduced Ronald McDonald
several years earlier.

In something of a character

reversal, it was usually somber Harry Sonneborn who pushed
for McDonald's sponsorship of the gimmicky band and the
national media coverage it attracted.

Sonneborn tracked

down the world's largest drum, stored in a Texas university
warehouse awaiting resale, and quickly assembled a marching
band composed of two students from each state and the
District of Columbia.

In a marketing coup, Sonneborn and Al

Golin ordered a new drumskin advertising "McDonald's AllAmerican Band" and unveiled it during the parade, in direct
violation of the parade commission's stringent regulations
on commercial advertising among parade participants.

Kroc

was proud of Sonneborn's initiative in pulling off the stunt
and the band's popularity guaranteed it an annual spot in
the parade. 39

Under the directorship of Radio City Music

Hall's Paul Lavelle for most of its history, the Band in
1985 boasted 102 members out of nearly 4,900 nominees. 40
39 Kroc,
40 In

Grinding It Out, 150.

addition to Macy's parade, the McDonald's AllAmerican Band also performs in the Fiesta Bowl,
the
Tournament of Roses parade, and Jerry Lewis' annual Muscular
Dystrophy telethon.
It has even performed in New York's
famed Carnegie Hall.
Obviously, all these forums have
generated wider exposure for McDonald's marketing..:. induced
philanthropy.
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In addition to providing travelling expenses for the parade,
inclusion in the Band made students eligible for New England
Conservatory of Music (Boston) scholarships. 41
McDonald's has encouraged local owner/operators to
supplement the corporation's efforts on a local or regional
level.

Licensee Herman Petty, owner of seven Chicago

McDonald's, established a college scholarship program for
his own crew workers, in addition to assisting several of
them obtain their own McDonald's franchises. 42

William

Pickard, another African-American operator in Detroit,
emphasized the training he provided to his crew "so that any
one of them will have the expertise to open his own
operation. 1143

McDonald's pointed to operators like Petty

and Pickard in response to charges that McDonald's
philanthropy was marketing-driven or impersonal.

And

4111 Presence Builds Preference," 12; Cheryl M. Patric,
"The Band Whose Pants Don't Match," The Instrumentalist
(April
1974),
McDonald's Miscellaneous Clippings File,
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 1.
The Instrumentalist
article was an excellent example of how McDonald's blends
philanthropy and marketing.
The author was an account
executive with Cooper and Golin, McDonald's public relations
firm. Obviously, the article was intentionally submitted to
generate favorable publicity for McDonald's sponsorship of
the band.

42 Bertagnoli,

"Inside McDonald's," 46.
Petty was
McDonald's first African-American operator, hired in 1968
amid the first wave of racial insensitivity charges directed
at McDonald's. Petty has since established McDonald's Black
Franchisee Association and has been instrumental in helping
other minority operators set up their own McDonald's units.
43 "An

Academic Twist to the Sale of Hamburgers, " Ebony
(October 1974): 70.
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although a wide array of scholarship or award programs are
available either to McDonald's own crew as a fringe benefit
or to high school students at large, the bulk of McDonald's
philanthropy targeted children not in high school, but in
the elementary grades, McDonald's primary consumer audience.
A pattern of consistent brand loyalty is usually
developed between the ages of seven and nine. 44

A seven-

year-old is already a discriminating, even cynical shopper,
who is frequently allowed to make routine consumer decisions
for himself/herself.

By age nine, 90% of children shop

independently of their parents, with over half purchasing a
product they specifically saw advertised on television. 45
McDonald's clearly targeted this age cohort, noticeably
extending it down to preschoolers, as their principal
marketing niche; thus, this is where most of their
philanthropy is expended.
"Our primary audience," stated McDonald's in its 19691973 "Marketing Manual," "is made up of young families with
children ages 2 to 11.

Your advertising should be reaching

44 Scott

Ward, Daniel B. Wackman, and Ellen Wartella,
How Children Learn to Buy:
The Development of Consumer
Information-Processing Skills (Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage
Publications, 1977), 23, 178.
Preschoolers, however much
they pester their parents for products seen on television,
are still inconsistent in their brand affections.
This
cognitive limitation is one which McDonald's has gone far in
ameliorating.
45 James

Utah McNeal,
"The Development of Consumer
Behavior Patterns in Childhood" (Ph.D. diss., University of
Texas--Austin, 1964), 49-50, 68, 82.
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this group first.

You are wasting valuable, hard-earned

dollars if you are placing your ads in other areas." 46
Not only did McDonald's hit this group hard with an intense
Saturday morning advertising campaign, it also soft-peddled
advertising to them, in the form of complimentary curriculum
materials for school, library, and scout meetings.
Curriculum decisions are most frequently made by local
and state school superintendents, based on state law and
current trends in education.

Corporate involvement in the

curricular process is not novel; publishers, for example,
intensely compete and lobby school boards to have their
respective titles "adopted" for state-wide use, guaranteeing
the books' long term sales.

Similarly, computer

manufacturers, especially Apple/Macintosh, have routinely
donated thousands of dollars of hardware for classroom use,
counting on software sales and future hardware expansion
needs, as well as developing brand loyalty and computer use
among children, to compensate for their initial
philanthropy. 47

The difference, of course, between these

46 "McDonald's
47 Joseph

Marketing Manual, 1969-1973," 3.

Galaskiewicz,
"Corporate Contributions to
Charity:
Nothing More than a Marketing Strategy?" in
Philanthropic Giving:
Studies in Varieties and Goals, ed.,
Richard Magat (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989),
247.
In the case of Apple/Macintosh, of course, once a
school system received its complimentary computers, it was
difficult to reconfigure to the non-compatible and more
costly IBM-based system.
By donating hardware to schools,
Apple, in essence, locked in a market for itself.
With the
increasing compatibility options between IBM and Apple,
however,
schools
have
regained
more
flexibility
in
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efforts and McDonald's was that the school board, rather
than the child or his/her parents, were the principal
targets of the corporation's marketing efforts.

Young

children were likely to be less successful urging their
parents to buy a computer system than they would pestering
to visit McDonald's.

Thus, because of its product line,

McDonald concentrated its classroom efforts on a smaller
scale.
In 1965, McDonald's published Let's Eat Out, a
children's storybook about a family's visit to McDonald's.
Siblings Tom and Sue give their visiting European friend
Hans "an American treat":

McDonald's. 48

reflected obvious Cold War sensibilities:
license plate was

11

The book
the family car's

1776," "mass production" was equated with

"American," and a German child was educated in the benefits
of capitalism.

Tom and Hans themselves ordered the food,

reflective of McDonald's intent to directly involve children
in consumer purchasing, and rounded out their "All-American"
trip with a visit to the local baseball stadium, another
American cliche.

McDonald's provided complimentary copies

of Let's Eat Out to schools, libraries, and doctors' offices
across the country.

McDonald's newsletter, however,

suggested that operators send the books directly to

developing their computer systems.
48

John
Jones,
Publishing, 1965).

Let's

Eat

Out

(Chicago:

Melmont

152
individual teachers, rather than to the local school boards,
and to send the books without prior authorization.

If the

teachers already had the books in hand, McDonald's hoped,
they would bypass standard textbook review procedures and
immediately adopt the books for classroom use. 49

While

it was obvious from the logo and text who sponsored the
storybook, McDonald's did limit the overall commercialism of
the book.

Except for the "Golden Arches Success Story"

reprinted at the end of the book, the story represented a
soft-sell approach.

McDonald's hoped the children would

take the books home and show their parents, who would be so
impressed with McDonald's generosity and the "success
story," that they would visit their local restaurant.
Evidently, the book did elicit positive feelings for
McDonald's as one Terre Haute, Indiana, librarian wrote to
McDonald's, "We feel sure that these colorful, eye-appealing
books will circulate widely among our juvenile patrons.

1150

That is exactly why McDonald's published the book.
Let's Eat Out was a one-time publication.

A more on

going philanthropic intrusion into classroom curriculum was
the series of McDonald's "Action Packs," targeted to
students in grades K-9.

The Action Packs were mini-

curriculum units that addressed physical education
49 "McDonald's
Newsletter"
McDonald's Corporation Archives.
50 Letter

(November /December

1965),

dated 15 June 1965, in "McDonald's Newsletter"
(August 1965), McDonald's Corporation Archives.
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(grades K-2), nutrition (grades 1-4), ecology (grades 4-6),
and career choices (grades 6-9).
reached 15-20 million students. 51

The ecology packet alone
Complimentary

educational films emphasized anti-drug messages ("Get It
Straight''), bicycle safety ("Bicycles R Beautiful"), home
safety ("Home Safe Home"), and, of course, the history of
McDonald's ("The McDonald's Story").

Most of these

classroom materials were discreet about using McDonald's
trademarked logos.

The supplements themselves were

assembled by experts in the topics featured, not by
McDonald's; thus, the direct advertising was minimal.
Again, McDonald's focus was as much on attracting parental
attention and goodwill as in developing brand loyalty among
children.
McDonald's strategy of using philanthropy to strengthen
its public image and increase its sales has proved
phenomenally successful, if judged by the number and scope
of awards and honors that the corporation has received.

Its

safety films have been endorsed by the National Safety
Council, the National PTA, and the American Red Cross. 52
In 1971, Ray Kroc even received the Boys Scouts' "Good
Scout" Award, ostensibly attesting to Kroc's embodiment of

51 McDonald's

Corporation
Annual
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 7.
52 McDonald's

Corporation
McDonald's Corporation Archives.

Annual

Report,

1973,

Report,

1981,
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the Scout virtues of patriotism, courage, and selfreliance. 53

For its ecology awareness efforts alone,

McDonald's received the "Keep America Beautiful Award," the
"Arbor Day Foundation Award," and the "National Foresters
Association Award," all in 1976. 54
While attributing a direct causal link is presumptive,
McDonald's sales have also undoubtedly benefitted from the
corporation's homey and concerned public image.

The mother

of one band member wrote McDonald's to thank them for their
generosity and ended her letter with "God Bless
McDonald's.

1155

Parents, like the mother who guaranteed

her family's patronage whenever "we feel the 'All-American'
urge," provided McDonald's with a steadily increasing core
of grassroots community support, crucial to the corporation
as it further expanded into America's small towns, suburbs,
and later, urban neighborhoods.
McDonald's diversified its philanthropy, not only to
achieve the greatest good, but to generate the broadest
possible publicity.

The fact that its charity was an

53

McDonald's Corporation Annual Report,
1974,
McDonald's Corporation Annual Report,
Corporation Archives.

1971,
17;
McDonald's

54McDonald's

Corporation
Annual
Report,
1976,
McDonald's Corporation Archives.
This, of course, only
reflects a few of the literally dozens of local and national
awards
honoring
McDonald's
community
service
or
philanthropy.
55 "McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.

(March

1982),
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amalgamation of sincere social concern and unadulterated
self-interest was not unique to McDonald's.

A 1974

Conference Board survey of corporate philanthropy listed
"Social Responsibility" and "Self-Interest" as the two
primary and competing motives for corporate donations. 56
Even Ray Kroc's own personal dictum of "giving
something back" was widely repeated throughout the postwar
decades.

In his historical review of corporate charity,

Peter Dobkin Hall showed that the period from 1950 to 1980
was marked by the philanthropic leadership of the "self-made
man," like Ray Kroc.

Alfred Sloan and Charles Kettering at

General Motors, Walter Teagle at Standard Oil, and Gerard
Swope at General Electric all prominently donated corporate
and personal funds in a largess matching McDonald's.

Unlike

Kroc, who emphasized practical vocational training over
theory, their charity was primarily aimed at national
educational institutions, like the Sloan Business School at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which could serve
to develop future corporate managers. 57

56 James

F.
Harris
and
Anne
Klepper,
Corporate
Philanthropy:
Public Service Activities
([New York]:
Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs/The
Conference Board, [ 1976]), 17.
The survey analyzed the
contributions function of 457 American corporations, chosen
from Fortune magazine's annual listing of highest revenueproducing companies.
57 Peter

Dobkin Hall,
"Business Giving and Social
Investment in the United States," in Philanthropic Giving:
Studies in Varieties and Goals, ed. Richard Magat (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989), 235-36.
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McDonald's used its philanthropic efforts, rather, as
"social currency," to be redeemed whenever McDonald's faced
opposition moving into an anxious neighborhood or when
targeted by activist groups seeking advertising,
nutritional, or environmental concessions. 58

When faced

with dissent, McDonald's relied upon the positive local and
national image which it had carefully developed, especially
its image of family wholesomeness.

This image, McDonald's

reminded its operators, needed to be jealously guarded and
nurtured, and most importantly, needed to be consistent.
None of its competitors could approximate McDonald's
philanthropy.

Kroc's commitment to aggressively seeking out

philanthropic opportunities combined with the corporation's
solid financial footing made possible by the book value of
its real-estate gave the corporation a definitive edge.
Although each operator chose his/her own outlet, community
commitment, involvement, and generosity was a dictum from
the corporation's headquarters and, more emphatically, from
Ray Kroc.

Licensee contributions, however, numerically and

geographically expanded the image of McDonald's generosity,
far beyond what Kroc could do alone, especially in the late
1950s and early 1960s when Kroc's primary corporate
commitment was to unit expansion.

More important from a

marketing perspective, licensees personalized and localized
58 The

term is borrowed from Galaskiewicz's analysis of
the
marketing
functions
of
corporate
philanthropy.
Galaskiewicz, "Corporate Contributions to Charity," 252.
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the beneficence, giving it a name and a face.

In essence,

McDonald's was grasping at the community spirit most
stereotypical of Mainstreet, U.S.A., by encouraging licensee
sponsorship of local Little League, scout troops, libraries,
and schools.

It was these images of family, home, and

community that finally proved successful in absolving
McDonald's of its associations with the seamy teenage
hangouts which typified drive-in stands throughout the 1950s
and 1960s.
Because of its success at creating an image of
McDonald's as "good," parents saw it_ as a safe and wholesome
place to visit, or to send their children to alone.
McDonald's, in fact, reinforced the same values that many
parents tried to inculcate in their own children: study
skills and ecological awareness through the Action Packs;
sanctioned extracurricular activities through the band,
basketball, and gymnastics teams; and concern for others
through the Ronald McDonald Houses.

The wholesome image

that McDonald's created through its centralized corporate
philanthropy and the combined commitment of hundreds of
individual operators guaranteed parental approval, even
admiration, for McDonald's.

Philanthropy, however, meant

little to children, especially the youngest ones most
inexperienced in consumer imagery.

The enticement for them,

of course, was that McDonald's was simply fun and home to
Ronald McDonald.

CHAPTER 6
"MEET RONALD MCDONALD"
"Children define Ronald in terms of the
specific things they see him do on TV. He is
nice because he shares his fries.
He's smart
because he figures out a way to catch
Hamburglar and get the hamburgers back. He's
magical because he makes an "M" with his
fingers or bounces up to the moon on a pogo
stick. He is more than a clown, he's a real
person. 111
McDonald's Corporation
The October, 1966 edition of "McDonald's Newsletter"
introduced Ronald McDonald to licensees as "our new
spokesman to the children of America. 112

The "Meet Ronald

McDonald" issue clearly and simply stated Ronald's role in
the corporation,
Keep Ronald selling the kids. They are your prime
market and the "influentials" which bring the parents to
your units. Watch your family business grow as Ronald
sells the kids on "fun eating" at McDonald's. 113
Ronald's original function was a combination of salesman and
corporate mascot, not unlike Buster Brown or Mickey Mouse.

111 Brief

McDonald's
original.

History of Ronald McDonald," 20 June 1990,
Corporation Archives, 2.
Emphasis is in the

211 McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.
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(October
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All three characters teetered between fantasy and reality
and were specifically used to appeal to a children's
consumer market.

Unlike Disney's Mickey and the Brown Shoe

Company's Buster, however, Ronald McDonald was real, a flesh
and blood multidimensional character who visited hospitals,
performed magic shows, and greeted children at restaurants.
Ronald existed in two worlds simultaneously, creating
confusion for children but profits for the corporation.
Ronald created the image of McDonald's as fun.

By the

early 1960s, Ray Kroc had already successfully created an
image of McDonald's as a clean, efficient, and wholesome
forum for routine dining out.

McDonald's earlier marketing

had focused almost exclusively on earning parental approval,
using corporate and licensee philanthropy to disassociate
itself from the teenage drive-ins and to build customer
goodwill.

Through numerous national interviews, Ray Kroc

carried the message of McDonald's to parents.
McDonald conveyed it to children.

Ronald

And the message was that

it was fun to eat hamburgers and fries, fun to visit
Ronald's house.
An informal, longitudinal look at McDonald's children's
commercials from the mid-1960s to 1980s highlights Ronald's
success as a marketer.

Ronald was originally created to

deliver a hard-hitting sales pitch to children and, in the
earliest spots, Ronald's commercialism was explicit.
Children were prompted either to ask their parents directly
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for McDonald's or to specifically request a certain product.
By the 1970s, however, the consumer function of young
children became increasingly independent of parental control
and consumer groups rallied against the explicit
commercialism of McDonald's.

Ronald reacted with distinctly

less overt commercialism in his message and soft-peddled his
pitch.

McDonald's advertised itself as the natural

extension of a baseball game, after school, or a trip to the
mall, and Ronald took on the role of cheerleader and
teammate, beginning his transformation from marketing
gimmick to "friend."
Surprising for a corporate spokesman, Ronald became
increasingly detached from explicit association with the
corporation.

This was both intentional and unavoidable.

With 97% of American children recognizing Ronald by 1973,
continuation of his hard selling persona was unnecessary and
risked parental backlash. 4

Ronald's mere presence was

advertising for the corporation and a subtle approach was
favored.

But a subtle use of Ronald was also crucial, even

unavoidable, from a philanthropic point of view.

As Ronald

increasingly became the focal point of McDonald's

4 The

"Ronald McDonald Awareness Studies" have become
somewhat legendary at McDonald's. The first survey, done by
Cooper/Golin in 1967, yielded a 77% awareness rating.
The
1973 study cited that 97% of American children recognized
Ronald.
The surveys were conducted periodically among one
thousand children aged five through twelve in ten different
U.S. cities.
"McDonald's Marketing Manual, 1971-1973,"
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 1.

161
philanthropy, especially through the Ronald McDonald Houses
and Ronald McDonald Children's Charities, the clown needed
to shed his commercial image lest the corporation's
beneficence seem less than sincere.

Between 1963 and 1985,

Ronald McDonald was transformed from salesman to friend, so
that by 1989, McDonald's could in some honesty claim,
"Ronald McDonald does not sell products . . . . He's more the
McDonald's spirit.

115

In 1965, however, the debut of Ronald McDonald merited
little more than a footnote in the corporation's monthly
newsletter.

After Ray Kroc's buyout of the McDonald

brothers in December, 1961, Kroc encouraged individual
operators to develop their own local advertising strategies.
Kroc was centralizing operational control and sought to
spare the highly leveraged corporation the expense of
advertising.

Also, Kroc hoped that licensee initiative on

local marketing would compensate for their increasing lack
of control on operational, production, and distribution
fronts.
recalled.

"It was really a free-wheeling time," one licensee
"We had very little direction from corp [sic] and

we only looked to them to develop the [national]

5

Lisa Bertagnoli, "Inside McDonald's,'' Restaurants and
Institutions,
21 August 1989,
64.
Obviously,
Ronald
McDonald does indirectly "sell products" or else the
corporation would not expend millions annually to continue
promoting the character.
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commercials. 116

Oscar Goldstein, a Washington, DC licensee,

contracted with an advertising agency to develop a character
for a local ad campaign.

This character became Ronald

McDonald.
Using a clown as an advertising gimmick already had
precedent among McDonald's licensees.

A Memphis, Tennessee,

owner/operator had previously promoted McDonald's on the
locally produced Looney Zoo Show, whose "Tiny the Clown"
plugged McDonald's products to its child audiences.

An

Orlando, Florida, licensee did a similar promotion with
"Checkers the Clown."

And "Bozo," Chicago's immensely

popular children's clown, frequently promoted the hamburgers
and fries of its local sponsor, McDonald's. 7

Goldstein,

however, was the first to develop a permanent character to
represent a specific franchise.

Goldstein and his partner,

John Gibson, created Gee-Gee Distributing Company (for
~oldstein

and

~ibson)

and ran their nearly forty Washington,

DC area units as a mini-empire within McDonald's.

They

exploited one of the few territorial franchises Kroc ever

611 McDonald's

Twenty-fifth
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 18.
711 McDonald's

Anniversary,"

1980,

Newsletter"
(April
1962),
McDonald's
Corporation Archives.
Interestingly, even after Ronald
McDonald became the corporation's official spokesman, an
Ohio licensee was still experimenting with his own clown
mascot, "Flippo," taking advantage of the marketing freedom
Kroc conceded to franchisees.
"McDonald's Newsletter" (May
1967), McDonald's Corporation Archives.
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granted. 8

Crucial to their "empire" was a distinct and

long term advertising presence in the local market, thus the
creation of Ronald McDonald.
The actor chosen to play the first Ronald was Willard
Scott, better known later as the weatherman on NBC's "Today"
show.

Scott's clown bore such little resemblance to the now

famous appearance of McDonald's clown that children today
would fail to recognize him.

The original Ronald costume

was a dark red and yellow jumpsuit, white gloves, and white
shoes.

On his nose, Scott wore a McDonald's paper soft

drink cup and on his hair, a stringy blond wig.

Anchored to

his waist was a tray from which he dispensed free burgers
and fries to child audiences.

His personality and

mannerisms were clumsy and silly, reminiscent of the antics
of Red Skelton's "Freddie the Freeloader" character. 9
From 1963 to 1965, Ronald continued as the advertising
spokesman only for the Washington, DC area.

Ronald first

attracted McDonald's Corporation's attention in April, 1965
with a short blurb about how rising sales at Gee-Gee's units
were tied to a manic clown whose antics appealed to child

8 Ray

Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out:
The
Making of McDonald's
(Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1977;
reprint, Chicago:
St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 157-58.
Page
references
are
to
the
reprint
edition.
Kroc
repurchased the territory from Goldstein and Gibson in 1967
for $16.5 million.
911 Brief

History of Ronald McDonald," 1.
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patrons. 10

Ronald, however, was not instantly adopted by

the overall corporation.

Bozo had been plugging McDonald's

hamburgers for several years on his own popular children's
show and seemed to be a more ideal advertising character
than upstart Ronald.

Bozo's clown persona was fully

developed and he already boasted a loyal following of
youngsters.

Ronald would have to develop both from scratch.

The Bozo character, however, was contractually tied to his
television show and the fact that his character was already
developed denied McDonald's the flexibility and independence
to create their own marketing spokesman.
Ronald's "victory" over Bozo did not guarantee instant
stardom.

Ronald McDonald made his official corporate debut

in a flying hamburger on network commercials for the
November, 1965 Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade.

But his

presence failed to capture even an honorable mention in
McDonald's 1965 Annual Report, though overall sponsorship of
the parade was widely touted. 11

Ronald's anonymity did

not last long.
After the October, 1966 "Meet Ronald McDonald" issue,
McDonald's ordered thirty-five one-minute television spots
featuring the clown to air on NBC's and CBS's Saturday

lO"McDonald' s
Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.

1965),

McDonald's

History of Ronald McDonald," 1;
Corporation Annual Report, 1965," McDonald's
Archives, 7.

"McDonald's
Corporation

11 "Brief

(April
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morning cartoon line-up.

McDonald's "kid blitz" reached 4.6

million homes that first month alone. 12

The marketing of

Ronald on children's television showed immediate results.
By April, 1967, only six months after Ronald's formal
adoption as company spokesman, an appearance by the clown
could automatically boost the day's sales by 50%, an
impressive accomplishment that underscored the importance of
both the fledgling child consumer market and children's
influence on their parents. 13

As with McDonald's earlier

success with food production and distribution, consistency
was the key to Ronald's popularity.
Willard Scott's characterization of Ronald lasted only
a short time.

The goofy mannerisms and amateurish costume

were quickly updated for mass appeal.

By the late 1960s,

Ronald had consistently assumed his present appearance of
yellow jumpsuit, red and white striped shirt and socks,
yellow gloves, and red wig and shoes.

Only his hairstyle

and make-up would undergo subtle changes in the next two
decades from the "Afro" look of the 1970s to a sleeker style
for the 1980s.

In addition to costume changes, McDonald's

hired a professional clown to assume Ronald's role.
Ringling Brothers, Barnum & Bailey's "Coco the Clown"
became the second national Ronald, complementing the dozens
12 "McDonald's

(November /December

13 "McDonald's

(April

Newsletter"
McDonald's Corporation Archives.
Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.

1967),

1966),

McDonald's
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that were hired locally for store appearances, tours, and
magic shows.

Hungarian by birth, Coco spoke no English;

thus, he built his characterization of Ronald entirely on
pantomime and circus antics.

The Ronald that is most

memorable, however, was personified in the 1970s by
professional clown King Moody, who gradually transformed
Ronald from a circus buffoon into a likable friend to
children.

While King Moody provided a transitional

characterization for Ronald, remnants of Ronald's direct
selling tactics continued until the 1980s.
In its 1969-1973 "Marketing Manual," McDonald's
outlined its "Ronald philosophy":
Ronald is first and foremost a McDonald's salesman.
If
your Ronald is qualified to put on a short show this is
an added plus. His only reason for existence is to sell
hamburgers and other McDonald products . . . NOT to make
children laugh, although if he can, it helps his
believability . . . . The only true test of Ronald's
effectiveness must be in the cash register, as the
result of a sustained advertising effort to children on
TV using Ronald commercials. We have created Ronald to
be loved and admired by all children. Once this was
achieved, we then used the personal endorsement
technique to sell our products. 14
Bluntly put, the only reason for the creation and continued
existence of Ronald McDonald in the 1960s and 1970s was to
sell hamburgers to unsuspecting youngsters who considered
him a friend.
All of the early national McDonald's commercials had
14 "

Ronald
McDonald:
Personal
Appearance
Recommendations," in "McDonald's Marketing Manual, 19691973," vol. 2, McDonald's Corporation Archives. Emphasis is
in the original.
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Ronald explicitly touting a product.

"Fishing," with

Willard Scott as Ronald, plugged McDonald's new fish filet
sandwich.

Coco in "Delivery Wagon" and "Flying Hamburger"

initiated the "McDonald's is Your Kind of Place" theme
developed by the D'Arcy, Masius, Benton & Bowles Advertising
Agency in late 1967.

In addition to plugging specific

products, such as the burgers-fries-shake trio in "Flying
Hamburger," this promotion created a jingle that
inextricably associated Ronald with McDonald's in children's
minds and became one of McDonald's most successful and
memorable advertising campaigns. 15

The standard jingle

refrain, to the tune of "Down By the Riverside,"
McDonald's is your kind of place
It's such a happy place . . .
Hap-hap-hap-happy place . . .
A bright and happy place . . .
was changed for children's audiences to
McDonald's is your kind of place . . .
Because its Ronald's place . . . 16
The change was made specifically to attract children's
attention.
By the mid-1970s, however, McDonald's changed their
strategy to "soft-peddle" Ronald's marketing message.
Ronald commercials that specifically advertised a product

15 "McDonald's

Commercials," tape 1, # 90.254.001, TVT
33-07, McDonald's Corporation Archives, commercial #16-60,
61-104, and 104-145 respectively.
1611 McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.

(November

1967),

McDonald's
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were intermingled with, and gradually gave way to, spots
that showed Ronald playing football, baseball, or relaxing
at "his house":

McDonald's.

In "Ronald Basketball" and

"Ronald Football," for example, a McDonald's hamburger was
the inspiration that allowed team player Ronald to score the
winning points.

After his victory, Ronald was magically

transported to McDonald's where he exclaimed, "Ah, this is
the place to go after the game . . . or whenever you play up
a big appetite.

Why not stop at my house today?"

The tag

line on the commercial replayed the "Your Kind of Place"
jingle. 17

In "Ronald Fun House," Ronald's circus antics

took place in a fun house with distorting mirrors.

His

pitch was "Next time you're hungry, come on over to my
house.

McDonald's is a real fun house. 1118

The continual

equating of McDonald's with Ronald's "house" reinforced an
image of Ronald as real and downplayed McDonald's real-world
function as a restaurant.

These later commercials also

reveal a more fundamental shift in McDonald's approach to
children.
By the late 1970s, Ronald promoted not so much an
individual product as he promoted himself.

Children's

loyalty to Ronald superseded even their hankerings for

1711 McDonald's

Marketing Manual, 1969-1973," storyboards
for children's television commercials, #272-McD-60 and #220McD-60R.
18 Ibid.,

original.

commercial

#274-McD-60.

Emphasis is

in the
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McDonald's newest product for children, the "Happy Meal."
Through Ronald McDonald banks, dolls, coloring books, comic
books, and a literal panoply of other toys, the image and
personality of Ronald McDonald, clown and friend, rather
than the image of McDonald's the restaurant, was constantly
reinforced.
Ronald McDonald was effective only so long as children
believed that the Ronald they saw on television was the same
Ronald who performed the magic show at the restaurant down
the street or visited them in the hospital.

To maintain the

charade, McDonald's published very detailed instructions on
how a Ronald must act, what tricks to perform, and how to
manage a child audience.

In January, 1972, the corporation

sponsored the first national meeting of Ronald McDonalds
with sixty individual, yet identical, Ronalds in
attendance. 19

This formal meeting of the clowns helped to

standardize Ronald's personality across the country and to
minimize any doubts by children as to who the "real" Ronald
was. 20

In 1974, McDonald's formalized Ronald's persona in

a detailed handbook issued to the national and local actors
19 "McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.
20 McDonald's

(February

1972),

McDonald's

perception of Ronald McDonald was even
more hallowed than that of Santa Claus.
Many youngsters
believe that Santa visits them on Christmas Eve, but that
the "Santas" they see on the street corners or in the stores
are his "helpers."
McDonald's sought to prevent even that
much ambiguity by making each Ronald so identical that
children were encouraged to believe that there was only one
Ronald McDonald.
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appearing as Ronald.
"Ronald McDonald & How!" a confidential in-house
manual, standardized Ronald's costume, make-up, and unit
appearances.

It included twenty-four detailed pages for

creating Ronald's trademarked clown face, how to handle
unruly or tired children, how to deal with sick youngsters
during hospital appearances, and even how to tell a good
joke.

Ronald's role, especially during lot appearances, was

to serve as an intermediary, a bridge, between children and
the restaurant.

One way to do this, the manual suggested,

was to have the restaurant manager help Ronald distribute
free trinkets, "to demonstrate to the kids that he [the
manager] is their friend.1121
was the following advice:

Most important, however,

"Never remove your gloves in

front of a kid because that will spoil your image as a
mystical person--not just a man in a clown suit. 1122

Like

much else at McDonald's, image ranked above reality.
The real flesh and blood men who portrayed Ronald--f or
obvious reasons, a female Ronald would destroy the charade-did bring to the role, however, a genuine affection for
children.

While professional clowns were hired to play the

Ronald that children saw on television, local Ronalds
included police officers, talk show hosts, and even a

2111 Ronald McDonald
Archives, 1974, S3/C3.
22 rbid., 86 /CL

&

How!"

McDonald's

Corporation
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McDonald's licensee. 23

Fun with the role as well as

working with children were primary reasons for taking the
job.

In an open letter to McDonald's Corporation by Bobby

Brandon, Boston's local Ronald McDonald, Brandon mused:
Perhaps this is the reason God gave me these talents.
I was part of their lives [the children's] for those
few moments . . . . I sincerely thank you for creating
me, and making me your symbol to all kids. . . . I would
like to tell you, those of you who have created me, what
joy and happiness you have brought to me this past
year. 24
A similar sentiment was expressed by Aye Jaye, the National
Field Ronald McDonald Consultant, in 1974.

"We're [the

people who portray Ronald McDonald] the kind of person who
can make people smile.
different.

That makes us--and McDonald's--

You're not selling hamburgers--you're sharing

happiness." 25
Jaye's romanticizing aside, McDonald's was indeed
selling hamburgers, by the millions, to an equal number of
young children.

Ronald McDonald created a uniquely personal

brand image for McDonald's, an image lacking in the
competition and rare even among other corporate mascots for
23

(February

19 7 2) ,

McDonald's

24

(February

1968),

McDonald's

"McDonald's Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.
"McDonald's Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.
25 "Ronald

McDonald & How!" 4.
As the National Field
Ronald, it was Jaye's task to inspect and insure the
uniformity of the local Ronald McDonalds, just as McDonald's
employed inspectors to guarantee the consistency of product
preparation and distribution.
Again, McDonald's considered
consistency, whether operational or marketing, to be crucial
to its success.
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children.

Burger King's and Burger Chef's attempts to copy

Ronald resulted in weak characters (a king and a chef,
respectively) which never transcended their obvious and
immediate advertising functions.

Taco Bell's "Taco Pete"

was little more than a logo, apparently always in the midst
of a siesta with head bowed down.

Kentucky Fried Chicken

never targeted children directly; their product was packaged
to parents relying upon the grandfatherly image of Harlan
Sanders.

Ironically, Sanders, a real person who had

attracted national renown for his homemade chicken recipe in
the 1940s, had less of a public persona than did the
fictional Ronald McDonald. 26

All of McDonald's

competition missed the children's market in the 1950s and
1960s, which is surprising since corporate mascots like
Buster Brown and Mickey Mouse had been extremely popular
with children earlier in the century.
Buster Brown, created by Richard Outcault, first
appeared in May, 1902, as a comic strip character in the New
York Herald.

Rather unisex in appearance, Buster Brown wore

a bobbed hairstyle, sailor outfit, and was trailed by his
companion dog, Tige.

The character's almost immediate

popularity convinced the Brown Shoe Company of St. Louis to
adopt the conveniently named lad as its corporate mascot in
1905.

While the original comic strip "Buster Brown" waned
26

stan Luxenberg, =R=o;...:a=d=s=1=·d=e=--__,E=m=p=i=r""e=s::....::'---=H=oo...:.w'---=t=h=e::;...___,C=h=a=1=·=n=s
Franchised America
(New York:
Viking/Penguin, 1985), 3132.
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in popularity by the 1930s, a comic book Buster retained its
following until the 1960s.

The Brown Shoe Company initially

used the comic books as premiums to promote their "Buster
Brown Blue Ribbon Shoes," but continued the advertising
theme through a series of Buster Brown books which were sold
at newsstands. 27

Like Ronald McDonald, Buster Brown was

anthropomorphized, but into the character of a small boy.
In the introduction to the 1st Buster Brown Book
(1903), creator Outcault explained,
Buster is not a bad or naughty boy as the thousands of
parents know. He is an industrious person, full of
energy and ingenuity • • • . Buster is a kind little chap
and his faithful dog finds in him a gentle but busy
companion. He is not an invention. 28
To create the reality of Buster Brown, the Brown Shoe
Company underwrote a series of comic books reinforcing its
mascot's persona.

Buster Brown's Autobiography was issued

in 1907, an ongoing series of Buster Brown's Amusing Capers
began in 1908, and, interestingly, even Buster Brown's dog,
Tige, had his own biography published in Tige:
(1908).

His Story

McDonald's efforts to fully humanize Ronald

McDonald hearken back to the Brown Shoe Company's success at
humanizing Buster Brown and giving him a personal history
through the autobiography issue.

27 Denis

Gifford, American Comic Strip
1884-1939:
The Evolution of an Era (Boston:
1990)' 11-12.
28

9.

Collections,
G. K. Hall,

Quoted in Gifford, American Comic Strip Collections,
Emphasis is mine.
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A second and culturally more significant precursor to
Ronald McDonald, of course, was Mickey Mouse.

Although

Mickey's general contribution to the consumer socialization
of children has been previously noted, specific examples of
overt consumer socialization merit further attention.
During the 1934 Christmas season, Mickey and girlfriend
Minnie appeared in a promotional comic book entitled Mickey
Mouse and Minnie at Macy's.

The book, reissued annually by

Macy's Department Stores' "Toyland,

11

introduced children to

Macy's Christmas collection and was an explicit attempt at
encouraging an active consumer role by children. 29

The

Mickey Mouse Magazine debuted in 1933 as a free promotional
give-away by theaters, stores, dairy companies, gas
companies, and even by toothpaste manufacturers.

Like

Ronald McDonald, Mickey Mouse existed in a tenuous realm
between reality and fantasy.

Addressing parents, Mickey

Mouse wrote in the mid-1930s,
It [the Mickey Mouse Magazine] will be delivered to your
home monthly by your milkman and with my compliments.
We hope your children will enjoy it.
If your little
ones are too young to read it themselves please read it
to them. And do give them my love.
Mickey Mouse 30
Given that the letter was addressed to parents, it may
seem somewhat surprising that Mickey Mouse, rather than Walt
Disney, authored the letter.

But Mickey's specific request

29 Gifford, American Comic Strip Collections,
30 Ibid.,

94.

105, 114.
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to "give them my love" is significant on two counts.

First,

Mickey's personal tone revealed the level of brand awareness
and loyalty he already enjoyed among children, to the point
that he and children had an emotional relationship of sorts.
Second, Disney's marketing strategy was nothing less than
brilliant.

If Walt Disney had asked parents to convey "his

love," it would have meant little to children and could have
seemed crass, but for parents to say "and Mickey sends his
love," implied parental approval of the relationship and
solidified Mickey's image as a real person in the minds of
children.

Given the precedents set by Buster Brown and

Mickey Mouse, the surprising thing was not that McDonald's
relied so extensively upon Ronald McDonald as a marketing
tool, but that other companies failed to do the same.
Ronald McDonald, however, entered the child's world two
steps ahead of either Buster or Mickey.

Unlike his

predecessors, Ronald was authentically real, that is, a
human being.

Although Mickey Mouse wandered through

Disneyland shaking children's hands, he was still outwardly
a mouse masking the man or woman operating inside the
costume.

Mickey could never become quite human and this

handicap, along with the obvious fantasy overtones of
animation, combined to limit his effectiveness as a personal
friend or a surrogate sibling.
Equally advantageous to Ronald as his humanity was his
clown persona.

In his introductory essay to the anthology
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Ronald Revisited:

The World of Ronald McDonald, popular

culture chronicler Marshall Fishwick credited the rich
history of clowning with giving Ronald a running head start
as a child marketer.
Ronald McDonald is a descendant of the zanni . . . or
comic servants of the commedia, such as the sly and
witty Harlequin and the awkward Pedrolino, whose costume
of baggy trousers, loose-fitting blouse, and wide
brimmed or peaked hat is still worn by many clowns. 31
Although Ronald lacked the zanni's characteristic hat,
McDonald's quickly realized the benefits of appealing to the
traditional clown persona.
McDonald's released Willard Scott and hired
professional clowns Coco and King Moody, respectively, to
represent Ronald on network television and in national
appearances.

Ronald's own distinctive clown persona

achieved further legitimation when Ronald, carrying a
platter of hamburgers, marched in the Parade of Clowns in
Ringling Brothers, Barnum & Bailey's 1967 circus.

Ronald

shared center ring with the ringmaster in the Philadelphia
and Boston performances and appeared in a two-page spread in
the circus' souvenir book.

Overall, Ronald's circus stint

reached 7 million Americans. 32

This, combined with his

31 Marshall

Revisited:
Green, OH:
2.

Fishwick,
"Introduction"
in
Ronald
The World of Ronald McDonald, 2d ed. (Bowling
Bowling Green University Popular Press, 1983),

32 Because

Coco was also a Ringling Brothers, Barnum &
Bailey clown, another actor was hired to portray Ronald for
this circus tour.
"McDonald's Newsletter" (April 1967),
McDonald's Corporation Archives.
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numerous visits to schools, hospitals, and local carnivals,
ameliorated his external commercial image and enhanced his
persona as friend and mentor.
"Ronald McDonald truly is one of our most valuable
marketing tools in what no TV spot, radio spot or newspaper
ad can do," stated McDonald's in 1980, "that is, share a
personal, one-on-one experience with a child.
McDonald was unique.

1133

Ronald

He was simultaneously corporate

spokesman, mascot, logo, philanthropist, advertising
gimmick, and friend.

The ease and subtlety with which he

combined the roles attested to McDonald's savvy success at
reading cultural cues.

In the early 1960s, there were few

cultural prohibitions against advertising to children;
indeed, as early as the Depression, marketing to children
was perceived as a form of necessary, even desirable,
economic education. Companies that ignored the child market
were deemed shortsighted if they failed to educate "the
consumer of tomorrow."

McDonald's enjoyed virtual autonomy

in how it used Ronald in the 1960s and it relied on the
clown's hard-sell approach to further Ray Kroc's goals of
rapid expansion and increased brand recognition.
By the mid-1970s, however, the cultural climate had
changed.

McDonald's was increasingly under attack for

subverting children's diets, masking commercialism with

3311 Ronald

McDonald Seminar
McDonald's Corporation Archives.

Booklet,"

28

July

1980,

178
philanthropy, and creating unnecessary domestic tension
between children who whined for McDonald's and parents who
refused.

McDonald's marketing blitz of the late 1960s and

early 1970s would prove an unqualified success; by 1976,
McDonald's was victorious in the "burger wars" and boasted a
19.6% share of the fast-food market, more than triple that
of its nearest hamburger rival, Burger King. 34

Its

advertising saturation produced impressive increases in
sales--from $161 million in 1965 to $1.8 billion in 1974-but also attracted public scrutiny. 35

McDonald's

perceived Ronald's explicit commercialism as increasingly
too direct amidst a pervasive anti-corporate public
sentiment.

Ronald's re-characterization from salesman to

teammate and friend mitigated his adversarial relationship
with parents and encouraged children to more deeply identify
with the clown.
Pivotal to creating brand identity is keeping the
product's name in front of its target audience.

McDonald's

34 "The

Fast-Food Stars:
Three Strategies for Fast
Growth," BusinessWeek, 11 July 1977, 56 (table). McDonald's
closest market share competitor was actually Kentucky Fried
Chicken which boasted an 8.4% share of the fast food market
in 1976. Colonel Sanders' restaurants, however, stayed out
of the "burger wars" and, for the most part, never directly
competed with McDonald's.
McDonald's main competition in
the 1970s consisted of Burger King, Burger Chef, Hardee's,
Jack-in-the-Box, and newcomer Wendy's.
35 Joseph

J. Doyle, "McDonald's Corporation," 15 July
1975 (New York:
Smith, Barney & Company), table VIII, 22.
Unlike most private investment analysts' reports, the above
report is publicly available through Northwestern University
Library, Evanston, Illinois.
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initially accomplished this through a host of Ronald
McDonald tie-in products.

In addition to in-store premiums,

McDonald's licensed a Hasbro Ronald McDonald doll,
Fieldcrest juvenile McDonald's bedding, a Sears-distributed
line of McDonald's-labelled children's clothes, a Playskool
mock-up of a McDonald's restaurant, a Milton Bradley
McDonald's board game, and a Fisher-Price line of McDonald's
play food.

McDonald's licensed Ronald's trademarked

appearance to complement its in-store promotions and network
advertising and, most importantly, to "extend our marketing
programs into the home.

1136

The use of established and

respected manufacturers implied quality products and
encouraged parents to accede to McDonald's "home marketing"
strategy.

McDonald's complemented this subtle strategy with

a more deliberate attempt to broaden Ronald's persona,
specifically to increase his realism.

To minimize Ronald's

salesman overtones and to give Ronald McDonald a "family,"
McDonald's introduced "McDonaldland" in 1970.
An early concern expressed by Max Cooper of
Cooper/Golin was that Ronald McDonald's popularity would
wane from overexposure.

Without careful regulation, Cooper

feared that "Ronald's popularity could peak too soon, the
market could be overloaded and Ronald could go the way of
Davy Crockett and his coonskin cap.

3611 McDonald's

We can't permit Ronald

Newsletter" (April 1976), 9; (June 1977),
14-15; (March 1979); (July 1980); (October 1983), 3.
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McDonald to become an overnight fad.

1137

One way to avoid

overexposure was to broaden Ronald's character, to make him
more multidimensional, thus interesting.
this and more.

"McDonaldland" did

The pseudo-real setting of McDonaldland

detached Ronald from explicit association with McDonald's
commercial function and introduced a "family" of characters
with which Ronald could interact.
"Mayor McCheese," whose voice and characterization were
patterned after vaudevillian Ed Wynn, was the nominal civic
leader in McDonaldland.

"Big Mac" tapped into the Keystone

Cops' antics; "Captain Crook" was designed as a cross
between John Barrymore and Errol Flynn; the shake-thirsty
"Grimace" resembled the voice of Edgar Bergen's Mortimer
Snerd; and the "Hamburglar,

11

whose mumbling personality is

not clearly attributable, rounded out the major cast of
characters in McDonaldland. 38

Each character visually

represented a specific product or served as antagonist to
Ronald.

Commercials set in McDonaldland ran like 60-second

morality plays with Ronald consistently assuming the role of
hero.

Hamburglar and Grimace proved the chief antagonists

whose respective attempts to "borrow" McDonald's hamburgers

3711 McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.
38

(May

1967),

McDonald's

" Star
Manual"
( 19 7 6) ,
McDonald's
Corporation
Archives, F-7.
Other characters gradually added included
the "French Fry Gobblins" (later the "French Fry Kids"), the
"Chicken McNugget Girls," and "The Professor," whose failure
as an inventor was mitigated by a visit to McDonald's.
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and shakes "without any thought of repayment" were met with
gentle admonitions from Ronald.

While Hamburglar and

Grimace euphemistically "borrowed" rather than "stole"
McDonald's food, the reward for their eventual conversion to
honesty was always the same:
fries.

a hamburger, shake, and

39

Although McDonaldland itself was imaginary, each
episodic commercial culminated in a visit to a real-world
McDonald's.

By creating a host of complementary characters,

McDonaldland furthered the tenuous reality of Ronald
himself.

Importantly, Ronald frequently welcomed real

children into McDonaldland and suggested at the end of each
commercial adventure that the group adjourn to McDonald's
for lunch.

The inverse of what was happening to Ronald also

happened to children.

Fictional Ronald walked freely in the

real world and, after the creation of McDonaldland, real
children strolled the paths of the fantasy McDonaldland.
What was real and what was fantasy was becoming
indistinguishable to the preschooler watching at home.
Second, McDonaldland reinforced the reality and
personhood of Ronald by providing him with a family, of
sorts.

Ronald played the role of the big brother, who

offered guidance and protection without the authoritative
overtones of a parent.
3911 Managing

It was Ronald who reformed the
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wayward Grimace, Ronald who aided the bumbling mayor and
helped Big Mac police McDonaldland, and Ronald who escorted
children deftly between two worlds.

With Mayor McCheese,

Big Mac, Hamburglar, and even real-life children as a
surrogate family, Ronald's character took on more depth and
seriousness. 40
By the mid-1970s, the appeal of McDonaldland ebbed.
McDonald's redirected Ronald's seriousness into clown antics
and silliness, hearkening back to Ronald's persona in the
1960s.

But there was a distinct difference.

Ronald in the

late 1970s and 1980s was a self-aware and self-controlled
clown.

McDonald's did not revert to the bumbling antics of

Scott or Coco; rather the corporation relied on Ronald's new
gift of magic.
Ronald's increasing reality, even in the fantasy world
of McDonaldland, restrained what Ronald could and could not
do.

A real Ronald could not fly, but a magical one could.

A magical Ronald could do the impossible, become a hero, and
did.

"He would never let kids down," Ronald's confidential

biography read.
disaster.

"Ronald would always save his friends from
He was magical and imaginative, yet he had

very real emotions and concerns for his friends.

Ronald had

transcended his previous role as a star circus clown and
became a paradox:

4011 Brief

3.

he was everything that a fantasy

History of Ronald McDonald," 29 June 1990, 2-
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character/world offered, yet he was very real."

41

But Ronald was not quite fully planted in the real
world.

Although each commercial ended with a trip to

McDonald's, Ronald never stood in line for his food or paid
for it.

Rarely, in fact, was he ever seen near the front

counter, the cash register, or even McDonald's own
crewpersons.

By the mid-1980s, McDonald's had de-

commercialized both Ronald McDonald and the entire
"McDonald's Experience" so thoroughly that young children
did not need to understand their consumer role in order to
fulfill it.
Although radio advertisers had initiated the consumer
socialization of young children in the period from 1910 to
1950, it was still teenagers who attracted the bulk of
marketers' attention even in the 1960s.

Periodicals such

as Time and BusinessWeek reported widely on the new "youth
market," but invariably delineated the market as a teen one
by emphasizing automobile purchases, the use of teen slang
in advertising, and back-to-school purchases for high school
and college students. 42

Only a handful of industries--

4111 Brief

History of Ronald McDonald, " 2.
Ronald's
biography was written by the corporation's archivist for
internal
use
by
McDonald's
licensees,
managers,
and
marketing representatives.
Its analytical tone reflected
McDonald's awareness of how changes in Ronald's persona
affected children.
4211 Bring
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Time, 3 January 1964, 74-75; "For Those Who Sell Young,"
Time, 1 July 1966, 73A.
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comic books, toys, and the cinema--produced goods easily
marketed directly to younger children.

And only Disney's

characters proved consistently successful at nurturing a
personal relationship with children.

Even then, however,

the limits of animation interfered in fully personalizing
the consumer relationship with children.
Ronald McDonald was unlimited in how he could interact
with children.

In restaurant appearances, hospital or

school visits, circus stints, or in the fantasy world of
McDonaldland, Ronald's primary objective was to have
children love him and, subsequently, transfer that love to
McDonald's.

What made McDonald's marketing strategy unique

in the 1960s was that children did not have to be
acculturated consumers in order to fulfill a consumer role.
They merely needed to love and follow Ronald.

As studies by

James McNeal and Scott Ward have shown, brand awareness is a
vague concept to a three-year-old; not until age seven is
the differentiation of brand-name products fully
grasped. 43

Yet, McDonald's did not need to wait until age

seven to begin its marketing barrage; with Ronald's help,
children as young as two or three could unknowingly make
brand choices.

43 scott

By the time children were seven or ten,

Ward, Daniel B. Wackman, and Ellen Wartella,
How Children Learn to Buy:
The Development of Consumer
Information-Processing Skills (Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage
Publications, 1977), 23, 178; James Utah McNeal,
"The
Development of Consumer Behavior Patterns in Childhood"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Texas-Austin, 1964), 8, 61, 86.
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then, recognition of the McDonald's brand and eating at
McDonald's were routine.
McDonald's frequently boasted that Ronald McDonald
enjoyed a cultural popularity second only to Santa Claus.
In 1967, Cooper and Golin's "Ronald McDonald Awareness
Study" concluded that Ronald had a recognition factor of
77%.

In 1973, after Ronald and McDonaldland had worked

their consumer magic, the percentage rose to 97%, second
only to Santa Claus who presumably merited 100%. 44

These

surveys became somewhat legendary, even at McDonald's, with
little other information to substantiate their claims.

But

McDonald's continued to cite them as proof that Ronald
McDonald had transcended his original advertising function
and had become a cultural icon.

Unlike most cultural

symbols, however, Ronald was a jealously guarded trademark,
who could not help but be a walking advertisement for
McDonald's.
At times, the complexity of Ronald's persona has
backfired on the corporation.

In December, 1991, Ronald

McDonald personally hosted a McDonald's-sponsored program,
"The Wish That Changed Christmas."

Immediately after the

broadcast, parents and child advocacy groups demanded an
investigation into McDonald's alleged violation of host
4411 McDonald's

Marketing Manual, 1969-1973," McDonald's
Corporation Archives, 1; "McDonald's Chronological History
Report,"
31.
The latter listed the
1973 awareness
percentage as 96%, rather than 97%; either way, it was
impressive.
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selling laws, contending that Ronald's mere presence
constituted one long commercial for McDonald's.

McDonald's

countered with surprise, claiming that Ronald was acting in
his role as friend to children, not as corporate spokesman.
In reality, he is inextricably and simultaneously both.
By 1985, it was Ronald, not McDonald's hamburgers and
fries, that made a sad child happy or a bored one animated.
Of course, Ronald's friendship originated in commercials,
but it also found parallels in real life.

It was Ronald

after all, not Ray Kroc or Fred Turner, who appeared with
stricken youngsters on the annual Muscular Dystrophy
Telethons, visited children in hospitals, celebrated with
them at parades and carnivals, and visited them at their
schools.

McDonald's has circuitously returned to its

initial Ronald marketing strategy, that of nurturing
personal loyalty first, and, with vastly more subtlety than
in 1965, using Ronald to gently draw the children in.

The

forced attempts at parental coercion and the crass
commercialism of product plugging of the late 1960s and
early 1970s were so successful, that by 1985, the
corporation no longer needed to "sell" either itself or
Ronald.

"If you believe in magic and I hope you do

"

sings Ronald in one of his more recent commercials, "you'll
always have a friend wearing big red shoes . . . 1145

45 As

of January, 1994, this commercial
running daily on network television.

is

currently

CHAPTER 7
PRESS ON:

THE 1970s AND 1980s

We know what we are going to say, what will
be said to us, what we will eat, how it will
taste, how much it will cost. Ronald, what
have you done to us? 1
Marshall Fishwick, Ronald Revisited

What Ronald did, of course, was to turn a parochial
Southern California drive-in restaurant into an
internationally respected feeding machine that served 22
million people daily in 51 countries. 2

McDonald's was a

concept born and bred from the postwar's obsession with
efficiency, convenience, and domesticity.

It succeeded, in

large part, because the Baby Boom had created both a
demographic market and a cultural need for the assembly line
food McDonald's offered.

By the early 1970s, however, the

birth rate had levelled off, the Boomers were maturing into
adults, and a cultural "back to basics" thrust challenged
McDonald's menu and its influence over children.

Most

1Marshall Fishwick, "Introduction," Ronald Revisited:
The World of Ronald McDonald, ed. Marshall Fishwick, 2d ed.,
(Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green University Popular Press,
1983), 4.
211 McDonald's Chronological History Report," 12 December
1990, 61. Figures are for 1989.
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threatening to McDonald's, however, the 1970s repudiated the
child-centered society of two decades earlier, leaving in
its wake not only a diminished children's market, but a
diminished children's culture as well.

All these factors

forced McDonald's, in the words of Ray Kroc, to "press on"
in the 1970s and early 1980s. 3
An anomaly in American cultural history, the idyllic
homogeneity of the 1950s and early 1960s could not be
sustained.

Cracks in the consensus were already apparent in

1955 when Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a
Montgomery, Alabama, city bus.

Or when John Kenneth

Galbraith, David Riesman, and Vance Packard published their
respective critiques of Americans' consumer obsessions.

And

in 1963, free-lance writer Betty Friedan gave name to the
suffocating domestic ideal in The Feminine Mystigue. 4

If

Americans in the 1950s could not maintain the cultural
charade; by the 1970s, few even tried.

3 Kroc

was

referring

to

a

The cultural

favorite

quote

by

Calvin

Coolidge:
Press On
Nothing in the world can take the place of persistence.
Talent will not; nothing is more common than unsuccessful
men with talent.
Genius will not; unrewarded genius is
almost a proverb.
Education will not; the world is full of
educated derelicts. Persistence and determination alone are
omnipotent.
4 Betty

Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York:
W.W.
Norton,
1963; reprint, New York:
Laurel/Dell, 1983).
Although
published
first
in
1963,
Friedan's
book
historically dates to a 1957 census she undertook of her
fellow graduates from Smith College, class of 1942.
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reorientation that defined the 1970s had obvious roots in
the civil rights, feminist, and anti-war movements of a
decade earlier, but the 1970s added another blow to the
postwar consensus:

detente.

Postwar America was invigorated by the Cold War.

It

provided not only jobs, but the overriding mentality that
defined the age.

It was the Cold War that redefined the

home as the last bastion against communism, impelling
parents to dote on their children, not only out of parental
love, but also civic duty.

If children were to be the

democratic torchbearers of the future, it was a necessary
and valued lesson in capitalism to spend their childhoods
basking in the consumption of the consumer goods that
defined "the American Dream."

But the Vietnam War betrayed

America's moral ambiguity against communism and President
Nixon prided himself on "opening up" Communist China to the
West in 1972 and in initiating Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT) to reduce Soviet-American nuclear arsenals.
While the U.S. reacted with fierce rhetorical blows
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December,
1979 and covertly funneled funds to struggling anticommunist "freedom fighters," the overt hostility between
the United States and the Soviet Union gradually gave way to
a tenuous alliance between superpowers.

Without the Cold

War rhetoric to bolster the domestic prerogative, children's
role in the family changed.

The first change was a
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quantitative one.
In 1972, the birth rate hit a century low of 15.6
births per thousand.

The rate continued to decline after

the Supreme Court legalized abortion in Roe vs. Wade in
1973, bottoming out at 14.6 in 1976. 5

In practical terms,

the demographic fluctuations meant that youth, variously
defined as up to ages twenty-five or thirty, took cultural
precedence over young children.

In contrast to the more

than 60 million Americans in 1970 aged fifteen to thirtyfour, stood the not quite 17 million youngsters aged five or
younger. 6

Their decreasing numerical significance heralded

their decreasing cultural clout.
While bureaucracies stereotypically react slowly to
social change, the 1970 White House Conference on Children
and Youth quickly sensed the increasing disinterest in
children's issues and addressed it head on.

The

longstanding Conference, which had always addressed children
and youth as a joint topic, convened a separate children's

u.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States,
1992 (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1992), table 80, p. 64. While Roe vs. Wade
undoubtedly impacted birth rate figures, it is presumptuous
to causally attribute the entire reduction in births to the
availability of legal abortions.
Other cultural trends,
such as later marriages, extended educations, and an overall
de-emphasis on child rearing contributed to the reduced
rate.
5

u. s. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of
the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), Series A 29-42, p.
10.
6
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conference exclusively devoted to youngsters under fourteen
years old.

"We were determined," Conference Chairman

Stephen Hess wrote President Nixon, "not to let this
important children's world become secondary because of the
greater attention currently being paid to youth.
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Children's culture, and the economic market it spawned, had
shown much promise in the 1950s and 1960s; by 1970, they
were both prematurely threatened by the maturation of the
very children who had given them life.
McDonald's was at the forefront in the 1950s in
appealing to Baby Boom children.

By the mid-1970s, the

logical impetus was to follow the maturing Boomers into
adulthood, targeting products to an adult, rather than
juvenile, market.

Although competitor Wendy's, for example,

had an anachronistically pig-tailed, freckle-faced girl as
its corporate logo, the new chain's appeal was nearly
exclusively adult.

Even McDonald's, while it premiered its

McDonaldland commercials, was simultaneously upgrading the

7 Letter

from Stephen Hess, National Chairman of White
House Conference on Children, to President Richard Nixon, in
Report to the President: White House Conference on Children
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 5.
The White House Conferences date back to 1909 when President
Theodore Roosevelt convened a symposium of educators,
doctors, sociologists, and business leaders to provide the
administration with information and recommendations on
children's issues. The first Conference led to the creation
of the Children's Bureau in 1912 and to the organizing of
the Child Welfare League of America. Conference Proceedings:
Golden Anniversary White House Conference on Children and
Youth
(Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing· Office,
1960), 2.
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exterior architecture and interior decor of many of its
units to de-emphasize juvenile themes.

Threatened with

saturation in the suburbs, McDonald's also aggressively
targeted urban markets with units typically geared to adult
or commuter, rather than family, traffic.
Still,
market.

McDonald's remained committed to its children's

It had no choice.

As late as 1977, children still

constituted more than a third of its market. 8

And by the

late 1970s, despite pessimistic birth rate forecasts,
McDonald's took a leap of faith, firmly and ineluctably recommitting itself to the children's market.

In the process,

it endured the jeers of the competition much as it had in
1948 when Mac and Dick McDonald first turned away their
teenage patrons.

But children's decreasing demographic size

actually made them a more moldable and impressionable cohort
and McDonald's realized that children held the key to
achieving Ray Kroc's goal of making McDonald's a social
institution.

By appealing to the upcoming generation of

children, rather than to the Baby Boom youngsters per se,
McDonald's both distinguished itself from its competitors
and tightened its hold on the children's consumer market.
It also made McDonald's the obvious choice when Baby
Boomers, now parents, took their own children out to eat.
The McDonald's that the Boomers knew as children,

8 BusinessWeek,

"The Fast-Food Stars:
for Fast Growth," 11 July 1977, 60.

Three Strategies
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however, was changing.
an era:

In January, 1967, McDonald's ended

it raised the prices on its hamburgers from fifteen

to eighteen cents.

Although in concrete terms the increase

had only a temporary effect on sales, the symbolism of the
move went much deeper.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s,

McDonald's was a constant in American society, a symbol of
successful capitalist growth and consumer confidence.

By

the early 1970s, however, consumer confidence was plunging
as Americans re-evaluated their equation of consumerism with
the American Dream.
In September, 1970, U.S. News & World Report ran an
article entitled "Why People Aren't Spending."

Although the

article primarily addressed the practical reasons for the
consumer slowdown--abnormally high savings deposits combined
with inflationary prices and high installment interest
rates--it questioned whether there were more serious reasons
behind consumers' reluctance to purchase both big-ticket
items and routine ones. 9

The worry was well-founded.

From

1971 to 1975, the major news magazines all ran a constant
stream of articles wondering how to foster consumerism
amidst a decidedly anti-consumerist backlash. 10
9

u. S. News & World Report,
Spending," 28 September 1970, 38-40.
10 Time

"Why

People

Aren't

and U.S. News & World Report did the most
thorough job of the general interest magazines in reporting
the fluctuations in consumer attitudes.
Although the
business trade
journals such as Fortune,
Forbes,
and
Nation's Business reported the same trends,
the more
mainstream periodicals examined them within the broader
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While inflation was an obvious culprit, higher prices
alone did not deter purchasing.

After all, hamburger sales

rebounded at McDonald's within a fiscal quarter, after the
initial shock of McDonald's price increase subsided. 11
And although inflation negated part of the gains, retail
sales did jump 12% from May 1972 to May 1973. 12

The

answer lay in a new attitude toward consumerism, a "new
breed of consumers.nl3
Reflecting the lower birth rate, consumers in the 1970s
concentrated on adult purchases.

overall, they preferred

more casual or simplistic designs and materials, and
increasingly evaluated the environmental impact of their
purchasing apart from the products' inherent uses.
Conditioned by affluent childhoods, they tended to expect
immediate gratification, were skeptical about commercial
advertisers' product claims, and preferred individually
oriented do-it-yourself projects to commercially
standardized products and services. 14

parameters of American society and culture.
11 Ray Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out:
The
Making of McDonald's (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1977;
reprint, Chicago:
St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 158-59.
Page references are to the reprint edition.
12 u. S. News & World Report, "Buying Spree By Shoppers
is Slowing Down," 25 June 1973, 60.
13 u. S. News & World Report, "A New Breed of Consumers
Will Be Calling the Turn," 14 July 1975, 19-20.
14 rbid.
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Increasingly freed from the Cold War imperatives of
consumerism, Americans in the 1970s groped toward a "new
functionalism" in their purchasing.

The stalwart

advertising themes of the 1950s, characterized by words like
"new, improved, modern, young, fresh, bold, and pace-setter"
were hackneyed and suspect by the 1970s. 15

Americans no

longer equated their personal consumption with the modernity
of their nation.

The sleek designs of the pre- and postwar

industrial designers seemed unnatural and ostentatious three
decades later.

Although the products of the 1950s were

heralded as the peak of efficiency in their own heyday,
efficiency in the 1970s was redefined along simplistic and
casual, rather than formal, lines of design and use. 16
McDonald's fared surprisingly well under the new
constraints of 1970s consumerism.

The negative connotations

of standardization were offset by several positive values
that McDonald's offered.

Its limited menu promised

simplicity; its new interior seating provided casual dining;
its longstanding emphasis on cleanliness and service was
still equated with efficiency; and its gradual reorientation
away from suburbs to urban areas produced more adultoriented decor and demeanor.

But McDonald's also needed to

change to keep pace with the expectations of its
increasingly sophisticated adult customer base.
15 Ibid.,

16 Ibid.

19.

The garish
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red and white tiled buildings gave way to wooden shingled
roofs and the menu, while still limited, increasingly
offered adult sandwiches such as the Big Mac, Filet o' Fish,
and McChicken entrees.

Noticeably absent from the new

definitions of consumerism, however, were children.
Children had provided the practical thrust for the
massive consumer spending in the two decades following World
War II.

Children's needs and desires created or

reinvigorated scores of products and industries, from
diapers to toys, housing to automobiles.

Purchases made by

the children themselves enriched motion picture studios and
pioneer radio and television sponsors, and were widely
analyzed and predicted by a dozen different child marketing
firms.

But the consumer market changes between 1950 and

1970 were so pronounced that the wealth of articles on child
and youth consumerism that flooded periodicals in the 1950s
and 1960s became a trickle of essays by the mid-1970s. 17
Children as a dynamic force in the economy were rediscovered
only after the baby boomlet in the mid-to-late 1980s, when
the young children's market was myopically hailed as a new

17 A

look at the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature
confirms this.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, periodicals
from mainstream general interest ones to business trade
publications examined the burgeoning children's market and
how meeting the needs of children had redefined American
consumerism.
As early as 1970, however, and throughout the
1970s, few articles appeared on child consumerism, per se.
The bulk of the new child articles revolved around
television
viewing
habits
and
cereal
consumption's
relationship to poor nutrition.
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and previously untapped market.

In reality, it was the

resurgence and expansion of the earlier market that had
flourished after World War II.
While children's demographic strength directly affected
their economic clout (and level of interest by magazine
editors), children were not wholly disenfranchised from the
economy.

While the culture no longer revolved around their

consumer whims, marketers were anxious to secure whatever
remained of the children's market.
especially good position to do this.

McDonald's was in an
It already had a

marketing advocate in Ronald McDonald, who enjoyed a 97%
recognition factor among American youngsters.

And the

steady diet of McDonald's commercials combined with the 1970
introduction of the McDonaldland storyline and setting gave
McDonald's an enviable lead in the children's market.
Competitor Wendy's only nominally tried to reach
children.

Named after founder Dave Thomas' daughter,

Wendy's never anthropomorphized its little girl logo, and
did not offer a "fun experience" to young patrons.

While

the standardization of McDonald's made ordering easy for
young children--all hamburgers came with pickles, onions,
ketchup, and mustard--the element of choice at Wendy's made
it difficult for youngsters to place their own food orders.
Burger King, who had always competed with McDonald's for the
family market but had fallen short in the efficiency,
consistency, and quality it offered, belatedly followed
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Ronald McDonald into the children's market with "Burger
King."

But Burger King was beset by a host of internal

problems in the 1970s caused by a decentralized structure
that allowed franchisees unchecked and nearly unlimited
power over the corporation. 18

Concentration on internal

restructuring while simultaneously protecting its number two
spot from the aggressive onslaughts of Wendy's, prevented
Burger King the mascot f rorn being a serious challenger to
Ronald McDonald.

The ongoing efforts of Burger King and

Wendy's to unseat McDonald's, however, coalesced into a
series of "Burger Wars" in the early 1970s that reshaped the
entire fast-food industry.
By 1969, the hundreds of independent drive-in and dinein restaurants serving fast-food in America had coalesced
into conglomerates of primarily local and regional chains.
While true "Morn and Pop" drive-in restaurants still dotted
the highways, especially in smaller towns or older
neighborhoods, even their combined economic impact had
become negligible when compared to the franchised chains.
Further, the Darwinian nature of America's market economy
made it inevitable that the national companies strongest in
exposure, sales, and access to expansion capital would
overtake the lesser-known or thinly capitalized local and
regional chains.
1811 Burger

It was not a good time to be an small-

King Corporation," International Directory of
Company Histories:
Food Services and Retailers, ed. Lisa
Mirabile (Chicago: St. James Press, 1990), 613-15.
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scale, independent player in the fast-food business.
Combined with ongoing fears of market saturation and
recession, "the fast-food market [by 1970] collapsed like a
soggy, overloaded paper cup. 1119

Chain expansion and stock

offerings "came to a near-total halt during the 1969-1970
bear market," with the first hints of recovery in the summer
of 1972. 20
Problems endemic to the fast-food industry did not
totally account for the slowdown.

Franchising, which for

two decades had provided the panacea both for expansionseeking companies and opportunistic entrepreneurs, had
fallen flat by 1970.

A March, 1970 Fortune article reported

on the growing disillusionment of licensees, attracted by
the franchisors' promises of instant wealth and the carnival
hoopla of the franchise shows, who "sign up often without
knowing quite what they've gotten into.112 1

Lack of full

disclosure laws and the power of franchisors to cut off
licensees indiscriminately left franchisees vulnerable,
.
.
. d ustry regu l a t.ion. 22
d isappointed,
and clamoring for in
McDonald's fared much better than its competitors in
19

J. Anthony Lukas,
"As American as a McDonald's
Hamburger on the Fourth of July," New York Times Magazine, 4
July 1971, sec. 6, pp. 4-5.
2011
Fast-Food Companies are Hot Again," BusinessWeek, 30
September 1972, 54-55.
21
Charles G.
Burck,
"Franchising' s
World," Fortune (March 1970): 117-18.
22 rbid.
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the burger shakeout.

It had a solid and respected

reputation for its dealings with licensees and, unlike many
other franchisors, could honestly point to dozens of
owner/operators who had become millionaires working their
franchises.

Ray Kroc's well-publicized fanaticism for

quality and consistency, as well as ongoing training through
the 1961 creation of Hamburger University, also reassured
prospective licensees.

Finally, McDonald's real estate

ownership of franchised units combined with its increasing
number of corporate-owned stores provided it with tangible
assets to access capital markets, a financing route often
denied its competitors.

Bolstered by tables of impressive

sales growth and anecdotes of millionaire franchisees,
Kroc's publicity campaign in the 1960s continued to bear
fruit a decade later. 23
A second round of intense national exposure in the
early 1970s solidified McDonald's leadership role in the
fast-food market.

In addition to occasional articles in

Fortune, Newsweek, and BusinessWeek, McDonald's benefitted
from major stories in Forbes, Time, and the New York Times
Magazine.

The earliest of these, "As American as a

McDonald's Hamburger on the Fourth of July," ran as the
cover story in the July 4, 1971 issue of the New York Times
Magazine.

The article, not inconsequentially run on

2311 McDonald's

15 June 1968, 102.

Makes Franchising Sizzle,"

BusinessWeek,
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Independence Day, lauded Kroc as a "superpatriot" and
canonized McDonald's as the "updated version of the American
dream.

1124

The magazine reiterated and legitimized the

cultural myth of McDonald's as a wholesome, family-centered
American restaurant.

It contributed to McDonald's social

legitimacy by reprinting a letter from an infantry soldier
in Vietnam who claimed that "when we get back to the world,
that will be our first act--going to McDonald's for a burger
and a shake.

1125

The tenor of the article equated

McDonald's with Americanism and the symbolism of McDonald's
as "home" was strong.

While competitors' chains were

failing under the weight of franchising disillusionment,
inadequate financing, and uneven quality, Kroc was hailed as
America's "Burger Mogul" by one of the most prestigious and
influential newspapers in the country. 26
In January, 1973, Forbes contributed to the publicity
blitz with a cover story on Ray Kroc.

In "For Ray Kroc,

Life Began at 50, Or was it 60?" Forbes squarely placed
McDonald's success on Kroc's personal perseverance and
"fanatical attention to detail.

1127

And, in September,

1973, Time ran its own testimonial to McDonald's in "The

24 Lukas,

"American as a McDonald's Hamburger," 4-5.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.
27 Forbes,

"For Ray Kroc,
60?" 15 January 1973, 30.

Life Began at 50,

or· was it
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blanket the state of Illinois, or form thirteen rings around
the earth.

The ketchup and mustard together metaphorically

filled the Mississippi River as McDonald's became a national
food purveyor in the league of the U.S. Army and Navy. 31
The strategic sleight of hand worked.

While dozens of

competitors were failing and McDonald's itself raised prices
several times, American children (and adults as well) were
loyally humming the infamous "Twoallbeefpatties

•

•

•

I II

Big

Mac tongue-twister of 1975.
McDonald's strategy also impressed Wall Street.

A 1975

Smith, Barney analysis cited McDonald's sales performance
since 1969 as "extraordinary" and "dynamic."

"In a real

sense," Smith, Barney analyst Joseph Doyle asserted, "there
is only one company that scores the highest in each of [the]
characteristics for success--McDonald's.

1132

McDonald's,

Doyle continued, was unique in that, overall, it was
unaffected by much of the economic troubles of the early
1970s.

Although wholesale beef prices nearly doubled from

1972 to 1973--from $.65 per pound in 1972 to $1.15 in
August, 1973--hamburger sales had increased, even in the
wake of successive price hikes. 33

Gasoline shortages and

rationing, which plagued highway-based hotel and hamburger

31 Ibid.
32

Joseph J.
Doyle, McDonald's Corporation,
Smith, Barney, 1975), 6.
Report #32-75 (New York:
33

Ibid., 37.

Company
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chains such as Howard Johnson's and Hardee's, barely touched
McDonald's, whose stronghold in the early 1970s was still
suburban residential neighborhoods. 34

New minimum wage

increases to $2.00 in 1975 also did not affect McDonald's
which, a year earlier, was already paying its crew $2.05
hourly. 35
Doyle did caution, however, against expecting
McDonald's to continue its double-digit annual growth trend.
The 1950s and 1960s smiled upon upstart entrepreneurs, but
the consumer restraint of the 1970s, fueled by inflationary
prices and fears of recession and job loss, required
companies and investors to lower their growth expectations.
Still, McDonald's ten-year growth curve topped that of CocaCola, IBM, Sears, Roebuck, or Walt Disney Productions. 36
Although Smith, Barney rated McDonald's favorably, other
analysts warily predicted the saturation of the fast-food

34

rbid., 17.

35 Ibid.

36 rbid.,

37.

1, 25, table XVII, p. 54. The growth analysis
was based on annual earnings per share from 1964 through
1974 for the twenty-five largest "growth companies" in the
U.S.
One reason for McDonald's dominance, of course, was
that McDonald's in the 1960s was intently focused on
expanding its operations, as are all younger companies.
As
more mature companies, Sears, IBM, et al. underwent their
initial bursts of expansion earlier in the century. An even
younger company than McDonald's, Wendy's expanded from its
first outlet in 1969 to 100 in 1975, to 2000 by 1980, an
expansion rate that paralleled, if not exceeded, McDonald's.
Stan Luxenberg, Roadside Empires: How the Chains Franchised
America (New York:
Viking/Penguin, 1985), 4; BusinessWeek,
"The Fast-Food Stars," 60.

205
market.

Even Doyle was somewhat concerned that McDonald's

would have to substantially diversify its product line or
spawn off subsidiary industries to combat what was seen as
an inevitable oversupply of fast-food outlets. 37
The twin concerns of inflation and recession, combined
with saturation uncertainty, forced McDonald's to "press on"
in the 1970s.

But the 1970s also presented a more

fundamental threat to McDonald's.

McDonald's built its

success upon catering to the needs of the postwar nuclear
family.

By the 1970s, however, McDonald's was faced with a

dwindling number of families to which to market its
products.

Demographic shifts affected not only the number

of children comprising the children's and family markets,
but fundamental changes in the structure of family life
struck at the core of McDonald's two parent, suburban,
white, middle-class, child-centered market.
As late as 1971, America's mainstream magazines
predicted a continuation, even expansion of the Baby Boom.
Although the birth rate had steadily decreased throughout
the late 1960s--the 1969 birth rate of 17.8 contrasted with
the 19.4 figure for 1965--analysts were buoyed by the rate's
1970 rise to 18.4, matching the figure for 1966. 38

The

rate seemed to be on the rise as Boomers reached adulthood.
37 Doyle,

"McDonald's Corporation," 19.

u.s. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics,
vol. 1, Series B 5-10, p. 49; U.S. Bureau of the ·Census,
Statistical Abstract, 1992, table 80, p. 64.
38
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Raised in larger families, the Boomers, it was assumed,
would begin to raise families of their own.

While "zero

population growth" was cited as a theoretical goal, a
healthy, or at least stable, population growth was important
economically to sustain the market expansion of the previous
decades. 39

But the new families that the Boomers created

in the 1970s and early 1980s were both qualitatively and
quantitatively different than their own families had been in
the 1950s and 1960s.
In 1970, journalist and free-lance social critic Alvin
Toffler published his paean to the twentieth century, Future
Shock.

Toffler had defined "future shock" in 1965 "to

describe the shattering stress and disorientation that we
[as a society] induce in individuals by subjecting them to
too much change in too short a time . . . . It is the disease
of change. 114

°

Families, in their role as social buffers,

were inordinately vulnerable to the rapidity of change.

Not

only did the family absorb the impact of social change, a
function it had long before the 1970s, but it was expected
to do so as it, itself, underwent rapid and unprecedented
change. 41
Toffler was not alone in his concern.

Although his

u.s. News & World Report, "Ahead for America--Biggest
'Baby Boom,'" 14 June 1971, 37.
39

40 Alvin

Toffler, Future Shock (New York:

1970), 4.
41 Ibid.,

211-12.

Random House,
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predictions that children would be reared by "professional,"
rather than biological, parents or that sanctioned, shortterm, "serial" marriages would replace the idealized lifelong union, never materialized, Toffler's critique was among
the first to declare the ideal family of the 1950s to be
dead. 42

While most generations lament changes in family

structure--James Gilbert has shown that juvenile delinquency
has been continually "rediscovered" by successive
generations of parents--the family in the 1970s was
popularly perceived to be on the verge of "a turbulent era
of experimentation and change.n 43
Gloria Steinem preached female independence and
initiative in Ms. magazine, Paul and Anne Ehrlich in The End
of Affluence encouraged families to limit childbearing to
preserve scarce environmental resources, and even renowned
anthropologist Margaret Mead lamented that Baby Boomers were
a culturally isolated generation, disinherited from the
value structure of their parents by rapidly changing
technology. 44
42 rbid.,

Lower marriage and birth rates, and
215-17, 222-24.

43 James

Gilbert,
A Cycle of Outrage:
America's
Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 3-4; U.S. News & World
Report, "The American Family:
Can It Survive Today's
Shocks," 27 October 1975, 30-43.
44 rn

addition to founding and editing Ms. , Steinem's
feminist writings included numerous essays from the late
1960s to early 1970s in New York magazine, and a compilation
of essays in Outrageous Acts and Everyday Rebellions (New
York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983); Paul R. and Anne
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escalating divorce rates were symptomatic of broader
cultural trends, the critics maintained.

And the changes

were as much attitudinal as numerical.
The popular image of the 1970s and 1980s was of an
America in which many refused to grow up, defined--following
a 1950s template--as marrying, starting a family, holding a
steady job, and taking an interest in the community.

The

permissive child-rearing practices, born of the middle-class
affluence of the 1950s and 1960s, came back to haunt
Americans as even Dr. Benjamin Spock was criticized for
helping to create a generation of youth accustomed to
immediate gratification devoid of individual initiative and
responsibility.
No doubt the critics glamorized and romanticized the
1950s family, holding American families in the 1970s and
early 1980s to a cultural standard that was more myth than
reality.

In The Way We Never Were:

American Families and

the Nostalgia Trap, Stephanie Coontz shattered the rosy
picture of family life in the 1950s, and dethroned its use
as a normative reference point.

Coontz wrote,

Beneath the polished facades of many "ideal" families,
suburban as well as urban, was violence, terror, or
simply grinding misery that only occasionally came to

H. Ehrlich, The End of Affluence (New York:
Ballantine
Books, 19 7 4) ; Margaret Mead, Culture and Commitment:
A
Studv of the Generation Gap (Garden City, NY:
·Natural
History Press/Doubleday & Company, 1970), 78-85.
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light. 45
Child abuse, chronic alcoholism, denial of ethnic and racial
diversity, and subjugation of women's rights to a masculinedefined cultural imperative betray the romanticized "Ozzie
and Harriet" image of the 1950s family.

Although Coontz

conceded that many Americans had happy memories of their
1950s families, the cultural contradictions of the era
nonetheless rendered the myth inadequate for gauging more
recent patterns of family life. 46

"Contrary to popular

opinion," Coontz concluded, "'Leave It to Beaver' was not a
documentary. 1147
Even without the rose-colored blinders, it was obvious
to McDonald's that their traditional family market had
shifted out of cultural focus.

The suburban sprawl that had

spawned McDonald's growth throughout the 1950s and 1960s was
not only economically, but culturally challenged in the
1970s.

Environmental and zoning restrictions on large tract

developments, shortages of natural gas and petroleum for
home heating and car fuels, and local ordinances that
required developers to provide community infrastructure in
the vein of William Levitt's earlier successes, all combined

45 stephanie

Coontz, The Way We Never Were:
American
Families and the Nostalgia Trap (New York:
Basic Books,
1992), 35.
46 Ibid.,

29-38.

47 Ibid.

29.

I
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to impede new subdivision development. 48
More troublesome to McDonald's, which had relied upon
skyrocketing suburban growth for its own double-digit annual
growth rate, was a cultural disenchantment, even
disillusionment, with suburbia.

Parochial anti-growth

sentiment lobbied for suburban containment at the same time
as more Americans began to question the core value of living
in culturally isolated communities that failed to represent
the diversity of the real world. 49
Scarsdale, 1891-1981,

In A Sort of Utopia:

Carol A. O'Connor showed how the

idealized and envied middle-class suburb of Scarsdale, New
York, became perceived by the 1970s as a haven for the
economically intolerant and culturally impotent.

Herself a

product of a Scarsdale upbringing, O'Connor claimed that, by
the 1970s, "instead of a symbol of American achievement,
Scarsdale had become a symbol of America's faults.

1150

48

u. s. News & World Report, "Home-Building Boom Hits
Snags in Suburbs," 16 October 1972, 39-41.
49 Historian

Bennett Berger pointed out that American
suburbanization was
never
as
homogeneous
as
critics
maintained.
Working class suburbs, often supported by a
large hometown manufacturing plant,
as well as once
independent towns that were eventually co-opted by aspiring
suburbanites also played a substantial role in American
suburbanization.
Bennett Berger, Working Class Suburb:
A
Study of Auto Workers
in Suburbia
(Berkeley,
CA:
University of California Press, 1960), 4-11.
Urban renewal
in the 1970s, however, challenged more the homogeneity of
the post-World War II, WASP, middle-class suburb than it did
these earlier and inherently more diverse suburban forms.
50

carol A. o 'Connor, A Sort of Utopia:
Scarsdale,
1891-1981 (Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press,
1983), 213.
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Correlative to suburban redefinition in the 1970s was a new
attitude toward America's cities.
Urban renewal was belatedly rediscovered in the late
1960s and 1970s, empowered by an organizational ethos that
sought to localize urban political power in individual
neighborhoods, rather than in state or federal
legislatures. 51

Not a novel idea--organized community

development dated to the late nineteenth century-neighborhood activism in the 1970s and 1980s became
mainstreamed and provided urbanites with an alternative to
suburban flight.

Zoning, block grants, and gentrification

had refurbished the tarnished image of the city, making it a
viable alternative to suburbia.

With an escalating emphasis

on adult living patterns, large backyards, four-bedroom
homes, and garage space for two or three cars were not only
unnecessary, but squandered valuable time, money, and
energy.

In a decade of environmental sensitivity and gas

rationing, living closer, rather than farther, from work was
preferred.

And the social diversity of the city became, in

itself, a draw, much as the homogeneous isolation of the

51 A

good analysis of the neighborhood movement is
Robert Fisher,
Let the People Decide:
Neighborhood
Organizing in America (Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1984).
Although Fisher questionably included the Vietnam era
groups, Students for a Democratic Society ( SDS) and the
Student
Nonviolent
Coordinating
Committee
( SNCC),
as
neighborhood organizations, his insight that neighborhood
activism was shaped by the socio-economic needs of its
residents, and thus can be either conservative or-radical
depending on time and place, is noteworthy.
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suburbs were two decades earlier.
As children and suburbia fell out of focus, McDonald's
broadened its target audience to include not only families,
but commuters, older adults, and, reaching farther back into
its history, teenagers.

Kroc had counted church steeples,

schools, and station wagons in the 1950s for his upcoming
units, but the importance of those institutional markers
waned as the myth of the 1950s was increasingly scrutinized
and found lacking.

Integrally tied to the culture of the

1950s, McDonald's and its own myths became similarly
vulnerable.
Although McDonald's benefitted from The New York Times
Magazine and Time articles, as well as popular sentiment
surrounding its sponsorship of the Ronald McDonald Houses
and corporate philanthropy programs, the very core of the
"McDonald's Experience" became suspect by the early 1980s.
As McDonald's units saturated the American landscape, the
cultural legitimacy of McDonald's was questioned, a novel
problem for the corporation, but foreseeable given Kroc's
expectations of McDonald's institutional role in American
society.

The sheer existence of the issue attested to

McDonald's success, much as it had for Sears, Roebuck and
Howard Johnson's.

As McDonald's became a recognizable

cultural landmark, it endured a social and cultural scrutiny
spared Burger King, Wendy's, or Kentucky Fried Chicken.
McDonald's became the archetype for a host of cultural
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issues:

standardization, domestic consumerism, convenience,

and efficiency among them.

Indeed, while hypothetically

dissecting the cultural impact of a Wendy's seemed trivial,
a similar assessment of a McDonald's yields unexpected
understanding of how children and families organized their
daily lives.

McDonald's was that distinct among its

competition.
Theodore Levitt's well-known study of McDonald's as an
example of the brilliant integration of automation and human
technologies defined the original parameters for analyzing
McDonald's role in American life.

The parameters, however,

were quickly breached as McDonald's influence became as
obviously cultural as technical.

While the broader

implications of the "McDonaldization" of American life were
still more than a decade distant, concrete contradictions in
McDonald's marketing message were already evident by the
1970s and early 1980s. 5 2
In its transformation from a regional California chain
to national dominance, McDonald's inevitably made
concessions of individuality, nutrition, cultural
heterogeneity, and consumer innocence.

That realization is

neither surprising nor necessarily pernicious for a
corporation obsessed with rapid expansion.
52 George

But McDonald's

Ritzer,
The
McDonaldization
of
Society
(Newbury Park, CA:
Pine Forge Press/Sage, 1993).
Ritzer's
comprehensive study of the United States as a "McDonaldized"
society, expanded from an article written in 1983; gets a
full hearing in the last chapter.
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case was different.

McDonald's consciously, even self-

consciously--the refinement reflects McDonald's acute
awareness of its actions--created an image of itself as
wholesome, echoing the idealized image of the 1950s.

And,

overall, McDonald's has fared quite well at sustaining the
myth, provided it was not scrutinized too closely.
On the inside, McDonald's frequently lamented the
"reality gap," that is, the difference between the public
perception of McDonald's and the reality of actually eating
a meal there.

This perceptual distortion was especially

egregious for children, who were told that McDonald's was
Ronald's "house," with all the attendant connotations, yet
arrived to find only a harried teenager impatient to take
their money, end the shift, and go home.

The "McDonald's

Experience," widely touted in both its juvenile and adult
advertising, was miniaturized into a hectic scramble to find
seating, feed the children, and rush out.

Whatever

"Experience" remained had to be compressed into the average
twenty-minute stay, barely long enough for children to
finish fidgeting with their food and eat.

McDonald's

inability to deliver what it really peddled--social
stroking--pointed to a fundamental flaw in its myth and
created the reality gap so distressful to McDonald's
insiders.
In the 1970s, the gap was merely a crack, uncovered
only after the cultural debris of the 1950s had been
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stripped away and analyzed.

Its existence, however, only

made McDonald's more adamant in perpetuating the myth, using
the cultural arsenal of saturation advertising and image
enhancement.

At stake was a vibrant, though numerically

weakened, children's market that had ignited McDonald's
growth and without which McDonald's risked becoming just
another fast-food restaurant, void of wider loyalties or
significance.

Despite demographic and social fluctuations,

children and families formed the core principle of
McDonald's existence, a passionate belief
uncharacteristically shared by both Ray Kroc and the
McDonald brothers.

To recapture the myth, McDonald's called

upon one of the most popular child institutions of the
1950s:

the Boy Scouts.

CHAPTER 8
ADVERTISING BLITZ
Each McDonald's TV commercial should strive
to capture the "magic moment" . . . that
little moment that tugs at your emotions, and
makes you laugh, or feel a warm empathy
towards the commercial.
It's the moment that
separates McDonald's advertising from all the
others. 1
Ray Bergold, McDonald's Corporation

McDonald's profitability, success, and long term
cultural significance rested upon the continued
reinforcement of its wholesome family image.

In 1967,

McDonald's sponsored the World Boy Scout Jamboree telecast,
hosted by cinema icon Jimmy Stewart.

Stewart's own boyish

image combined with the obvious value overtones of the Boy
Scouts made sponsorship a "natural . . . [which] created
unique local public relations opportunities.
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While

McDonald's no doubt benefitted directly from the commercial
spots aired during the Jamboree, it more importantly

1 Ray

Bergold, McDonald's Assistant Vice President for
Advertising
and
Promotion,
to
Advertising
Managers,
Owner /Operators, and Operators' National Advertising Fund
(OPNAD) members, 1978, in "Golden Arches Code," McDonald's
Corporation Archives, 7.
2 McDonald's

Corporation Annual Report, 1967, McDonald's
Corporation Archives, 5.
216
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parlayed the sheer fact of sponsorship into public relations
currency among hundreds of local troops across America. 3
It was McDonald's marketing at its best:

a generous, but

efficient use of advertising dollars that paid double, even
triple, dividends.

And, in 1967, it merely foreshadowed

what was to come.
In 1967, McDonald's spent $3.5 million on network
television advertising; five years later, the amount
skyrocketed to $40 million; and by 1985, it reached an
ethereal $1.1 billion, reflecting a full 6.3% of systemwide
sales. 4

Ironically, the rate of increases were not

uncharacteristically impressive, since throughout the 1980s
McDonald's had historically spent over 6% of sales annually
on advertising.

What the advertising figures really

testified to was the phenomenal financial and physical
growth of McDonald's during the 1980s, a growth directly
attributable to television advertising. 5
Television matured McDonald's.

It gave it a national

presence and reinforced the crucial importance of menu and
image standardization.

Through the 1967 creation of the

Operators' National Advertising Fund (OPNAD), McDonald's
3

"McDonald's
Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.

(May

1967),

McDonald's

4
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operators cooperatively pooled advertising dollars within a
formalized structure unmatched by the competition.

The

result was a unilateral victory for McDonald's in the
recurring wave of "burger wars" throughout the 1970s and
1980s and a growing realization that McDonald's was
culturally something more than a fast-food restaurant.
McDonald's commitment to television had other
ramifications.

It cemented Ronald McDonald's relationship

with his young audience, though at a cost.

In its focused

targeting of children, McDonald's was swept into the barrage
of rhetoric between commercial sponsors and anti-television
lobbyists best exemplified by Peggy Charren's Action for
Children's Television (ACT).

With young children watching

over three hours per day, the distinction between reality
and fantasy could easily become challenged or compromised. 6
And the fantasy world of McDonaldland included not only real
children, but a continually expanding ensemble of menuidentifiable characters such as the "Fry Kids," the "Happy
Meal Guys," and the "McNugget Buddies.
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Distressing to McDonald's, the combined expansion and
intensity of its child marketing triggered a national outcry
against the nutritional deficiencies of McDonald's menu.

6 Federal

Trade Commission, Staff Report on Television
Advertising to Children (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1978), 27-29.
7

McDonald's Customer Relations Packet (Oak Brook,
McDonald's Corporation, 1990), 9.

IL:
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While the "All-American Meal" was unquestionably convenient
and debatably tasty, it threatened to produce a generation
of obese and nutritionally compromised children.

And

environmentalists' discomfort over McDonald's profligate use
of paper and polystyrene packaging--exacerbated by the
superfluous outer packaging of the children's "Happy Meal"-put McDonald's further on the offensive to maintain its
wholesome image.

It was McDonald's intensified exposure on

television that made it a target for nutritionists,
environmentalists, and anti-television lobbyists, yet it was
ironically through television advertising that McDonald's
daily recreated its images of wholesomeness and quality to
combat the critics.

That it could do the latter in the face

of such determined opposition spoke both of the power of the
medium and the savvy of McDonald's marketing message.
Beyond McDonald's, television advertising overall in
the 1970s and 1980s heralded the magnification and
sophistication of the children's consumer market.

In 1955,

direct purchases by children under 13 years old added a
negligible blip to the American economy.

In 1990, the

children's consumer market approached $75 billion, nearly 2%
of the entire U.S. economy. 8

Obviously, much of this newer

"kiddie market" was fueled by zealous parents eager to
purchase the latest toy or videogame for their children, as

8 Peter Newcomb,

June 1990, 126.

"Hey, Dude, Let's Consume," Forbes,

11
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were earlier children's markets from the 1940s through the
1960s.

But unlike those former incarnations, a healthy and

respectable percentage reflected children's own independent
purchases and increased direct economic influence over their
families' discretionary incomes. 9

Television in the 1970s

and 1980s opened up consumer options for children, expanded
their range of economic choices and outlets, and helped to
routinize both direct child purchasing and children's
purchasing influence.

Combined with a baby boomlet in the

late 1980s, the proliferation of dual career households and
the commensurate rise of increased childhood independence,
the advertising saturation on children's television
programming thrust the children's consumer market from its
1970s malaise into full throttle during the later 1980s.
For McDonald's, which had firmly recommitted itself to the
children's market despite its demographic downturn of the
1970s, the decided uptick in 1980s child consumerism both
validated its corporate strategy and ensured its unqualified
lead in capturing a new generation of American consumers.
The beginnings of McDonald's intensified exposure to
children coincided, and directly benefitted from, the 1967
creation of OPNAD.

Through membership in OPNAD, individual

licensees could collectively pool advertising dollars-initially set at 1% of gross sales--and purchase television

9

Ibid., 126-28.
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air time independent of the parent corporation. 10

While

McDonald's continued to orchestrate the actual production of
its commercials, OPNAD dollars were spent on local,
regional, and national buys to increase overall exposure of
the McDonald's name.

It was a cooperative rather than

competitive effort, made possible first by the lucrative
revenues that individual units were producing by the late
1960s and then by the corporation's standardization ethos,
which allowed for undifferentiated advertising.

Burger

King, which as late as 1972, still only produced two-thirds
the "sales-per-store" figures as McDonald's, was plagued by
maverick operators, inconsistent quality, and internal chaos
in the late 1960s and was thus unable to match OPNAD's
advertising clout. 11
The roster of OPNAD members swelled to over 90% of all
McDonald's owner/operators by May, 1967. 12

The focus

quickly centered on network advertising, with OPNAD
regularly purchasing time for nationally run or syndicated
10 "McDonald's

Newsletter" (February 1967), McDonald's
Corporation Archives.
While financially independent of the
corporation,
OPNAD
still
operated
within
guidelines
established in Oak Brook.
D. Wyckoff and w. Earl Sasser, The ChainRestaurant Industry (Lexington, MA:
D. C. Heath, 19 7 8) ,
table I-21, p. 52.
A typical barometer of overall chain
profitability is "sales per store" for units opened at least
one year.
McDonald's has historically led its fast-food
competitors
under
this
standard,
primarily
because
McDonald's initial training programs jumpstart new units.
11 Daryl

12 "McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.

(May

1967),

McDonald's
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shows that appealed to McDonald's targeted family audience.
Examples of these shows throughout the 1970s and 1980s
included "The Brady Bunch," "Little House on the Prairie,"
the "Waltons, 11 and, unsurprisingly, "The Wonderful World of
Disney. 1113

In effect, OPNAD doubled, though not

duplicated, the corporation's own advertising, which was
increasingly refocused to sponsoring major telecasts,
holiday sporting events and parades, and comedy and dramatic
"specials."
McDonald's emphasis on advertising was not novel to the
late 1960s.

A clause in Ray Kroc's original franchising

agreement with Dick and Mac McDonald mandated that Kroc
expend a minimum of $10,000 annually on advertising.

In his

own contract with licensees, Kroc required operators to set
aside 2 1/2% of gross sales for advertising, a modest amount
compared against the 4% of gross that the most successful
licensees spent. 14

The February, 1960 edition of

"McDonald's Newsletter" hyped the value of advertising,
calculating that licensees who spent $300 per month per unit
could realize a quick and impressive 30% increase in

1311 McDonald's

Newsletter" (June 1973); (February 1976);
(September 1980), McDonald's Corporation Archives.
1411 Franchise

Agreement Between Richard and Maurice
McDonald
and
Ray
Kroc,"
19
August
1954,
McDonald's
Corporation Archives;
"McDonald's Newsletter"
(February
1960), McDonald's Corporation Archives.
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business. 15

Although convenience and quality were

undoubtedly factors, what kept McDonald's name, rather than
rivals White Castle, Burger King, or Burger Chef, in front
of parents and youngsters was McDonald's dogged pursuit of
radio and television air time. 16

Licensees pledged

advertising money to OPNAD, above and beyond the 2 1/2%
contractually required by Kroc, because the air buys
produced quick and tangible results, especially in the venue
of children's programming.
One of the first purchases made by OPNAD was on
Saturday morning children's cartoons.

Bought in eight week

increments, OPNAD purchased air time on the three major
networks--CBS, NBC, and ABC--and sponsored their respective
hits, "Underdog," "The Flintstones," and "Bugs Bunny," among
many others. 17

OPNAD took over cartoon sponsorship from

the corporation, which had ventured into Saturday morning
1511 McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.

(February

1960),

McDonald's

16 understandable

given
the
state
of
television
technology and use, McDonald's, in the early 1960s, stressed
and encouraged radio, not television, spot buys as the most
efficient use of advertising dollars.
In 1965, McDonald's
purchased its first network buy in co-sponsoring the Macy's
Thanksgiving Day Parade and formally unveiling Ronald
McDonald.
Although individual units still frequently
purchased radio time for local ads, and the corporation
continued to issue guidelines and sample scripts for radio
messages, all nostalgia for corporate radio advertising was
quickly dropped in favor of television.
"McDonald's
Newsletter"
(April 1962); "McDonald's Marketing Manual,
1971-1973," sample spot scripts.
1711 McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.

(February

1967),
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commercials in the summer of 1966 after its success at cosponsoring the Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade the previous
autwnn. 18

Advertising time was competitive, thus

expensive, and pitted McDonald's as the newcomer against
veteran toy and cereal manufacturers which led in Saturday
morning sponsorship. 19

With one-third of their sales

influenced by children, McDonald's predominant advertising
goal in the late 1960s and early 1970s was to create an
image and a presence in the children's market.
willing to compete for the airtime.

Thus, it was

This is underscored by

the fact that the bulk of McDonald's corporate network
advertising was committed to the children's conswner market,
leaving local units to pierce the adult fast-food
segment. 20

In a six-week period from January to March,

1968, OPNAD sponsored 44 spots on Saturday morning cartoons,

1811 McDonald's

Newsletter" (August 1966); "McDonald's
Chronological
Report,"
12
December
1990,
McDonald's
Corporation Archives, 23.
McDonald's purchased one-quarter
sponsorship of the parade,
a
risky investment given
McDonald's corporate inexperience at network advertising.
1911 Advertising,

Marketing Reports on the 100 Top
National Advertisers," Advertising Age, 18 August 1975, XX.
Citing 1973 and 1974 figures,
Advertising Age ranked
McDonald's as the 39th largest national advertiser, behind
food giants Kraft, General Mills, General Foods, Nabisco,
and
Ralston
Purina.
In
terms
of
television
spot
advertising,
however,
McDonald's ranked 6th,
ahead of
General Mills and Coca-Cola.
2011 McDonald's
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(August
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compared with only 22 prime-time, or evening, spots. 21
And in the autumn of 1968, McDonald's estimated that 183
million viewers saw the 52 minutes of McDonald's commercials
aired in a typical four-week period.

Echoing their current

advertising jingle, the McDonald's Newsletter boasted in
December, 1968, "Just about everyone who watches T.V. will
get the point that 'McDonald's is your kind of place.

11122

And the point was especially directed at children.
Part of the reason that McDonald's so intensely
targeted the children's market was elementary economics.
Saturday morning airtime, while competitive, was still
significantly less expensive than prime-time advertising.
It simply delivered a greater return on investment.

In its

Spring buys for 1969, OPNAD purchased 29 minutes of primetime spots on CBS and ABC for a total cost of $1 million.
McDonald's estimated that the spots would reach an adult
audience of 832,000 over several weeks.

But for $838,000,

OPNAD purchased a full fifty-two weeks of children's
advertising, reaching over one million ongoing viewers
through a total of 175 minutes of advertising spots. 23
For Ray Kroc, who firmly believed that advertising and

2111 McDonald' s

(January

1968),

McDonald's

2211 McDonald's

(December

1968),

McDonald's

2311 McDonald's

(March

Newsletter•:
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Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.
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Corporation Archives.
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promotion equalled an investment, rather than an expense,
the children's market yielded impressive dividends,
especially when saturated with Ronald McDonald commercials.
Ronald spearheaded McDonald's television marketing to
children.

In 1983 alone, the clown starred in 55 different

commercials aimed at youngsters aged two to nine.

That same

year, he made more than 5,700 personal appearances and,
according to McDonald's calculations, was recognized by more
than 25 million children. 24

Throughout the 1970s, Ronald

appeared in football, baseball, and basketball uniforms and
told children "This is the place to go after the game .
or whenever you play up a big appetite. 1125

He was a

magician, an artist, a bandleader, and a moon explorer.

He

told children that "Everybody's heading for McDonaldland,"
and that "Nobody can resist these delicious McDonald's
hamburgers," and, again and again, "Come on over to my
house. 1126

Most of the commercials ended with Ronald and

friends adjourning to McDonald's for a meal, yet,
ironically, the commercials never showed Ronald explicitly
purchasing any food.

2411 McDonald's

Like everything else about the clown,

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.

(October

1983),
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Marketing Manual, 1969-1973," Children's
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the appearance of the food was magical.
The basic facts of consumerism never made it into
McDonald's commercials for children.

Though Ronald consumed

hamburgers, he was not a consumer in the economic sense of
exchanging dollars for products.

Although many McDonald's

units had a stool for youngsters to stand on in order to
reach the counter and order their own meals, McDonald's
commercials never showed children actually placing an order.
While McDonald's obvious underlying goal was to produce a
nation of hamburger-hungry preschoolers, its overt strategy
de-emphasized explicit consumerism in favor of nurturing a
personal loyalty between the children and Ronald McDonald.
McDonald's goal was to create brand recognition not so
much for themselves as for their mascot, Ronald McDonald.
In a late 1970s commercial, McDonald's boasted, "Nobody can
do it like Ronald can,"

quietly substituting "Ronald" for

the word "McDonald's," which is how the advertisement ran
for adult viewers. 27

Ronald was billed as children's

"McFavorite Clown, 11 --perpetuating the "McLanguage" gimmick
originally created by McDonald's public relations firm,
Cooper and Golin--who was the "McFriendliest, McFunniest and
McWackiest. 1128

The entire advertising campaign seemed

predicated on nurturing children's love for Ronald; the
presence of hamburger, shake, or french fry products in the
2711 McDonald's Commercials," Counter 1690.
28 Ibid.
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commercials were incidental.
Beyond friendship, Ronald McDonald offered children a
host of product-based and character-related premiums to
further entice children to choose McDonald's.

A premium,

claimed McDonald's "Marketing Manual," "rewards [customers]
for buying a product they normally wouldn't purchase. 1129
Premiums have traditionally kept the advertiser's name in
front of the customer and, understandably, the most common
premium McDonald's used with children was toys.

Ronald

McDonald's banks, puppets, dolls, autographed pictures
(again, reinforcing the reality of Ronald), window decals,
pencil cases, clocks, folders, and so on were all either
complimentary premiums or nominally priced products designed
to attract children. 30

McDonald's most obvious premium

gimmick, of course, was the Happy Meal, targeted at children
aged two through nine and billed as "Food and Fun in a
Box. 1131

Composed of a hamburger, fries, soft drink, and

toy premium, the Happy Meal was a simple to order,
prepackaged meal for children. 32
2911 McDonald' s

Marketing Manual,
Corporation Archives, 1.
30

1969-1973," McDonald's

Ibid., 1-3.

3111 McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.
3211 McDonald's

(April

1979),

McDonald's

Newsletter"
(May
1979),
McDonald's
Corporation Archives, 10.
Initially, the Happy Meal also
included several complimentary cookies -- a practice later
discontinued.
While the original meals were limited to
hamburgers and fries, more recent versions offer Chicken
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McDonald's first tested the Happy Meal in the summer of
1979, with the goal of increasing customer counts by 2% and
product sales by an aggressive 10%.

Citing research that

children were a "major influence" on where to eat 50% of the
time and of ''some influence" 75% of the time, McDonald's
justified the Happy Meal's net cost per meal of five cents.
For an expenditure of a nickel, due to the additional costs
of the Happy Meal's exterior paper packaging and premium,
McDonald's was able to manipulate the children's market to
fuel an anticipated 10% rise in sales. 33
While McDonald's figures on the tangible influence of
child consumers were obviously imprecise--the percentages
that the corporation cited varied from 20% to 50% or more,
as the above illustrates--McDonald's was forcefully
committed to targeting and encouraging child consumer
behavior in children as young as two years old.

While many

major toy manufacturers offered toddler or preschool lines
of products, the items were primarily marketed to parents
and grandparents, not the youngsters themselves.

Not only

did children that young lack a weekly allowance, considered
a prerequisite to independent child consumer behavior, but
they were deemed incapable of distinguishing either between
differing products or between television shows and the

McNuggets, carrot sticks,
junior sized milkshakes.
33 Ibid.

applesauce,

corn-on-the-cob,

and
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commercials which sponsored them.

McDonald's, however,

risked presenting the incomprehensible to its very young
viewers and, in the process, proved that even among children
who can barely talk, brand recognition can be created and
manipulated.

Parents and child advocates quickly realized

it, too.
Although the debate between sponsors and child
advocates currently centers around fast-food and child
marketing, this was not always the case.

Indeed, it was the

cereal manufacturers, which plugged their sugar-laden brands
Saturday mornings and weekday afternoons, that bore the
brunt of the assault.

But with the exception of Kellogg's

"Tony the Tiger" and "Toucan Sam," most cereals did not rely
heavily upon the advertising draw of a personified mascot.
And although the tiger and pelican were anthropomorphized,
they lacked the empathy, playfulness, and camaraderie of
Ronald McDonald.

They also rarely made it off their

respective commercials or cereal boxes, while Ronald
frequently scampered down hospital corridors, performed in
magic shows and circuses, and entertained children in
schools or scout troops.

But parents did not necessarily

object to Ronald's influence over their children, at least
not immediately.

The more pressing, and more tangible,

problem was the nutritionally questionable products that
Ronald peddled.
In June, 1990, the Washington Post conducted a
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telephone survey of one thousand randomly selected adults
nationwide.

Of the sample, 48% consumed fast-food meals at

least once per week.

Speed and convenience were cited as

the most determining factors in selecting fast-food, with
less than 1% of respondents choosing fast-food for its
nutritional value.

Rather, 47% had actually curtailed their

consumption of fast-food specifically because of nutritional
concerns. 34

When asked specifically about McDonald's, 76%

of respondents verified that they had eaten there within the
last six months, with less than half believing that all
fast-food was of similar nutritional quality.

Twenty-eight

percent actually believed that McDonald's menu was less
nutritious than its competitors' proctucts.35
The results were disheartening to McDonald's.

Since

the early 1970s, when McDonald's first became sensitive to
the nutritional criticisms of its products, the corporation
had launched extensive public relations campaigns and
expedited internal new product development to convince

34 Richard Morin,
"Poll Shows Convenience is What
Counts, " Washington Post, 2 7 June 19 9 O, sec. E, 1.
The
survey was conducted between June 8-12, 1990 by the !CR
Survey Research Group, Media, Pennsylvania.
The 47% who
claimed to have stopped eating at fast-food restaurants also
included a surprisingly high 8% who claimed to have never
eaten fast-food.
35 rbid.
To the question, "Is McDonald's more or less
nutritious
[than
other
fast-food
restaurants],
the
respondents replied:
More - 14%
Same - 45%
Less - 28%
Don't Know - 13%
There does not appear to be a clear consensus on this point.
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customers of its nutritional sincerity and worth.
choice.

It had no

Like many other food retailers, especially those

which heavily advertised and promoted products to children,
McDonald's was the target of extensive investigation into
how its products were allegedly polluting children's eating
habits and health.
In 1978, Action for Children's Television (ACT)
commissioned a study analyzing food advertising messages
specifically directed at children and aired during
children's prime viewing hours.

Of 293 commercials

analyzed over a one week period in June, 1978, authors F.
Earle Barcus and Lucille McLaughlin singled out 59
individual spots advertising fast-food, for a total of 20%
of all ads directed at children for the test period. 36
While the percentage may seem small, only two companies
sponsored those advertisements:
Burger King.

McDonald's and arch-rival,

McDonald's aired 36 commercial messages in

that week, for a total of 23.5 minutes of actual airtime.
Burger King had 23 spots for a significantly fewer 14.5
total minutes of exposure. 37

Nutritionists did not

36 F.

McLaughlin,
Food
Earle
Barcus
and
Lucille
An Analysis of
Advertising on Children's Television:
Action for
Appeals and Nutritional Content (Boston, MA:
Children's Television, 1978), 62.
37 Ibid.

The difference in airtime reflected both the
fewer commercials that Burger King aired as well as the
shorter length of its spots.
In the test period, Burger
King ran only six 60 second spots, compared to McDonald's
eleven. Additionally, Burger King aired seventeen 30 second
ads, compared to McDonald's twenty-five 30 second spots.
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necessarily disagree with the number of commercials aired;
rather, they were alarmed at the high calorie, high fat diet
that the advertised food represented.
In 1978, a McDonald's hamburger, small order of french
fries, and junior sized milkshake equalled 791 calories with
28 grams of fat.

Of the 791 calories, 33% represented

calories derived from the fat content of the meal.

Burger

King fared equally poorly, with 36% of the calories of its
standard children's meal derived from fat.

This was high

compared to a 30% ceiling set by the U.S. Senate Select
Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs. 38

While the

overages were not excessive, Barcus and McLaughlin
continued, the figures did not represent the equally
excessive sugar content of the products (especially the
milkshakes) as well as the high ratio of cholesterolproducing saturated fats used to prepare the hamburgers and
french fries.

While both fast-food giants warranted

significant improvement in those areas, the report concluded
on a hopeful note, citing each corporation's product testing
of salads, soups, and alternative frying practices. 39
Beyond the nutritional merits of the food itself,
critics faulted the sponsors' marketing the food as fun,
thereby diluting the issue of nutrition.

In a 1980 study,

Harvard Business School professor Scott Ward, one of the
38 Ibid.,
39 I

b'd
l.. •

,

64,

65.

66.
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leading researchers on children's advertising and children's
consumer patterns, co-authored a study citing "fun" as the
primary advertising lure to encourage fast-food brand
loyalty.

Not an egregious marketing message in itself, but

in the absence of mitigating nutritional education at home
or at school, positioning fast-food as "fun," Ward
concluded, created unrealistic or distorted
expectations. 40
the message.

And children were constantly deluged with

A 1988 University of Delaware study concluded

that 71% of the commercials aired on one Saturday morning
were for food items of excessively deficient nutritional
quality. 41
The various nutritional analyses, combined with the
public exposure and acceptance they received, convinced
McDonald's to attack the issue of nutrition promptly and
directly.

Ray Kroc hired former Kraft dairy researcher Ed

Traisman to conduct an independent nutritional analysis of
McDonald's food.

Careful to avoid hints of impropriety,

Traisman, who himself owned five McDonald's franchises in
40 Richard

P. Adler, Gerald S. Lesser, Laurence Krasny
Meringoff, Thomas S. Robertson, John R. Rossiter, and Scott
Ward, The Effects of Advertising on Children (Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books/D.C. Heath, 1980), 16, 126, 132, 213.
41 Nancy

Cotunga, Department of Nutrition and Dietetics,
University of Delaware-Newark, "TV Ads on Saturday Morning
Children's Programming--What 's New?" Journal of Nutrition
Education 20,
no.
3
(June 1988):
125-26.
Cotunga
videotaped
four
successive hours of
Saturday morning
cartoons on January 24, 1987, simultaneously on ABC, CBS,
and NBC. The 71% figure that Cotunga cited included·cereal,
candy, and fast-food sponsors.
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Madison, Wisconsin, sold his units prior to accepting Kroc's
offer.

Kroc trusted Traisman, who was among the batch of

early entrepreneurs who had given McDonald's its successful
head start in the 1950s.

Traisman's research essentially

concurred with other, and more legitimately independent,
analyses. 42

Kroc acted quickly. In October, 1976, he

hired Luxembourg-trained chef Renee Arend, formerly of
Chicago's Whitehall Club, as McDonald's Executive Chef.
"His job," Kroc stated in his autobiography, "[was) to study
ways to make our menu more nutritious [and] get more fiber
into it. 1143

Arend was obviously successful.

After

exhaustive testing, McDonald's premiered its line of
prepackaged salads in 1987.

Currently, McDonald's has a

complete low-fat menu, including yogurt shakes, fat-free
muffins, 1% milk, reduced calorie salad dressings, and, the
most important changes to the menu, the addition of a 91%
fat-free "McLean" hamburger and the preparation of french
fries in 100% vegetable, rather than animal, oil. 44
McDonald's also attacked the nutrition issue by
launching an extensive lobbying and public education
42 Max

Boas and Steve Chain, Big Mac:
The Unauthorized
Story of McDonald's (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1976), 86.
43 Ray

Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out:
The
Making of McDonald's (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co. , 19 7 7;
reprint, Chicago: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 203.
Page references are to the reprint edition.
4411 McDonald' s
informational
Food:
The
Facts,"
"McDonald's
brochure,
McDonald's
Corporation,
1990;
Chronological History Report," 43.
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campaign.

Prohibited by Food and Drug Administration

regulations from offering brochures outlining its products'
nutritional values, McDonald's lobbied the Senate
Subcommittee on Nutrition to hold hearings in 1978 in
anticipation of overturning the FDA's ruling.

Hoping to

score points with the farm lobby by emphasizing the quality
of American home-grown beef and dairy products, subcommittee
chair Senator George McGovern expedited the reversal that
enabled fast-food restaurants to present their case to the
public. 45

And true to McDonald's style, the corporation

premiered a lively, but short term, advertising campaign
featuring Ronald and "The Nutrients."

Using a rock band

dressed as vitamins, McDonald's hoped to reach older
children and teenagers who typically consumed excessive
quantities of fast-food. 46

While this initial effort

proved too "gimmicky," later efforts included sponsoring
nutritional mini-curricula for schools and the 1992
introduction of the clay-animation character "Willie
Munchright."

Public service announcements geared to

children aged two through eleven, Willie Munchright
encouraged children to stress "everyday" foods such as
45 John

F. Love, McDonald's:
Behind the Arches
(New
York: Bantam Books, 1986), 369-70. McGovern and McDonald's
were unlikely allies in this cause, especially in light of a
well-publicized $250,000 campaign donation that Ray Kroc had
made to President Nixon's re-election effort in 1972.
46 Boas and Chain, Big Mac,

87; Alix M. Freedman, "FastFood Chains Play Central Role in Diet of the Inner-City
Poor," Wall Street Journal, 19 December 1990, sec. A, 1.
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fruits and vegetables over "sometimes" products like,
presumably, McDonald's own fare.

The spots received kudos

even from ACT's Peggy Charren, a longstanding opponent of
any children's advertising. 47
Although McDonald's was a leader in expanding
customers' nutritional options, the industry, and McDonald's
particularly, remained under attack.

In 1990, Phil Sokolof,

an Omaha industrialist turned nutrition crusader, purchased
full page advertisements in twenty major U.S. newspapers
indicting the fast-food industry for "poisoning" the nation
and, mocking a famous McDonald's slogan, asked "McDonald's
to give our kids a break today.

1148

Although McDonald's

labelled Sokolof 's accusations, "sensational, reckless and
ridiculous," they had the net effect of sensitizing the
industry to the enormity of the nutrition issue. 49

While

Sokolof exacerbated the emotionalism of the debate, more
mainstream organizations such as the American Academy of
Pediatrics has more recently called for a "wholesale ban on
4 7 Laura

Bird,
"McDonald's
Slates
Nutrition-Advice
Spots," Wall Street Journal, 23 September 1992, sec. B, 8.
48 Dan

Sperling, "McDonald's Tries a
USA Today, 5 April 1990, 1.
49 Ibid.;

New Way to Fry,"

Charles Bernstein, "The French-Fry Cooking
War:
'Healthier' Foods Emerge as Critical," Nation's
Restaurant News, 13 August 1990, 23.
The emerging belief,
cited by Bernstein's editorial, that Sokolof was taking
credit for the industry's nutritional innovations, did not
ring true. McDonald's, for example, had hired Chef Arend in
1976, specifically to create healthy menu items· for the
chain.
And salad-based alternatives were in extensive
testing at least from 1979.
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food ads aimed at kids." 50
Looming beyond the nutrition question, the larger issue
of tackling the fundamental ethics of children's advertising
remained equally unresolved.

In 1970, Action for Children's

Television and consumer activist Robert Choate, later
chairman of the Council on Children, Merchandising and
Media, jointly petitioned the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to unilaterally prohibit all commercial
advertising from children's television shows.

The self-

regulatory arm of the industry, the National Association of
Broadcaster's Review Board, responded by eliminating vitamin
and medicine sponsorship from children's programming,
discontinuing host selling, and gradually reducing overall
commercial exposure from 16 to 9.5 minutes per hour on
weekdays. 51

But self-regulation was erratic, with many

stations casually exceeding the limit on commercial
minutes. 52
While the FCC's own "Notice of Inquiry" report in
January, 1971, admitted children's vulnerability to
commercial advertising, it was not prepared to mandate the
50 Laura

Bird,
Spots," sec. B, 8.

"McDonald's

Slates

Nutrition-Advice

51 F.

Earle
Barcus
and
Rachel Welkin,
Children's
Advertising:
An Analysis of Programming and Advertising
(New York:
Praeger, 1977), xxi; Scott Ward, "Kids' TV-Marketers on Hot Seat," Harvard Business Review (July-August
1972): 17. The reduction in advertising minutes was phased
in from a drop to 12 minutes in 1972 to 9.5 minutes in 1976.
52 ward,

"Kids' TV--Marketers on Hot Seat," 22.
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wholesale ban that ACT advocated.s 3

The history of

children's commercial sponsorship had been one of selfregulation, with varying degrees of success.

By the early

1950s, the children's viewing slots of Saturday mornings and
weekday afternoons were being solidified.s 4

In response,

NBC in 1954 created a children's programming review
committee to censor inappropriate material.
authority was limited.

But NBC's

From 1953 to 1959, sponsors, not the

networks, controlled the production of children's
programming, following the precedents of radio advertising.
Blamed for many of the quiz show scandals of the late 1950s,
however, sponsors gradually relinquished production control
for their current role of merely purchasing airtime.ss
After the FCC declined the petition, opting for further
industry self-regulation, ACT and Choate similarly
petitioned the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1977.

In

its internal staff report, the FTC concluded that television
advertising to children younger than eight years old
violated the spirit of Section 5 of the Federal Trade

s 3 William Melody, Children's Television:
The Economics
of Exploitation
(New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press,
1973), 1.
54 Ibid.,

1, 38.
Ironic given children's earlier
consumer response
to
radio advertising,
sponsors and
networks
remained
unconvinced
that
younger
children
constituted a viable advertising market.
Like radio,
television relegated to children the medium's "dead" time,
when presumably few adults were watching.
55 Ibid.,

45-47.
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Commission Act on unfair advertising. 56

Children that

young, the report continued, lacked the discrimination
skills to distinguish commercials from the programming they
sponsored as well as the concepts of size, volume, and price
essential to consumer choice.

Finally, the report concluded

that children's advertising undermined the parent/child
relationship by overemphasizing the commercial aspects of
it. 57
In spite of its own staff report, the FTC, like the
FCC, supported the self-regulation efforts of the National
Association of Broadcasters.

While the FTC intervened in

specific cases--it ordered Wonder Bread to stop claiming its
product helped "build strong bodies 12 ways 11 --it stopped far
short of the extensive regulation sought by ACT and
Choate. 58

Their inaction was influenced, in part, by the

conflicting research on the topic.
All sides uniformly agreed that children watched
56 Federal

Trade Commission, Staff Report on Television
Advertising to Children
(Washington, DC:
U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1978), 27-29.
57 Ibid.,
58 scott

17, 83.

Ward, "Compromise in Commercials for Children,"
Harvard Business Review, 12 November 1978, 130, 135.
Ward
offered a thorough and balanced summary of the entire
debate, citing each side's respective evidence, conclusions,
and bargaining positions.
As a centrist on the issue, he
suggested that educating school-age children on the function
and role of commercials would ameliorate many parental
concerns.
He admitted, however, that his solution did not
apply to preschool children, most of whom were cognitively
incapable of consistently differentiating and evaluating
commercial messages.
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substantial hours of television; the 1978 FTC staff report
recorded that children aged 2-11 watched an average of 3 2/3
hours per day, one hour more than in 1955.

In addition,

these children viewed more than 20,000 commercials per
year. 59

Rather, the dispute centered around whether

children were being unfairly manipulated into prematurely
assuming consumer roles.

A 1956 study by youth marketing

research firm, Eugene Gilbert & Company, cited that 94% of
mothers sampled responded that their children specifically
requested products advertised on television. 60

A 1971

survey by Scott Ward posted almost identical results, with
95% of mothers responding that children requested products
based on television commercials. 61
Alternately, a 1975 study by Myrna Carol Morris found
that only 49.5% of children aged three through five were
influenced by commercials to the point of requesting

59

FTC, Staff Report, 13.

60

cited in Grace w. Weinstein, Children and Money:
A
Guide for Parents
(New York:
Schocken Books, 1975), 107.
Unfortunately, Weinstein did not detail the demographics or
size of the Gilbert & Company sample.
61 ward,

"Kids' TV,'' 20.
Surprisingly, Ward discovered
that children less frequently request specific brands as
they grow older.
Only 77% of mothers felt their eleventhrough twelve-years-olds were frequently influenced by
commercials.
This contradicted the common perception that
brand awareness increased with age and served as an· example
of the contradictory nature of the various analyses.
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specific brands. 62

When the surveys were limited to

restaurants, the percentages were decidedly lower.

The 1990

Washington Post poll, confined to fast-food, found that
children were a factor in where to eat only a small 6% of
the time. 63

And a 1974 poll by the National Restaurant

Association did not even record children's preferences on
its list of the sixteen most popular reasons for eating
out. 64
Like the debate over nutrition, a proposed ban on all
children's advertising contradicted historical attitudes on
the subject.

Thirty years earlier, advertising to children

had been hailed as informative, entertaining, and
educational; it was deemed both necessary and desirable in
acculturating children to their future economic roles as
adults.

Dorothy Gordon of the New York Times Youth Forum

had affirmed that in 1948. 65

But radio advertisers had

62 Myrna

Carol
Morris,
"Consumer
Socialization
of
Preschool Children:
The Parental View"
(Ph.D. diss.,
University of Georgia-Athens, 1975), 61. Morris used a mail
questionnaire to interview 214 mothers of preschool children
in Clarke County, Georgia.
Her results were typical of the
studies that refuted that preschoolers were uniformly mature
enough to request specific brands.
63 Morin,

"Poll Shows Convenience is What Counts,"

sec. E, 1.
Daryl Wyckoff and w. Earl
Restaurant Industry (Lexington, MA:
table I-13, p. 41.
64 D.

65 Albert

Sasser, ~T~h~e~~C~h~a~i=·n~
D. C. Heath, 1978),

N. Williams, Listening:
A Collection of
Critical Articles on Radio (Freeport, NY:
Books for
Libraries Press, 1948; reprint, 1968), 100-101.
References
are to the reprint edition.
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not saturated the children's market to the same degree as
did television sponsors and, for the most part, children as
young as three and four remained on the fringe of this
earlier market.
McDonald's kept a low profile while the debate raged,
especially since the initial rhetoric centered around the
cereal and toy manufacturers whose combined advertising
still dominated children's programming.

When McDonald's did

speak out, it was to offer an alternative, its own "Golden
Arches Code," which it held up as a model of the selfregulation officially advocated by both the FCC and FTC. 66
Formally presented to McDonald's advertising managers,
owner/operators, and OPNAD in 1978, the "Golden Arches Code"
defined McDonald's position in "respecting the intelligence
and rights of our customers." 67

The Code's articles on

children's advertising specifically forbade the promotion of
adult-sized sandwiches (too large for children to
comfortably consume) and the depiction of bad manners,
destructive behavior, or unsafe practices.
car, children had to wear seatbelts.

If seated in a

And if shown entering

a restaurant, they had to be accompanied by an adult

66 "McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.
67 Roy

(February

1974),

McDonald's

Bergold, McDonald's Assistant Vice President,
Managers,
Advertising
and
Promotion,
to
Advertising
Owner/Operators, and OPNAD, 1978, McDonald's Corporation
Archives, 1.
The Code was updated in 1987; no substantive
changes were made.
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(presumably a parent).

Responding to the common criticism

that young children had no concept of money,

McDonald's

forbade ads that mentioned price or discounting. 68
Ironically, however, that practice could have the unwanted
side effect of children believing the products were free.
Ronald McDonald, especially, was constrained by the
Code.

In addition to exhibiting wholesome behavior, Ronald

could not promote a premium nor could he any longer directly
instruct children to purchase a product.
threshold decision for McDonald's.

This was a

"Ronald McDonald is not

a pitchman," the 1978 Golden Arches Code stated.

Rather,

Ronald stood for "good citizenship," or as later put by
Peter Nelson, McDonald's Senior Vice President of Marketing,
Ronald became "more the McDonald's spirit. 1169

With the

loss of his original function as overt salesman, Ronald
developed more the friend persona with which he is now
identified.

That does not mean, of course, that his

marketing impact has been diluted; rather, that it has
become more subtle and, thus, perhaps, more invasive.
McDonald's applied similar strict standards to its
68 Ibid.,

9-10; Paul D. Schrage, "McDonald's Corporation
Policy Toward the Television Environment," Appendix to
Golden Arches Code, 21 February 1978, McDonald's Corporation
Archives, 1.
In addition, the Code prohibited sponsorship
of programs depicting "excessive or gratuitous violence,
drug abuse, [or] controversial sexual themes. "
Licensees
were encouraged to prescreen shows and to ref rain from
advertising on programs prefixed by a "child disclaimer."
69

Ibid.,
13; Lisa Bertagnoli,
"Inside McDonald's,"
Restaurant and Institutions, 21 August 1989, 64.
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children's premiums.

They were tested for flammability,

toxicity, topical irritants, sharp edges, color permanency,
and fragility.

If they could pass down a narrow tester

chute, they risked being swallowed by small children, and
were discarded.

Still, licensees were ordered to maintain a

supply of coloring books or similar items, in lieu of
smaller Happy Meal premiums, for children younger than
three. 70
The "Golden Arches Code" held McDonald's to a high
standard of children's advertising, incorporating many of
the reforms long advocated by ACT.

The termination of host

selling, long an objectionable tactic, scored extra public
relations points for McDonald's, but proved equally
necessary to creating the image of Ronald as "friend."
While McDonald's may have been progressive in its
advertising restraints, it merely was responding to changing
social beliefs on the role of children and television.

The

Ronald McDonald that in 1965 directly and forcefully pitched
hamburgers and fries to children was no longer socially
tolerated a decade later.

Not only were parents and

advocates cringing at the increasingly obsessive consumerism
of young children, but, more ominous for McDonald's, were
rallying against the nutritional deficits of a meal which, a
few years earlier, had been unquestioningly accepted as all7011 Premium

Purchasing
Standards,"
McDonald's Corporation Archives, pt. I I,
Newsletter" (April 1983), 5.

February
1980,
7-8; "McDonald's
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American.
Still, the commercials that McDonald's aired from 1967,
its big media push financed by OPNAD, to the mid-1980s,
reflected a McDonald's that increasingly relied upon the
consumer initiatives of young children to realize the
corporation's expectation of double-digit growth.

Even in

the demographically disappointing 1970s, children still
accounted for roughly 30% of McDonald's sales and McDonald's
kept children's advertising its highest priority as rivals
Burger King and Wendy's looked to the adult market.

This

strategy, questionable at the time, put McDonald's
comfortably ahead of the competition when the birth rate
rebounded in the late 1980s.

Although McDonald's hedged its

decision by increasingly opening units in non-traditional,
non-residential sites such as shopping malls, tollways,
naval bases, hospitals, and in downtowns nationwide, the
majority of new openings continued to be in child-oriented
communities, much as it was in 1955. 71

And while

McDonald's television exposure lagged behind the combined
airtime of cereal and toy manufacturers, McDonald's and its
rival Burger King virtually dominated children's commercial
airtime for fast-food advertising, a strategy that backfired
when McDonald's became a rallying point of the pronutritionists.

71 McDonald's

Corporation
McDonald's Corporation, 6.

Annual

Report,

1992,
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From 1967 to the 1980s, McDonald's advertising pointed
to and nourished the maturation and increasing
sophistication of the children's market.

Amidst the

continuing theoretical debate of how and at what age young
children developed the cognition necessary for consumer
agency, McDonald's was practically proving that children as
young as two and three could ask for a Happy Meal.

And

McDonald's intentionally pushed that age demarcation down,
to toddlers, by positioning Ronald McDonald as a child's
friend and role model.

It is noteworthy that while its

competitors were looking to the demographically strong adult
market to sustain corporate growth, McDonald's focused on
the exact opposite spectrum, consciously educating two-yearolds in consumerism and creating for themselves, a new
generation of fast-food hungry Americans.

CHAPTER 9
"MCKIDS"
When it comes to marketing to kids, earlier
is better. Until age two, a child is a
virtual blank slate just waiting to be filled
up with advertising stimuli. By age six the
child has formed many of the buying habits
that will stay with him for life. 1
Newsweek
In 1986, Newsweek heralded the tot market as new.
"Until recently," Newsweek wrote, "toys and candy were about
the only products marketed directly to the under-six set. 112
It was a myopic view.

The observation was true enough in

that nickel and dime toys and penny candy were long a staple
of children's consumerism, beginning in the 1930s.

But

since 1955, McDonald's has proven that toddlers and
preschoolers, even if lacking full cognitive volition, can
parrot both television commercials and the entreaties of a
red-haired clown and become active consumer agents.
While other advertisers marketed their toys and candies
as treats or presents, McDonald's positioned itself as the
natural and logical extension of everyday routines:

1 Annetta

Miller,
14 April 1986, 45.

"Targeting the Tiny Tots,"

2 Ibid.
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Newsweek,
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shopping, a Boy Scout meeting, band practice, a baseball
game, and even after school.
was not new in 1986.

The young children's market

McDonald's, which could have smugly

chuckled at Newsweek's naivete, had already been exploiting
it for nearly two decades.
McDonald's loudly professed that it was, first,
foremost, and always, a hamburger company.

Ray Kroc wove

that belief throughout the corporation's cultural fabric,
partly to defend McDonald's against the charge that it was
forsaking hamburgers for real estate acquisition. 3

But in

order to promote its hamburger identity, McDonald's became
much more.

McDonald's entered the toy industry full force

in the 1970s.

Between 1974 and 1976, McDonald's National

Retail Marketing Program had joined with Playskool to offer
a scaled down version of a McDonald's restaurant and a
McDonald's game developed by Milton Bradley. 4

McDonald's

goal was to "offer carefully selected quality items which

3Ray Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out:
The
Making of McDonald's
(Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1977;
reprint, Chicago:
St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 152-55.
This charge was frequently levelled internally, within the
ranks of McDonald's corporate managers who questioned
whether McDonald's was more acutely interested in selling
hamburgers or in managing the real estate empire they
amassed. The concern was legitimate and reflected a serious
rift between Kroc, whose primary emphasis had always been
hamburgers, and McDonald's Vice-President and financier
Harry Sonneborn, who "sold" investors on the McDonald's
concept by marketing the corporation as a real estate
holding company that only incidentally sold hamburgers.
4 "McDonald's

Newsletter"
Corporation Archives.

(April

1976),

McDonald's
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extend our marketing programs into the home.

These toys are

designed to complement our total children's marketing
program.

115

By 1985, McDonald's had licensed products

ranging from children's bedding, school supplies, bandages,
story books, and videotapes to what visually identifies a
child as a McDonald's aficionado, McDonald's clothing. 6
Originally launched as "McDonaldland Fashions,"
parroting the successful children's ad campaign, the
clothing line was redesigned and redubbed "McKids" in 1988.
McDonald's chose Sears, Roebuck to distribute the line,
dovetailing McDonald's own family image with that of the
longstanding middle-class retailer.

In conjunction, Sears

opened a chain of freestanding "McKids" clothing stores
offering customers a mix of clothing and educational toys.
The clothing itself was unimpressive:

basic rugby, polo,

and t-shirt designs awash in bright primary colors
coordinated with standard jean and overall bottoms.

And

while the in-store McKids line is still promoted, the
freestanding McKids stores were closed after a short few
years' trial.

More significant than the specific success or

failure of the clothing line, however, was McDonald's
strategy of targeting children in all their daily
activities, even including the clothing they wore.

5

Ibid.

I

9.

611 McDonald'

s Newsletter" (June
McDonald's Corporation Archives.

1977);

(January 1980),
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A four-year-old could sleep underneath Ronald McDonald
sheets and comforter, hugging a Ronald McDonald doll,
babbling to Grandma and Grandpa on a Ronald McDonald
telephone, attend daycare or preschool with a Ronald
McDonald lunch box, have an injury nursed with a Ronald
McDonald bandage, pretend that he or she worked at
McDonald's at playtime, eat supper off Ronald McDonald
tableware, take a bath with a Ronald McDonald towel, slip
into Ronald McDonald slippers, read a Ronald McDonald
"Golden Book," and drift off to sleep protected by a Ronald
McDonald nightlight.

Through licensing, McDonald's

reinforced its brand among youngsters without them ever
having to watch a McDonald's commercial on television and at
every important point in a child's day--everyday.
McDonald's was by no means alone in aggressively
marketing its brand name to young children through licensed
products.

Disney teamed up with Mattel in 1988 to

distribute its own line of "Disney Babies" toys and linens
to toddlers and preschoolers. 7

Even non-commercial

programs such as Sesame Street and the phenomenally popular
Barney used the exact same approach, making them both heir
and competitor to Ronald McDonald and Mickey Mouse.

Indeed,

public television has learned much from commercial
7 "Mattel

Toys Information Release:
Company Profile,"
13 March 1990, Northwestern University, Kellogg Graduate
School of Management, Placement Center Library, Evanston,
Illinois, 3.
The Disney line helped fuel a 25% increase in
Mattel's net sales in its first year.
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licensing, even using the lure of children's premiums to
encourage children to press their parents to donate to
public television.

Licensed characters such as the Teenage

Mutant Ninja Turtles, Cabbage Patch Babies, Batman, Trolls,
and Barbie have all successfully followed the same pattern
of advertising to children.

McDonald's was not unique in

this advertising, per se, though it was unquestionably among
the earliest to target these products at toddlers and
preschoolers in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
McDonald's did not invent child consumerism.

As early

as 1900, cereal manufacturers were touting print
advertisements directly to children, bypassing the scrutiny
of parents.

Nickelodeons and radio both reinforced and

nourished the fledgling children's market in its formative
years.

But these earlier marketers handily dismissed and

never seriously explored the possibility of substantive
consumerism by children younger than eight or nine.
Literacy was an assumed prerequisite to comic book
advertisers and the sometimes complicated and episodic plots
of cinema and radio entertainment required a broader
attention span than most four- or five-year-olds could
muster.

But McDonald's saw the possibilities.

Richard and

Maurice McDonald realized them as early as 1948 when they
risked their already successful operation on a hunch.

Even

Ray Kroc did not see it immediately, vetoing most of the
child promotions suggested by the McDonald brothers.
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By the late 1950s, however, the brothers' hunch had
been validated.

The birth rate soared amid a postwar

population freed from the restraints of Depression and war.
The child-centered culture of the 1950s and early 1960s
fueled and reinvigorated dozens of industries stagnated by
the 1930s fears and 1940s rationing.

Still, while the

culture became "child-centered," consumer agency remained
with parents and was just beginning to substantially filter
down to high school students, who were then nationally
touted as the "new market."
Younger children had not been completely overlooked,
however, as Bozo the Clown, Kukla, Fran and Ollie, and
Captain Kangaroo's popularity attested.

Sponsors put out

feelers to the young children's market, primarily through
host selling, but even in the 1960s, the market did not
descend below five- or six-year-olds.

It was Ronald

McDonald who made concerted and organized marketing to
toddlers and preschoolers a viable strategy.

But McDonald's

course was a risky one, since it encouraged loyalty to
Ronald McDonald rather than loyalty to the products that
Ronald pitched.

But as long as children flocked to

McDonald's because it was "Ronald's place," McDonald's used
Ronald as its Pied Piper to keep them coming back.
Ronald's popularity took off in the late 1960s, much as
he himself took off in the flying hamburger in commercials
for the 1965 Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade.

He has
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appeared in hundreds of parades since then, has become a
spokesman for children's causes that reach far beyond his
original role as marketing gimmick, and has become a
iconographic representation of contemporary American
society.

His own popularity with children as well as the

increasing public lobbying against host selling and poor
nutrition, has forced Ronald into shedding his commercial
shell to reveal what McDonald's considers his "true"
identity, that of friend and goodwill ambassador.

But does

that make him less of a marketing gimmick?
Ronald McDonald is still the primary marketing tool to
children under eleven years old; it is his face and his
antics that youngsters see every weekday afternoon and every
Saturday morning on television.

McDonald's claims he is not

a salesman; yet, if he were not a salesman, he would not be
in dozens of commercials annually.

If he were not a

salesman, McDonald's would not be spending millions of
dollars annually to promote him.

Though he no longer hawks

products directly, there is no confusion as to whom he
represents, where his "house" is, and where fun-loving
children should go.

Ironically, although the explicit

commercialism of Ronald has been diluted, partly through the
Golden Arches Code and partly in adherence to changing
FCC/FTC rules on children's advertising, Ronald's commercial
presence is stronger than ever and, perhaps, more ethically
ambiguous.
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The Golden Arches Code, an attempt at industry selfregulation, reinforced Ronald's transformation from crass
salesman to friend; yet, in the process, it made Ronald less
honest.

When he clearly pitched hamburgers, he was offering

tangible product for tangible payment, hamburgers for money.
But as McDonald's soft-peddled its marketing to avoid public
criticism, the marketing became more ambiguous.

Ronald no

longer promoted hamburgers, but friendship, fun, and a sense
of the magical, psychological needs that have little to do
with purchasing and eating a hamburger.

Even preteens, too

wise for Ronald, were told that McDonald's was "the" place
to go after school, to meet friends, to giggle over growing
up, or to be popular.

McDonald's is not alone in forsaking

the marketing message for the marketing form, that is, for
trying to sell happiness instead of hamburgers.

What of

Mickey Mouse, for instance, who has become little more than
the doorman to Disney's own consumer paradises?
Even in the 1970s, when McDonald's was faced with the
demographic reality that its core market was dwindling, its
emphasis solidly remained on children.

Expansion into

children's advertising with the McDonaldland concept, a
commitment to child philanthropy through the Ronald McDonald
Houses, and the unveiling of its premiere children's
product, the Happy Meal, all reinforced the fun and
wholesome family image of McDonald's.

But it was the

Playlands that bridged the gap between image and reality, a
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thorny problem that had long plagued McDonald's.
McDonald's promised children fun and often promoted it
more vigorously than it promoted its hamburgers and fries.
But fun is difficult to deliver and a disappointed child
might turn to the competition.

First tested in 1971, the

Playlands delivered on McDonald's promise of fun.

With over

2,000 Playlands nationwide by 1983, McDonald's offered
slides, climbing towers, and merry-go-rounds for children,
miniature amusement parks geared to the under ten-year-old
set. 8

Unlike other McDonald's products, Playlands varied

from unit to unit.

Some were indoors; some were outside.

Many boasted a grandiose, carnival-like atmosphere, while
some McDonald's units did not have one at all.

Indoors or

outdoors, all Playlands prominently displayed life-sized
statues of Ronald, Mayor McCheese, and the rest of the
McDonaldland family and offered child-sized seating tailored
to toddlers and preschoolers.
McDonald's promised fun and if the commercials could
not deliver it, if the Happy Meals could not deliver it,
then the Playlands would fulfill the promise.

Since the

Playlands were accessible only through the restaurants,
McDonald's counted on the fact that most families ordered a
meal, too.

But the meal itself was relegated to being

hastily gulped down or ignored while the Playland--the fun,
8 "McDonald's

Chronological
History
Report,"
31;
1983,
McDonald's
McDonald's Corporation Annual Report,
Corporation Archives.
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not the food--became the overriding reason for the visit.
The Playlands beckon a larger question.

Burger King

now also has play areas and pizza chain Chuck E. Cheese's
playgrounds target preteens as well as tots.

What are the

long term ramifications of pre-packaging our children's fun
for them?

Has fun become so consumerized that, even to a

three-year-old, "having a good time" necessitates the
purchase of a commercial product?

And is using fun as the

primary advertising lure exploiting preschoolers' innocence
and making a "bad guy" out of the parent who says "no"?

The

image of fun is just one critical component to McDonald's
child marketing; another is promoting the image of
McDonald's as wholesome to parents.
It was one of the few things that Ray Kroc and the
brothers ever agreed upon, the need to maintain McDonald's
wholesome facade.

In the 1950s, McDonald's was equated with

Americanism as the chain positioned itself as a "safe"
alternative to the teen infested drive-ins that dotted the
nation's thoroughfares.

Disney took like advantage of that

same psychological need for safety, offering a morally
simple alternative to the often gloomy and ambiguous films
of the Cold War era.

But is it wholesome to fill children's

diets with hamburgers and fries and is it in children's best
interests to acquiesce to their demands to visit Ronald's
house?

Perhaps what was wholesome in 1950 is now viewed

differently.
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The definition of wholesomeness in the 1950s and 1960s
was inextricably tied to fears of Cold War weapons and
juvenile delinquency.

McDonald's "All-American Meal" was

wholesome because it reflected efficiency and quality of
production, convenience of use, and value for the dollar.
With its limited menu, sleek architecture, and clean
kitchens, McDonald's promised an unambiguous "what you see
is what you get."

Further, McDonald's was the friendly

neighbor, always ready with a plate of free hamburgers for
Red Cross workers, with a tour for kindergartners, with a
donation to Olympic hopefuls, or with a visit from Ronald
McDonald to sick children.

But McDonald's philanthropy, in

many ways sincere, cannot be extricated from its obvious
marketing functions.

Although it is a common corporate

dilemma, the stakes are higher for McDonald's which promises
sincerity.

McDonald's offered a mercifully easy choice to

Cold War Americans who daily witnessed America's grappling
with harder questions on the evening news.

And although

McDonald's, like most Americans, now defines "wholesomeness"
primarily in terms of nutrition, McDonald's continues to
hearken back to its 1950s image in promoting itself abroad.
It was Americanism understood as efficiency that
McDonald's started exporting in the late 1960s.

In 1967,

the same threshold year that OPNAD took root, McDonald's
opened its first international units in Canada and Puerto
Rico.

McDonald's reach remained modestly close to home
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until 1971, when Japan, Holland, Germany, and Australia,
among others, joined the ranks of McDonald's affiliates. 9
As of December, 1992, McDonald's was located in 65
countries, with nearly a third of its total 13,093 units
overseas. 10

Even the former Soviet Union, whose

historical enmity towards the West was moderated under
perestroika, welcomed McDonald's into Moscow into 1990.

The

four story unit, serving 50,000 customers daily, took on an
unexpected political and cultural significance, however,
when it became a refuge for Muscovites during the aborted
coup attempt in August, 1991. 11

Especially to Muscovites

in their teens and twenties, McDonald's was a "symbol of
what life could be like."
"People here are happy.

1112

Or in the words of one young man,
That is the essence of the

McDonald's image and promise.
Ronald McDonald, too, has ventured abroad, sometimes
with a slight name shift, as in "Donald McDonald" in Japan.

911 McDonald's

Chronological
History
Report,"
31.
McDonald's uses the term "affiliates" rather than licensees
to denote its international owner/operators.
Unlike its
domestic licenses, McDonald's grants extensive territorial
contracts to a local entrepreneur (or government agency, in
the case of Communist countries) to open its foreign units.
10McDonald's

Corporatiom
Annual
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 11.

Report,

1111 McDonald's

1992,

Chronological History Report," 62; Laurie
Hays, "A Soviet Generation, Eating Big Macs, Still Clings to
Hope," Wall Street Journal, 20 August 1991, sec. A, 1.
12 Hays,

"A Soviet Generation, " sec. A, 1.
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Delivering the McDonald's message in nearly two dozen
different languages, Ronald has brought to the world the
idea that eating at McDonald's is fun.

But the world has

not unilaterally accepted the message.

A Finnish consumer

affairs court banned a McDonald's advertisement that showed
a visibly depressed youngster whose melancholy subsided
after eating a McDonald's hamburger.

The court ruled "that

the advertisement could convey the impression that eating at
a McDonald's unit could end depression or serve as a
substitute for a friend. 1113
that McDonald's intended.

Clearly, that is the message
More frequently, however, the

foreign criticism over McDonald's centers around exporting
standardized American mass culture to an unsuspecting world.
In 1972, Harvard University business professor Theodore
Levitt applauded McDonald's for its "manufacturing and
technological brilliance. 1114

McDonald's, Levitt wrote,

is a machine that produces, with the help of totally
unskilled machine tenders, a highly polished product.
Through painstaking attention to total design and
facilities planning, everything is built integrally into
the machine itself, into the technology of the system.
The only choice available to the attendant is to operate
it exactly as the designers intended. 15
But the very things that impressed Theodore Levitt about
13 Nation'

s

Miscellaneous
Archives.

Restaurant
Clippings

14 Theodore

News,
File,

16 July 1990 f McDonald's
Corporation
McDonald's

Levitt,
"Production-line
Approach
to
Service," Harvard Business Review (September-October 1972):
45.
15 Ibid.

1

46.
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McDonald's in 1972, indeed, the very elements that made
McDonald's a success, have since become suspect.
Standardization, rationalization, and efficiency, defined by
Alfred Chandler as the hallmarks of American commerce, have
been recast as undermining Americans' free will and cultural
options.

In a scathing attack on the culture that

McDonald's sows at home and exports worldwide, sociologist
George Ritzer decries the "McDonaldization" of American
society, defined as "the process by which the principles of
the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and
more sectors of American society as well as of the rest of
the world. 1116
McDonald's prides itself on predictability, that a
hamburger eaten in Chile is identical to one consumed in
Hong Kong or Milwaukee; yet, that very predictability,
Ritzer claims, limits our ability to function as autonomous
individuals, free to choose or to be creative.

McDonald's,

in effect, constrains individuals, from the counter people
who are ordered to smile eight hours a day to the young
children who are taught, through McDonald's commercials,
that their fun is pre-packaged and waiting for them in a
Happy Meal or a Playland visit. 17
Ritzer's critique of American homogeneity is not new.

16 George

(Newbury Park,
17

Ritzer,
The
McDonaldization
of
Society
CA: Pine Forge Press/Sage, 1993), 1.

rbid., 13.
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In 1951, C. Wright Mill's White Collar:

The American Middle

Classes defined the new middle-class as being composed of
culturally cloned automatons, vulnerable to "synthetic
molding at the hands of popular culture.

1118

And in 1956,

William H. Whyte, Jr.'s The Organization Man examined
America's increasing social and cultural tepidity caused, he
believed, by the rise of static corporate and social
bureaucracies. 19

But William Whyte and Ray Kroc saw the

same world differently.

Whyte lamented Americans' exodus to

ranch house suburbia, complete with smiling children,
station wagon, and the family dog.
was America at its best.

But to Ray Kroc, this

It was Kroc's image of America

that McDonald's promoted, but it was an image that, by the
early 1970s, was wearing thin.

America was never the

homogeneously white, middle-class, suburban society that
Kroc envisioned and McDonald's, like most other corporate
advertisers, had disenfranchised millions of urban, ethnic,
working-class, or poor Americans whose own lives were
inadequately represented in the advertising.
Stereotyped, by Ritzer among many others, for its rigid
conformity, McDonald's was actually quite flexible in
response to these realizations.

After Ray Kroc's death,

many of McDonald's "sacred cows" were sacrificed to customer
18

c. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle
Classes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), xvi.
19 william

City, NY:

H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man· (Garden
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), 3, 313-16.
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demands.

Telephones, uniformly banned by the McDonald

brothers and Ray Kroc, have become a practical addition to
McDonald's units, especially those along highways or in
tollway oases.

The 1950s teen culture, which both the

brothers and Kroc disdained, have been resurrected in
various "Rock 'n Roll" units, one even ironically hosting a
"Friday-Nite Cruise-In" with hot rodding automobiles. 20
And in the ultimate reversal of its history, one can even
find hot dogs on a McDonald's menu. 21
But McDonald's impact is felt far beyond eating.

The

same homogeneity and rationalization originally typified by
a McDonald's has filtered to newspapers, medical care,
cinemas, education, and sports.

USA TODAY, known for its

short, often shallow news snippets, has been derided as a
"McPaper."

Drive-in health clinics have become "McDoctors"

and "McDentists." 22

The ubiquitous prefix "Mc," which

Cooper and Golin had coined to create instant brand
recognition for McDonald's, continues to accomplish its
original aim, but now in an unexpectedly negative light.
The "Mc" prefix denotes disdain and derision, even
20

"Presenting
'Nostalgia'
McDonald's,"
promotional
flyer for Gurnee Mills McDonald's, Gurnee, Illinois, April,
1993; Jeff Cole, "You Deserve to Rock Today; McDonald's to
be 'Solid Gold,'" Milwaukee Sentinel, 12 March 1992, sec. D,
1. One of the most notable McDonald's using the 1950s theme
is in downtown Chicago.
21 one

of the larger units offering
Woodfield Mall, Schaumburg, Illinois.
22 Ritzer, McDonaldization of Society,

hot
4.

dogs

is

in
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bemusement, yet it is that same prefix that McDonald's
itself has applied to children, "McKids."
McDonald's, as an archetype of corporate America's
influence on society, has claimed American children as its
own.

Numerous critics, most notably Action for Children's

Television, have decried this trend as pernicious and have
lobbied to ban all television advertising directed at
children.

They are wrong.

Although well-intentioned, these

advocates miss the fact that children still save over forty
cents out of every dollar they earn (see Figure 4).
critics ignore an even more important reality.

And the

Child

consumerism is an unavoidable and legitimate outgrowth of
American capitalism.

All children are socialized into the

dominant ideology of their culture; for twentieth century
American children, this means consumerism.

One hundred

years ago, the most common way of participating in the
American economy was as a producer, and children were no
exception.

Since then, the development of mass production

has introduced consumer goods into every economic stratum.
Beginning with radio, then television, and ultimately, with
Disney and McDonald's, children have fulfilled the
capitalist promise.

Consumption has filtered down from

teenagers, to preteens, and now, to preschoolers and
toddlers.

In both the 1930s and the 1950s, this process of

creating the "consumer of tomorrow" was seen as a source of
American strength.

That it is being questioned now implies
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Fig. 4.
1991 Spending, Children Aged 4-12.
In 1991,
children saved 40 cents of every dollar they earned,
compared to an adult savings rate of only 5.2 cents per
dollar. Valerie Reitman, "Those Little Kids Have Big
Pockets," Wall Street Journal, 26 August 1992, sec. B, 1;
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1992 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1992), table 682, p. 434.
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ambivalence towards the capitalist legacy and its future
course.
McDonald's, however, seems undisturbed by the broader
ambiguity of its relationship to children.

Heeding the

capitalist imperative to sell more hamburgers, McDonald's
continues to rely upon children for a third of its sales,
and has recently broadened its children's fare to include a
breakfast Happy Meal, changing yet another family eating
pattern.

Ronald McDonald continues to learn new languages,

open more Ronald McDonald Houses, and star in new
commercials.

And children continue to flock to Ronald's

"house" as McDonald's, and American capitalism, plots its
next conquest, "McWorld. 1123

2311 McWorld"

its

most

1993).

recent

is the tagline that McDonald's is using in
children's advertising campaign (October

APPENDIX

GIVING SOMETHING BACK: A SAMPLING OF MCDONALD'S
CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 24

Goal:

"To extend McDonald's leadership position and enhance
its quality image by creative, newsworthy execution
of programs and activities that demonstrate community
commitment and involvement. 1125

PROGRAM

DESCRIPTION

DIRECT SPONSORSHIP:
Ronald McDonald House

residential facility for
families with seriously
ill children

Ray A. Kroc Youth Achievement
Award

awarded to junior- and
high school students
who exemplify Ray
Kroc's principles

All-American High School Band
All-American Jazz Band

elite marching and jazz
bands composed of
students from all fifty
states and the District
of Columbia

All-American Basketball Team

showcases high school
athletes

24 This

Appendix only reflects McDonald's corporate
philanthropy and does not include the donations or sponsored
programs initiated by individual owner/operators.
25 "McDonald's

Public Relations Department,"
brochure (1987), McDonald's Corporation Archives.
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publicity
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Draw America

Hispanic Heritage Art Contest

a creative arts program
for ages three through
eight, in conjunction
with Crayola, Inc.
aimed at grades 1-6

Congressional Hispanic Caucus
Institute/High School Internship
Program

sponsors students
as Congressional aides

Literary Achievement Award

recognizes AfricanAmerican writers

Gospel Fest

sponsors African-American
choral competition

Academic, Cultural, Technological, scholastic competition
and Scientific Olympics
for African-American
students
"His Light Still Shines"

travelling exhibit on
Martin Luther King

McDonald's American Cup

gymnastics competition

Hispanic Artists' Exhibit

highlights Hispanic
artists

McDonald's Sidekick Soccer

ages seven through
sixteen

What's in a Name:
Astronaut Program

science program/cosponsored with Young
Astronaut Council

Young

ON-GOING CONTRIBUTOR:
American Council for the Arts
American Dental Association
American Dietetic Association
Big Brothers/Big Sisters
Boy Scouts/Girl Scouts
Boys Club/Girls Club
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Citizens for a Better Environment
Day Care Council of America
Junior Olympics
Muscular Dystrophy Association
Museum of Science and Industry (Chicago)
NAACP
National 4-H
National Future Homemaker's Association
National Hispanic Scholarship Fund
National Parents Teachers Association (PTA)
National Urban League
Operation PUSH
Special Olympics
United Negro College Fund
World Gymnastic Championships
World Youth Soccer Championships
YMCA

CURRICULUM MATERIALS:
Title

Description

Moving/Learning Action Pack

primary grades/physical
education

Nutrition Action Pack

grades 1-4

Ecology Action Pack

grades 4-6

Career Action Pack

grades 6-9

Learn to Study/Learn to Read

grades 6-9/reading skills
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watch Out for the Other Guy

bicycle/water safety

Fit and Fun: Fitness Fun
with Ronald McDonald

grades K-4/physical
education

Wecology

recycling/ co-sponsored
with World Wildlife
Fund

Mecology

ages 6-12/ecology

Lif etrack

grades 4-12/physical
education and nutrition

Get It Straight

drug awareness program

Plan to Get Out Alive

emphasizes home fire
safety

Home Safe Home

emphasizes home fire
safety

Bicycles R Beautiful

emphasizes bike safety

Star Reader Kit

reading skills

Sources:

"McDonald's Public Relations Department," brochure
(1987); "McDonald's Contributions Report, 1977,"
21-24; "McDonald' Community Service and Social
Investment Report, 1981-1982," 8-12; "Presence
Builds Preference: Communications Department,"
brochure (May 1986), 11-12; "Growing Up Together:
McDonald's and Children," in "McDonald's Giving:
A Commitment to Our Communities" (June 1988), 1116; "McDonald's 1985 Catalog of Educational
Resources" (1985). McDonald's Corporation
Archives.
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